Manuel Amador
Names
| first: |
Manuel |
| last: |
Amador |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (weight: 1%)
-
University of Minnesota
/ Department of Economics (weight: 49%)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
/ Research Department (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Tariff Revenue and Tariff Caps (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:3:p:459-65)
by Manuel Amador & Kyle Bagwell - Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:101-06)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath - Self-Fulfilling Debt Dilution: Maturity and Multiplicity in Debt Models (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:9:p:2783-2818)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Expropriation Dynamics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:2:p:473-79)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath - Reputation and Partial Default (RePEc:aea:aerins:v:5:y:2023:i:2:p:158-72)
by Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan - Exchange Rate Policies at the Zero Lower Bound (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11928)
by Perri, Fabrizio & Amador, Manuel & Bocola, Luigi & Bianchi, Javier - Commitment vs. Flexibility (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:74:y:2006:i:2:p:365-396)
by Manuel Amador & Iván Werning & George-Marios Angeletos - The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:81:y:2013:i:4:p:1541-1599)
by Manuel Amador & Kyle Bagwell - Reverse speculative attacks (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:72:y:2016:i:c:p:125-137)
by Amador, Manuel & Bianchi, Javier & Bocola, Luigi & Perri, Fabrizio - Money burning in the theory of delegation (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:121:y:2020:i:c:p:382-412)
by Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle - Sovereign Debt (RePEc:eee:intchp:4-647)
by Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel - Learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:3:p:910-940)
by Amador, Manuel & Weill, Pierre-Olivier - Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:161:y:2016:i:c:p:37-75)
by Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel - A contraction for sovereign debt models (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:842-875)
by Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel - Efficient expropriation: sustainable fiscal policy in a small open economy (RePEc:fip:fedbwp:06-9)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath - Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:511)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath - Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:518)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Reverse Speculative Attacks (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:528)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi & Luigi Bocola & Fabrizio Perri - Reputation and Sovereign Default (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:564)
by Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan - Self-Fulfilling Debt Dilution: Maturity and Multiplicity in Debt Models (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:565)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Micro Risks and Pareto Improving Policies with Low Interest Rates (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:92826)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Cristina Arellano - Pareto Improving Fiscal and Monetary Policies: Samuelson in the New Keynesian Model (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:96368)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Cristina Arellano - Exchange Rate Policies at the Zero Lower Bound (RePEc:fip:fedmwp:740)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi & Luigi Bocola & Fabrizio Perri - Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing (RePEc:fip:fedmwp:93466)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi - Helicopter Drops and Liquidity Traps (RePEc:fip:fedmwp:95949)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi - Expropriation Dynamics (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11987997)
by Gopinath, Gita & Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel - Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11988004)
by Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel & Gopinath, Gita - Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions (RePEc:hrv:faseco:12559514)
by Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel & Farhi, Emmanuel & Gopinath, Gita - Commitment Vs. Flexibility (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10151)
by Manuel Amador & Ivan Werning & George-Marios Angeletos - Efficient Fiscal Policy and Amplification (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11490)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath - Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13353)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath - Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14255)
by Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill - Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15194)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17457)
by Mark A. Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Sovereign Debt: A Review (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19388)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Crisis and Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to Sovereign Debt Crises (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19516)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath - Take the Short Route: How to Repay and Restructure Sovereign Debt with Multiple Maturities (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19717)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20277)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath - Reverse Speculative Attacks (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22298)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi & Luigi Bocola & Fabrizio Perri - Take the Short Route: Equilibrium Default and Debt Maturity (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22847)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Hugo Hopenhayn & Iván Werning - Exchange Rate Policies at the Zero Lower Bound (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23266)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi & Luigi Bocola & Fabrizio Perri - Reputation and Sovereign Default (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24682)
by Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan - Self-Fulfilling Debt Dilution: Maturity and Multiplicity in Debt Models (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24683)
by Mark A. Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Micro Risks and (Robust) Pareto Improving Policies (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28996)
by Mark A. Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Cristina Arellano - Reputation and Partial Default (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28997)
by Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan - Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29397)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi - Helicopter Drops and Liquidity Traps (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31046)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi - Pareto Improving Fiscal and Monetary Policies: Samuelson in the New Keynesian Model (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31297)
by Mark A. Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Cristina Arellano - Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:2:p:651-697)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:130:y:2015:i:4:p:1727-1779)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath - Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang (RePEc:oup:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:1:p:1-31)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath - Exchange Rate Policies at the Zero Lower Bound (RePEc:oup:restud:v:87:y:2020:i:4:p:1605-1645.)
by Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi & Luigi Bocola & Fabrizio Perri - On the Welfare Losses from External Sovereign Borrowing (RePEc:pal:imfecr:v:68:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1057_s41308-019-00103-2)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Stelios Fourakis - Learning from Private and Public Observation of Other's Actions (RePEc:pra:mprapa:109)
by Amador, Manuel & Weill, Pierre-Olivier - Efficient Expropriation: Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy (RePEc:pri:econom:2006-2)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath - Crisis and Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to Sovereign Debt Crises (RePEc:pri:econom:2013-4)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath - Micro Risks and Pareto Improving Policies (RePEc:pri:econom:2022-10)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Cristina Arellano - Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions (RePEc:qsh:wpaper:142521)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath - Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions (RePEc:qsh:wpaper:165301)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath - A Political Model Sovereign Debt Repayment (RePEc:red:sed004:762)
by Manuel Amador - Commitment vs. Flexibility (RePEc:red:sed004:87)
by Manuel Amador & George-Marios Angeletos & Ivan Werning - Fiscal Policy Amplified Shocks in Emerging Markets (RePEc:red:sed005:229)
by Gita Gopinath & Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Learning by Matching (RePEc:red:sed006:373)
by Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill - Sovereign Debt and the Tragedy of the Commons (RePEc:red:sed007:1000)
by Manuel Amador - Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt (formerly Efficient Expropriation) (RePEc:red:sed007:239)
by Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath & Mark Aguiar - Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare (RePEc:red:sed008:390)
by Manuel Amador & Pierre Olivier Weill - Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation (RePEc:red:sed010:1194)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - Growth dynamics in a small open economy under political economy frictions (RePEc:red:sed011:1363)
by Manuel Amador & Mark Aguiar - Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies (RePEc:red:sed011:527)
by Manuel Amador & Mark Aguiar - Take the Short Route: How to repay and restructure sovereign debt with multiple maturities (RePEc:red:sed014:165)
by Manuel Amador & Mark Aguiar - Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions (RePEc:red:sed015:1337)
by Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath & Emmanuel Farhi & Mark Aguiar - Sustainable Exchange Rates (RePEc:red:sed016:1396)
by Luigi Bocola & Javier Bianchi & Fabrizio Perri & Manuel Amador - Maturity and Multiplicity in Sovereign Debt Models (RePEc:red:sed016:1693)
by Manuel Amador & Mark Aguiar - Reputation and Sovereign Default (RePEc:red:sed017:1167)
by Christopher Phelan & Manuel Amador - Optimal Reserve Management at the Zero Lower Bound (RePEc:red:sed017:1269)
by Luigi Bocola & Javier Bianchi & Fabrizio Perri & Manuel Amador - On the Welfare Losses from External Sovereign Borrowing (RePEc:red:sed019:435)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Stelios Fourakis - Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation (RePEc:sip:dpaper:08-051)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador - A note on interval delegation (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:6:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-017-0133-4)
by Manuel Amador & Kyle Bagwell & Alex Frankel - Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers (RePEc:the:publsh:4691)
by Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle - Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/657923)
by Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill - Take the Short Route: Equilibrium Default and Debt Maturity (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:87:y:2019:i:2:p:423-462)
by Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Hugo Hopenhayn & Iván Werning - Reputation and Sovereign Default (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:4:p:1979-2010)
by Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan