Marco Battaglini
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Battaglini |
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Cornell University
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:9:p:2858-71)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey - Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:3:p:637-658)
by Marco Battaglini - Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:1:p:118-149)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:1:p:201-36)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:2:p:194-200)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:4:p:268-308)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey - Social Networks in Policy Making (RePEc:anr:reveco:v:11:y:2019:p:473-494)
by Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini - The Political Economy of Public Debt (RePEc:anr:reveco:v:3:y:2011:p:161-189)
by Marco Battaglini - A Political Economy Theory Of Fiscal Policy And Unemployment (RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:14:y:2016:i:2:p:303-337)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.4:y:2004:i:1:n:1)
by Battaglini Marco - Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Public Investment (RePEc:cca:wpaper:142)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000914)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey - A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001094)
by Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate - Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000205)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000760)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey - A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt (RePEc:cla:najeco:321307000000000026)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers (RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000048)
by Marco Battaglini - Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1262)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The Swing Voter’s Curse in the laboratory (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1263)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The dynamics of distributive politics (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1273)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10788)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R & Nunnari, Salvatore - Optimal Dynamic Contracting: the First-Order Approach and Beyond (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10956)
by Battaglini, Marco & Lamba, Rohit - The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11356)
by Battaglini, Marco & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi & Lai, Ernest - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11357)
by Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R - Self-Control and Peer Groups: An Empirical Analysis (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11563)
by Patacchini, Eleonora & Battaglini, Marco & Diaz, Carlos - Influencing Connected Legislators (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11571)
by Battaglini, Marco & Patacchini, Eleonora - The Political Economy of Weak Treaties (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11713)
by Battaglini, Marco & Harstad, BÃ¥rd - Effectiveness of Connected Legislators (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12796)
by Battaglini, Marco & Leone Sciabolazza, Valerio & Patacchini, Eleonora - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13097)
by Nunnari, Salvatore & Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R - Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13581)
by Battaglini, Marco - Tax Professionals: Tax-Evasion Facilitators or Information Hubs? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13656)
by Battaglini, Marco & Guiso, Luigi & Lacava, Chiara & Patacchini, Eleonora - Endogenous Social Connections in Legislatures (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13845)
by Patacchini, Eleonora & Battaglini, Marco & Rainone, Edoardo - Professional Interactions and Hiring Decisions: Evidence from the Federal Judiciary (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14370)
by Battaglini, Marco & Harris, Jorgen & Patacchini, Eleonora - Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14385)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Patacchini, Eleonora - A Graphical Lasso Approach to Estimating Network Connections: The Case of U.S. Lawmakers (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15041)
by Battaglini, Marco & Crawford, Forrest & Patacchini, Eleonora & Peng, Sida - Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15270)
by Battaglini, Marco & Leone Sciabolazza, Valerio & Patacchini, Eleonora - Chaos and Unpredictability in Dynamic Social Problems (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15662)
by Battaglini, Marco - Refining Public Policies with Machine Learning: The Case of Tax Auditing (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17796)
by Battaglini, Marco & Guiso, Luigi & Lacava, Chiara & Miller , Douglas L. & Patacchini, Eleonora - Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17951)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R - Logrolling in Congress (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18111)
by Battaglini, Marco & Leone Sciabolazza, Valerio & Patacchini, Eleonora - Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19102)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R - Unobserved Contributions and Political Influence: Evidence from the Death of Top Donors (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19195)
by Battaglini, Marco & Leone Sciabolazza, Valerio & Lin, Mengwei & Patacchini, Eleonora - Self Control in Peer Groups (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3149)
by Tirole, Jean & Bénabou, Roland & Battaglini, Marco - Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3611)
by Bénabou, Roland & Battaglini, Marco - Joint Production in Teams (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4702)
by Battaglini, Marco - Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5014)
by Battaglini, Marco - Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5291)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R & Morton, Rebecca - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5458)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R & Morton, Rebecca - Cheap Talk with Multiple Audiences: an Experimental Analysis (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8146)
by Battaglini, Marco & Makarov, Uliana - A Dynamic theory of electoral competition (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8633)
by Battaglini, Marco - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:cso:wpaper:0019)
by Marci Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey - Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:101:y:2007:i:03:p:409-424_07)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas - Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:106:y:2012:i:02:p:407-429_00)
by Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:106:y:2012:i:04:p:908-909_00)
by Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:113:y:2019:i:01:p:55-76_00)
by Battaglini, Marco & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi - When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power? (RePEc:cup:jexpos:v:2:y:2015:i:02:p:139-151_00)
by Battaglini, Marco & Mechtenberg, Lydia - A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt (RePEc:ecl:corcae:07-04)
by Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:ecl:prirpe:03-13-2006)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas - Sequential Voting with Abstention (RePEc:ecl:prirpe:05-19-2004)
