Yeon-Koo Che
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Yeon-Koo |
| last: |
Che |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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University of Wisconsin-Madison
/ Economics Department (weight: 50%)
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Columbia University
/ School of Arts and Sciences
/ Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Bidding with Securities: Comment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:4:p:1929-35)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim - Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:1:p:399-410)
by Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda - Pandering to Persuade (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:1:p:47-79)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Wouter Dessein & Navin Kartik - Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:2:p:585-623)
by Eric Budish & Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima & Paul Milgrom - Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:8:p:2993-3029)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Konrad Mierendorff - Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: The Wald Problem with Ambiguity (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:114:y:2024:i:2:p:426-61)
by Sarah Auster & Yeon-Koo Che & Konrad Mierendorff - Caps on Political Lobbying (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:3:p:643-51)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L - Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:1:p:125-147)
by Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che - Optimal Incentives for Teams (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:3:p:525-541)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo - Optimal Design of Research Contests (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:3:p:646-671)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale - Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:1355-1360)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale - Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:4:p:1-34)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Rajiv Sethi - Expanding "Choice" in School Choice (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:1:p:1-42)
by Atila Abdulkadiro?lu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda - Disclosure and Legal Advice (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:188-225)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov - Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching (RePEc:aea:aerins:v:2:y:2020:i:4:p:425-42)
by Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux - Performance-Based Pricing for Nucleaer Power Plants (RePEc:aen:journl:1995v16-04-a03)
by Yeon-Koo Che and Geoffrey Rothwell - The Optimal Mechanism For Selling To Budget-Constrained Consumers (RePEc:ags:uwssri:292704)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:194)
by Sarah Auster & Yeon-Koo Che & Konrad Mierendorff - Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention (RePEc:arx:papers:1812.06967)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Konrad Mierendorff - Weak Monotone Comparative Statics (RePEc:arx:papers:1911.06442)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim & Fuhito Kojima - Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion (RePEc:arx:papers:2003.07338)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Konrad Mierendorff - Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets (RePEc:arx:papers:2004.11531)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Weijie Zhong - Bailout Stigma (RePEc:arx:papers:2006.05640)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Chongwoo Choe & Keeyoung Rhee - "Near" Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima (RePEc:arx:papers:2008.10819)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim & Fuhito Kojima & Christopher Thomas Ryan - Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods (RePEc:arx:papers:2105.02828)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong - Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents (RePEc:arx:papers:2207.13939)
by Georgy Artemov & Yeon-Koo Che & YingHua He - Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity (RePEc:arx:papers:2208.14121)
by Sarah Auster & Yeon-Koo Che & Konrad Mierendorff - Optimal Queue Design (RePEc:arx:papers:2307.07746)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Leveraging Uncertainties to Infer Preferences: Robust Analysis of School Choice (RePEc:arx:papers:2309.14297)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Dong Woo Hahm & YingHua He - Section 365 : mandatory bankruptcy rules and inefficient continuation (RePEc:att:wimass:199812)
by Che,Y.K. & Schwartz,A. - Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions (RePEc:att:wimass:19986)
by Che,Y.K. & Gale,I. - Optimal incentives for teams (RePEc:att:wimass:19988)
by Che,Y.K. & Yoo,S.W. - A dynamic theory of holdup (RePEc:att:wimass:200125)
by Che,Y.-K. & Sakovics,J. - Know thy enemies : knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions (RePEc:att:wimass:20019)
by Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J. - Contractual remedies to the holdup problem : a dynamic perspective (RePEc:att:wimass:20043)
by Che,Y.-K. & Sakovics,J. - Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms (RePEc:att:wimass:20044)
by Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J. - Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions : an experiment (RePEc:att:wimass:20066)
by Andreoni,J. & Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J. - The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation (RePEc:att:wimass:9120)
by Che, Y.K. & Yi, J.G. - Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions (RePEc:att:wimass:9123)
by Che, Y.K. - The Economics of Collective Negociation: Consolidation of Claims by Multiple Plaintiffs (RePEc:att:wimass:9212)
by Che, Y.K. - Adverse Selection in Class Action Suits (RePEc:att:wimass:9229)
by Che, Y.K. - "Revolving Doors" and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion (RePEc:att:wimass:9301)
by Che, Y.K. - The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers (RePEc:att:wimass:9415)
by Che, Y.K. & Gale, I., - The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers (RePEc:att:wimass:9415r)
by Che, Y.K. & Gale, I. - Optimal Use of Information Litigation: Should Regulatory Information be Withheld to Deter Frivolus Suits? (RePEc:att:wimass:9501)
by Che, Y.K. & Earnhart, D. - Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods (RePEc:att:wimass:9509)
by Che, Y.K. - Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments (RePEc:att:wimass:9524)
by Che, Y.K. & Chung, T.Y. - Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition (RePEc:att:wimass:9527)
by Che, Y.K. - Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting: Coase vs Williamson (RePEc:att:wimass:9608)
by Che, Y.K. & Hausch, D.B. - The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers (RePEc:att:wimass:9609)
by Che, Y.K. & Gale, I. - Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting (RePEc:att:wimass:9714)
by Che, Y.K. & Hausch, D.B. - Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:6:y:1997:i:1:p:175-200)
by Yeon‐Koo Che & Ian Gale - Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:44:y:1996:i:1:p:17-24)
by Che, Yeon-Koo - The role of lockups in takeover contests (RePEc:bla:randje:v:38:y:2007:i:3:p:648-669)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Tracy R. Lewis - Strategic judgment proofing (RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:926-948)
by Yeon‐Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier - Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: The Wald Problem With Ambiguity (RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_366)
by Sarah Auster & Yeon-Koo Che & Konrad Mierendorff - Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Care through Liability and Regulation (RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:7:y:2016:i:3:p:279-303:n:5)
by Che Yeon-Koo - Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2002:i:1:n:3)
by Che Yeon-Koo - The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:6:y:2009:i:9:n:5)
by Che Yeon-Koo & Hendershott Terrence - Privacy Regulation and Targeted Advertising: Evidence from Apple’s App Tracking Transparency (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10928)
by Guy Aridor & Yeon-Koo Che - Expanding “Choice” in School Choice (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000062)
by Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda - Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000293)
by James Andreoni & Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim - Pandering to Persuade (RePEc:cla:levrem:661465000000000163)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Wouter Dessein & Navin Kartik - Pandering to Persuade (RePEc:cla:levrem:661465000000000197)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Wouter Dessein & Navin Kartik - Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000474)
by James Andreoni & Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim - Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001049)
by Yeon Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001059)
by Yeon Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001065)
by Yeon Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Optimal Design for Social Learning (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001075)
by Yeon Koo Che & Johannes Horner - Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types (RePEc:cla:najeco:784828000000000012)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale - Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11904)
by Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick - Pandering to Persuade (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7970)
by Dessein, Wouter & Che, Yeon-Koo & Kartik, Navin - Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1677)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima - Optimal Design for Social Learning (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2000)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Johannes Horner - Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2013)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2014)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2015)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (RePEc:duk:dukeec:10-23)
by Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda - A Dynamic Theory of Holdup (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:4:p:1063-1103)
by Yeon-Koo Che & József Sákovics - Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:74:y:2006:i:4:p:1063-1107)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim - Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:5:p:1625-1672)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima - Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network‐Flow Approach (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:81:y:2013:i:6:p:2487-2520)
by Yeon‐Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim & Konrad Mierendorff - Optimal Design of Research Contests (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1784)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale - Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective (RePEc:edn:esedps:100)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics - The Hold-up Problem (RePEc:edn:esedps:142)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics - A Dynamic Theory of Holdup (RePEc:edn:esedps:74)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics - Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:52-54)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo & Lewis, Tracy R. - Buy-in through goldplating : The effect of defense profit policy on quality determination (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:45:y:1994:i:3:p:397-405)
by Che, Yeon-Koo - Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:50:y:1996:i:3:p:373-379)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - How to divide the possession of a football? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:561-565)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Hendershott, Terrence - Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1 (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:4-6:p:947-957)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:20-43)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Choi, Syngjoo & Kim, Jinwoo - Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:30:y:2000:i:1:p:22-43)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999) (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:195-205)
by Che, Yeon-Koo - Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:383-397)
by Kim, Jinwoo & Che, Yeon-Koo - Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:2:p:240-259)
by Andreoni, James & Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo - Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:31:y:2013:i:5:p:659-665)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian & Kim, Jinwoo - Optimal collusion-proof auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:565-603)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo - Efficient assignment with interdependent values (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:158:y:2015:i:pa:p:54-86)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo & Kojima, Fuhito - Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:178:y:2018:i:c:p:398-435)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Condorelli, Daniele & Kim, Jinwoo - The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:92:y:2000:i:2:p:198-233)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - Equilibrium formation of class action suits (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:62:y:1996:i:3:p:339-361)
by Che, Yeon-Koo - Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result (RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9402)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale - Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03544026)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey - Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01631682)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02087847)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03029897)
by Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux - Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01631682)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02087847)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03029897)
by Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux - The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:549-576)
by Yeon-Koo Che - Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:92:y:1997:i:1-2:p:109-26)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - Brave New World of Market Design (RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20110630-27-1-02)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Erin Cho - Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_127:plsad_2.0.tx_2-d)
by Yeon-Koo Che - Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_4:eptsda_2.0.tx_2-g)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier - Bailout Stigma (RePEc:mos:moswps:2015-26)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Chongwoo Choe & Keeyoung Rhee - Bailout Stigma (RePEc:mos:moswps:2018-10)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Chongwoo Choe & Keeyoung Rhee - Strategic Judgment Proofing (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14183)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier - Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23265)
by Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux - The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26900)
by Guy Aridor & Yeon-Koo Che & Tobias Salz - Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3634)
by A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che - Expanding "Choice" in School Choice (RePEc:ngi:dpaper:08-17)
by Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda - To Trade, or not to Trade, that is the Question: New Roles for Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Settings (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:19:y:2021:i:3:p:1621-1655.)
by Yeon-Koo Che & József Sákovics - Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:441-67)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Schwartz, Alan - The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:399-424)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Yi, Jong Goo - Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:133:y:2018:i:2:p:871-925.)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Johannes Hörner - Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders (RePEc:oup:restud:v:65:y:1998:i:1:p:1-21.)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale - Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents (RePEc:oup:restud:v:80:y:2013:i:1:p:73-107)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale & Jinwoo Kim - Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation
[Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations] (RePEc:oup:restud:v:88:y:2021:i:5:p:2149-2178.)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey - Opinion as Incentives (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6094)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Kartik, Navin - Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6095)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6097)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6098)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo - Strategic Judgment Proofing (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6100)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn - Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6101)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Severinov, Sergei - Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6102)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian - How to Divide the Possession of a Football? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6103)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Hendershott, Terrence - Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6104)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn - Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation (RePEc:rje:randje:v:22:y:1991:i:winter:p:562-570)
by A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che - Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions (RePEc:rje:randje:v:24:y:1993:i:winter:p:668-680)
by Yeon-Koo Che - Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion (RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:autumn:p:378-397)
by Yeon-Koo Che - Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Should Regulatory Information Be Withheld to Deter Frivolous Suits? (RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:spring:p:120-134)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Dietrich Earnhart - Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments (RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:spring:p:84-105)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Tai-Yeong Chung - Competitive Procurement with Corruption (RePEc:rje:randje:v:35:y:2004:1:p:50-68)
by Roberto Burguet & Yeon-Koo Che - Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:358)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey - Caps on Political Lobbying (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_19)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale - Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types (RePEc:the:publsh:157)
by , & , - Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets (RePEc:the:publsh:2793)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Tercieux, Olivier - Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation (RePEc:tse:wpaper:30793)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick - Legal Advice and Evidence with Bayesian and non-Bayesian Adjudicators (RePEc:ubc:pmicro:sergei_severinov-2015-24)
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Severinov, Sergei - Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents (RePEc:ucp:jpemic:doi:10.1086/722978)
by Georgy Artemov & Yeon-Koo Che & YingHua He - Decentralized College Admissions (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/688082)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Youngwoo Koh - Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/701791)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux - Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/722985)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Konrad Mierendorff - Opinions as Incentives (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:117:y:2009:i:5:p:815-860)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Navin Kartik - Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments (RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9603)
by Che, Y.K. & Chung, Y.T. - Notes on the Microfoundations of Monetary Economics (RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9612)
by Laidler, D. - Stable Matching in Large Economies (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:87:y:2019:i:1:p:65-110)
by Yeon‐Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim & Fuhito Kojima - Caps on Political Lobbying (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9809003)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale - Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm94)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz - Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach (RePEc:zur:econwp:031)
by Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim & Konrad Mierendorff