Pierpaolo Battigalli

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Affiliations

• Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi → Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER)
  • website
  • location: Milano, Italy

Research profile

author of:

• An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano
• Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games.
  by Battigalli, P. & Bonanno, G.
• RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY
  by Pierpaolo Battigali & Giacomo Bonanno
• Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli
• Rationalizable Bidding in General First-Price Auctions
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi
• International agreements on product standards: an incomplete-contracting theory
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi
• International agreements on product standard: an incomplete contracting theory
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi
• Imperfect Contracting
  by P. Battigalli & G. Maggi
• Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi
• On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Joel Watson
• Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi
• Editors' note
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo
• Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo
• Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano
• Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo
• Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano
• On Rationalizability in Extensive Games
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo
• Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo
• Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo
• Editors' Note
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo
• Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano
• Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo
• A Note on Stochastic Independence without Savage-Null Events
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Veronesi, Pietro
• An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi
• Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction
  by P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi
• Rationalization and Incomplete Information
  by P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi
• Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli
• Dynamic Psychological Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg
• Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano
• Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction.
  by Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M.
• Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games.
  by Battigalli, P.
• Four textbooks on game theory
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Calzi, Marco Li
• Buyer Power and Quality Improvement
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Chiara Fumagalli & Michele Polo
• Buyer Power and Quality Improvements
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Fumagalli, Chiara & Polo, Michele
• Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi
• Buyer power and quality improvements
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Fumagalli, Chiara & Polo, Michele
• Guilt in Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg
• Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano
• Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta
• Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi
• Dynamic psychological games
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin
• Context-Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Amanda Friedenberg
• Rationalization and Incomplete Information
  by Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano
• Forward induction reasoning revisited
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Friedenberg, Amanda
• Strategies and interactive beliefs in dynamic games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Dov Samet
• The Logic of Belief Persistence
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo
• On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
  by J. Watson & P. Battigalli
• Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Andrea Prestipino
• Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
  by Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio
• Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci
• Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty
  by P. Battigalli & S. Cerreia-Vioglio & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci
• Analysis of Information Feedback and Selfconfirming Equilibrium
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci
• Deception: The Role of Guilt
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg
• Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game
  by Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni
• Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game
  by Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni
• Mixed Extensions of Decision Problems under Uncertainty
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci
• Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
  by Battigalli Pierpaolo & Prestipino Andrea
• Deception: The role of guilt
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin
• Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in a Trust Game
  by Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Rosemarie Nagel
• A note on comparative ambiguity aversion and justi?fiability
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci
• Frustration and Anger in Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg & Alec Smith
• Frustration and Anger in Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg & Alec Smith
• A Framework for the Analysis of Self-Confi rming Policies
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Thomas Sargent
• Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game
  by Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni
• A Note on Comparative Ambiguity Aversion and Justifiability
  by P. Battigalli & S. Cerreia‐Vioglio & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
  by Battigalli, P. & Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M.
• Learning and Self-confi rming Long-Run Biases
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alejandro Francetich & Giacomo Lanzani & Massimo Marinacci
• M&A negotiations with limited information: how do opaque firms buy and get bought?
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Carlo Chiarella & Stefano Gatti & Tommaso Orlando
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
  by PIERPAOLO BATTIGALLI
• Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Gabriele Beneduci & Pietro Tebaldi
• Mixed extensions of decision problems under uncertainty
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci
• Ambiguity Attitudes and Self-Confirming Equilibrium in Sequential Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Emiliano Catonini & Giacomo Lanzani & Massimo Marinacci
• Frustration and Anger in the Ultimatum Game: An Experiment
  by Chiara Aina & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Astrid Gamba
• Belief-dependent Preferences and Reputation: Experimental Analysis of a Repeated Trust Game
  by Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni & Rosemarie Nagel
• Sources of Uncertainty and Subjective Prices
  by V. Cappelli & S. Cerreia-Vioglio & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci & S. Minardi
• Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Fabrizio Panebianco & Paolo Pin
• Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Fabrizio Panebianco & Paolo Pin
• Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
  by Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni & Rosemarie Nagel
• RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY
  by Giacomo Bonanno & Pierpaolo Battigalli
• THE LOGIC OF BELIEF PERSISTENCY
  by Giacomo Bonanno & Pierpaolo Battigalli
• Beliefs, Plans, and Perceived Intentions in Dynamic Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Nicodemo De Vito
• Epistemic Game Theory without Types Structures: An Application to Psychological Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Roberto Corrao & Federico Sanna
• Incorporating Belief-Dependent Motivation in Games Psychological game theory (PGT), introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989) and significantly generalized by Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2009), extends the standard gametheoretic framework by letting players' utility at endnodes depend on their interactive beliefs. While it is understood that a host of applications that model and/or test the role of emotional and other psychological forces find their home in PGT, the framework is abstract andcomprises complex mathematical objects, such as players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Thus,PGT provides little guidance on how to model specific belief-dependent motivations and usethem in game theoretic analysis. This paper takes steps to fill this gap. Some aspects are simplified - e.g., which beliefs matter - but others are refined and brought closer to applications by providing more structure. We start with belief-dependent motivations and showhow to embed them in game forms to obtain psychological games. We emphasize the role oftime and of the perception of players' intentions. We take advantage of progress made on the foundations of game theory to expand and improve on PGT solution concepts.JEL classification:C72; C73; D81; D82; D92Keywords:Psychological game theory; Belief-dependent motivation; Intentions; Time;Rationalizability; Self-confirming equilibrium; Bayesian sequential equilibrium
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Roberto Corrao & Martin Dufwenberg
• Psychological Game Theory
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg
• Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
  by Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M.
• Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi
• Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin & Smith, Alec
• Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Paolo Leonetti & Fabio Maccheroni
• Learning and self-confirming long-run biases
  by Battigalli, P. & Francetich, A. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M.
• Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Paolo Leonetti & Fabio Maccheroni
• Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Dufwenberg, Martin
• Dynamic Psychological Games
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg
• Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
  by Attanasi, Giuseppe & Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Manzoni, Elena & Nagel, Rosemarie
• Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Sanna, Federico
• Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures
  by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Leonetti, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio
• Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory
  by Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg
• Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment
  by Aina, Chiara & Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Gamba, Astrid