by Battaglini, Marco - Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis (RePEc:ecl:prirpe:08-09-2005)
by Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen - Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:ecl:prirpe:09-19-2005c)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas - Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:4:p:1379-1401)
by Marco Battaglini - Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1557)
by Marco Battaglini - Sequential voting with abstention (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:51:y:2005:i:2:p:445-463)
by Battaglini, Marco - Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:60:y:2007:i:2:p:213-246)
by Battaglini, Marco - Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:147-164)
by Battaglini, Marco & Makarov, Uliana - Self-control and peer groups: An empirical analysis (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:134:y:2017:i:c:p:240-254)
by Battaglini, Marco & Díaz, Carlos & Patacchini, Eleonora - Self-control in peer groups (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:123:y:2005:i:2:p:105-134)
by Battaglini, Marco & Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean - Joint production in teams (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:130:y:2006:i:1:p:138-167)
by Battaglini, Marco - Fiscal policy over the real business cycle: A positive theory (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2223-2265)
by Barseghyan, Levon & Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen - Political economy of debt and growth (RePEc:eee:moneco:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:36-51)
by Barseghyan, Levon & Battaglini, Marco - The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:136:y:2016:i:c:p:45-61)
by Azzimonti, Marina & Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen - Pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:844-868)
by Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen - Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining (RePEc:eie:wpaper:1902)
by Marco Battaglini - Tax Professionals:Tax-Evasion Facilitators or Information Hubs? (RePEc:eie:wpaper:1904)
by Marco Battaglini & Luigi Guiso & Chiara Lacava & Eleonora Patacchini - Self-Control in peer Groups (RePEc:fth:priwpu:217)
by Benabou, R. & Battaglini, M. - Self-Control in Peer Groups (RePEc:ide:wpaper:602)
by Battaglini, Marco & Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean - Should we trust banks when they sit on the board of directors? (RePEc:igi:igierp:117)
by Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Battaglini - Il vantaggio di bussare due volte: contratti bancari ed usura, diritti di proprietà, valore della garanzia e della rinegoziazione (RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/1990:y:2000:i:3:p:415-444)
by Donato Masciandaro & Marco Battaglini - Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests (RePEc:nad:wpaper:20200039)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Eleonora Patacchini - Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10119)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11495)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12100)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - Fiscal Policy over the Real Business Cycle: A Positive Theory (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14047)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - Fiscal Policy and Unemployment (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17562)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17926)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas Palfrey - Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18585)
by Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad - Political Economy of Debt and Growth (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21660)
by Marco Battaglini & Levon Barseghyan - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22406)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey - Influencing Connected Legislators (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22739)
by Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini - The Political Economy of Weak Treaties (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22968)
by Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad - Effectiveness of Connected Legislators (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24442)
by Marco Battaglini & Valerio Leone Sciabolazza & Eleonora Patacchini - Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25664)
by Marco Battaglini - Tax Professionals: Tax-Evasion Facilitators or Information Hubs? (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25745)
by Marco Battaglini & Luigi Guiso & Chiara Lacava & Eleonora Patacchini - Endogenous Social Connections in Legislatures (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25988)
by Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini & Edoardo Rainone - Professional Interactions and Hiring Decisions: Evidence from the Federal Judiciary (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26726)
by Marco Battaglini & Jorgen M. Harris & Eleonora Patacchini - Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26757)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Eleonora Patacchini - A Graphical Lasso Approach to Estimating Network Connections: The Case of U.S. Lawmakers (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27557)
by Marco Battaglini & Forrest W. Crawford & Eleonora Patacchini & Sida Peng - Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27822)
by Marco Battaglini & Valerio Leone Sciabolazza & Eleonora Patacchini - Chaos and Unpredictability in Dynamic Social Problems (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28347)
by Marco Battaglini - Refining Public Policies with Machine Learning: The Case of Tax Auditing (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30777)
by Marco Battaglini & Luigi Guiso & Chiara Lacava & Douglas L. Miller & Eleonora Patacchini - Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30991)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey - Logrolling in Congress (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31169)
by Marco Battaglini & Valerio Leone Sciabolazza & Eleonora Patacchini - Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32473)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey - Unobserved Contributions and Political Influence: Evidence from the Death of Top Donors (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32649)
by Marco Battaglini & Valerio Leone Sciabolazza & Mengwei Lin & Eleonora Patacchini - Welfare in the Volunteer’s Dilemma (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32999)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis (RePEc:ntw:wpaper:1601)
by Battaglini, Marco & Lai, Ernest K & Wooyoung Lim & Joseph Tao-yi Wang - Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1295)
by Marco Battaglini - A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1441)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - The Dynamics of Distributive Politics (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1451)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey - The Costs and Benefits of Balanced Budget Rules: Lessons from a Political Economy Model of Fiscal Policy (RePEc:nys:sunysb:15-03)
by Marina Azzimonti & Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - A Political Economy Theory of Fiscal Policy and Unemployment (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:14:y:2016:i:2:p:303-337.)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:18:y:2020:i:4:p:1969-2012.)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R Palfrey - Public Protests and Policy Making (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:132:y:2017:i:1:p:485-549.)
by Marco Battaglini - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:oup:restud:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:61-89)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey - Endogenous Social Interactions with Unobserved Networks (RePEc:oup:restud:v:89:y:2022:i:4:p:1694-1747.)
by Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini & Edoardo Rainone - On the Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (RePEc:pra:mprapa:25935)
by Marina, Azzimonti & Marco, Battaglini & Stephen, Coate - Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:pri:cepsud:121)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey - When do conflicting parties share political power? An experimental study (RePEc:pri:metric:057-2014)
by Marco Battaglini & Lydia Mechtenberg - Cheap Talk with Multiple Audiences: an Experimental Analysis (RePEc:pri:metric:wp012_2011_battaglin_makarov.pdf)
by Marco Battaglini & Uliana Makarov - The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis (RePEc:pri:metric:wp021_2011_battaglini_nunnari_pafrey.pdf)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas Palfrey - Growth and fiscal policy: a positive theory (RePEc:pri:metric:wp041_2012_barseghyan_battaglini.pdf)
by Levon Barseghyan & Marco Battaglini - Optimal Dynamic Contracting (RePEc:pri:metric:wp046_2012_battaglini_lamba_optm_dyn_contract_10october2012_short.pdf)
by Marco Battaglini & Rohit Lamba - The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:pri:metric:wp048_2012_battaglini_nunnari_palfrey_dyn_free_rider.pdf)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. R. Palfrey - Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities (RePEc:red:sed004:140)
by Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini - Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis (RePEc:red:sed005:209)
by Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini - A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt (RePEc:red:sed007:573)
by Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini - Starving the Leviathan: a Dynamic Analysis of Fiscal Constitutions (RePEc:red:sed007:641)
by Marina Azzimonti & Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - Starving the Leviathan: a dynamic analysis of Balanced Budget Rules (RePEc:red:sed008:539)
by Stephen Coate & M. Battaglini & Monica Azzimonti - On the Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (RePEc:red:sed009:131)
by Marco Battaglini - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A General Equilibrium Approach (RePEc:red:sed011:1444)
by Marco Battaglini & Levon Barseghyan - The dynamics of distributive politics (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:739-777)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey - A dynamic theory of electoral competition (RePEc:the:publsh:1328)
by , - Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond (RePEc:the:publsh:2355)
by Battaglini, Marco & Lamba, Rohit - Trust, Coordination, and the Industrial Organization of Political Activism (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:1:y:2003:i:4:p:851-889)
by Marco Battaglini & Roland Bénabou - The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:2-3:p:367-380)
by Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate - Interactions with Powerful Female Colleagues Promote Diversity in Hiring (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/720392)
by Marco Battaglini & Jorgen M. Harris & Eleonora Patacchini - Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/684478)
by Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad - Influencing Connected Legislators (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/700074)
by Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini - The Political Economy of Weak Treaties (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/704610)
by Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad - Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/716105)
by Marco Battaglini - Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/729580)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey - Effectiveness of Connected Legislators (RePEc:wly:amposc:v:64:y:2020:i:4:p:739-756)
by Marco Battaglini & Valerio Leone Sciabolazza & Eleonora Patacchini - Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment (RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2011205)
by Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas