רועי זולטן

Names

Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• Ben Gurion University of the Negev / Economics Department
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Strategic And Social Preplay Communication In The Ultimatum Game (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1107)
  by Roi Zultan
• See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1108)
  by Roi Zultan & Eva-Maria Steiger
• Timing of Messages and the Aumann Conjecture: A multiple-Selves Approach (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1109)
  by Roi Zultan
• Job Search Costs And Incentives (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1307)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan
• Social Motives In Intergroup Conflict (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1308)
  by Ori Weisel & Ro'i Zultan
• Can Higher Rewards Lead To Less Effort? Incentive Reversal In Teams (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1309)
  by Esteban Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan
• Auctions And Leaks: A Theoretical And Experimental Investigation (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1404)
  by Sven Fischer & Werner Guth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan
• Punishment and Reward Institutions with Harmed Minorities (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1405)
  by Sagi Dekel & Sven Fischer & Ro’i Zultan
• Auction Mechanisms And Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals And Selection (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1406)
  by Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan
• The Effect Of Economic Cycles On Job Satisfaction In A Two-Sector Economy (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1605)
  by Ro’i Zultan & Oded Ravid & Miki Malul
• Information Aggregation in Arrow-Debreu Markets: An Experiment (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1807)
  by Ro’i Zultan & Todd R. Kaplan & Lawrence Choo
• Manipulation And (Mis)Trust In Prediction Markets (RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2012)
  by Lawrence Choo & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro’i Zultan
• Auctions With Leaks About Early Bids: Analysis And Experimental Behavior (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:59:y:2021:i:2:p:722-739)
  by Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan
• Leveraging Wage Subsidies to Facilitate Fair Wages and Increase Social Welfare (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6597)
  by Tomer Blumkin & Haim Pinhas & Ro'i Zultan
• Reputation and Cooperation in Defence (RePEc:cge:wacage:53)
  by Hugh Jones, David & Zultan, Ro'i
• Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002199)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan
• Job Market Signalling and Job Search (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002301)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan
• Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002411)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan
• Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less E ort? Incentive Reversal in Teams (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000073)
  by Esteban F. Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan
• Collusion and Information Revelation in Auctions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11944)
  by Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro'i
• Beyond Value: on the Role of Superficial Characteristics in Demand for Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18743)
  by Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Oliveros, Santiago & Zultan, Ro'i
• The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05c90021)
  by Carsten Schmidt & Ro'i Zultan
• The bad consequences of teamwork (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:160:y:2017:i:c:p:12-15)
  by Soraperra, Ivan & Weisel, Ori & Zultan, Ro’i & Kochavi, Sys & Leib, Margarita & Shalev, Hadar & Shalvi, Shaul
• Wage Subsidies and Fair Wages (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:127:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120301240)
  by Blumkin, Tomer & Pinhas, Haim & Zultan, Ro’i
• Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:90:y:2016:i:c:p:122-133)
  by Weisel, Ori & Zultan, Ro׳i
• Collusion and information revelation in auctions (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:95:y:2017:i:c:p:84-102)
  by Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i
• The effect of economic cycles on job satisfaction in a two-sector economy (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:138:y:2017:i:c:p:1-9)
  by Ravid, Oded & Malul, Miki & Zultan, Ro’i
• Can higher rewards lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:97:y:2014:i:c:p:72-83)
  by Klor, Esteban F. & Kube, Sebastian & Winter, Eyal & Zultan, Ro’i
• Perceptions of conflict: Parochial cooperation and outgroup spite revisited (RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:167:y:2021:i:c:p:57-71)
  by Weisel, Ori & Zultan, Ro’i
• Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game (RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:33:y:2012:i:3:p:425-434)
  by Zultan, Ro’i
• Costly superstitious beliefs: Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:69:y:2018:i:c:p:30-43)
  by Bayer, Ya'akov M. & Ruffle, Bradley J. & Shtudiner, Zeev & Zultan, Ro'i
• See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:109:y:2014:i:c:p:1-12)
  by Steiger, Eva-Maria & Zultan, Ro'i
• Potential Pareto Public Goods (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:146:y:2017:i:c:p:87-96)
  by Dekel, Sagi & Fischer, Sven & Zultan, Ro’i
• Incentives, mission and productivity (RePEc:eee:soceco:v:91:y:2021:i:c:s2214804321000082)
  by Ravid, Oded & Malul, Miki & Zultan, Ro’i
• Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment (RePEc:esi:discus:2004-35)
  by Carsten Schmidt & Ro'i Zultan
• Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - (RePEc:esi:discus:2005-18)
  by Ben Greiner & Ro’i Zultan & Werner Güth
• Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:1-15:d:10959)
  by M. Vittoria Levati & Ro’i Zultan
• Examining the Generalizability of Research Findings from Archival Data (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04452695)
  by A. Delios & E.G. Clemente & T. Wu & H. Tan & Y. Wang & M. Gordon & D. Viganola & Z. Chen & A. Dreber & M. Johannesson & T. Pfeiffer & E.L. Uhlmann & A.M.A. Al-Aziz & A.T. Abraham & J. Trojan & M. Adam
• Corporate Social Responsibility as a Signal in the Labor Market (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04726664)
  by Eldar Dadon & Marie Claire Villeval & Ro'I Zultan
• Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp369)
  by Carsten Schmidt & Ro`i Zultan
• Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp396)
  by Ben Greiner & Werner Guth & Ro’i Zultan
• Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signaling (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp483)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan
• Job Market Signaling and Job Search (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp488)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan
• Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp511)
  by M. Vittoria Levati & Ro'i Zultan
• When Being Wasteful is Better than Feeling Wasteful (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp550)
  by Ro'i Zultan & Maya Bar-Hillel & Nitsan Guy
• We sing the praise of good displays: How gamblers bet in casino roulette (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp585)
  by Maya Bar-Hillel & Ro`i Zultan
• Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3959)
  by Goerg, Sebastian J. & Kube, Sebastian & Zultan, Ro'i
• Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5501)
  by Klor, Esteban F. & Kube, Sebastian & Winter, Eyal & Zultan, Ro'i
• Unknown item RePEc:jdm:journl:v:5:y:2010:i:7:p:489-496 (article)
• Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-029)
  by M. Vittoria Levati & Ro'i Zultan
• Imperfect Recall and Time Inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver "paradox" (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-035)
  by Vittoria M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro'i Zultan
• Social Communication and Discrimination: A Video Experiment (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-038)
  by Ben Greiner & Werner Güth & Ro'i Zultan
• Brothers in Arms: Cooperation in Defence (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-064)
  by David Hugh-Jones & Ro'i Zultan
• When being wasteful appears better than feeling wasteful (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-002)
  by Ro'i Zultan & Maya Bar-Hillel & Nitsan Guy
• See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-040)
  by Eva-Maria Steiger & Ro'i Zultan
• Social motives in intergroup conflict (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-033)
  by Ori Weisel & Ro'i Zultan
• Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-027)
  by Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan
• Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2017-012)
  by Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan
• Social communication and discrimination: a video experiment (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:3:p:398-417)
  by Ben Greiner & Werner Güth & Ro’i Zultan
• Information aggregation in Arrow–Debreu markets: an experiment (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:22:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-017-9548-x)
  by Lawrence Choo & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro’i Zultan
• Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - (RePEc:kls:series:0018)
  by Ben Greiner & Werner GÑŒth & Ro'i Zultan
• Job Market Signaling and Job Search (RePEc:kse:dpaper:10)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan
• The uncontrolled social utility hypothesis revisited (RePEc:mnh:spaper:2642)
  by Schmidt, Carsten & Zultan, Ro'i
• Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection (RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2014_18)
  by Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro'i Zultan
• Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation (RePEc:pra:mprapa:58940)
  by Fischer, Sven & Guth, Werner & Kaplan, Todd & Zultan, Roi
• Job Search Costs and Incentives (RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:693)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan
• Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection (RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:734)
  by Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan
• Unknown item RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp693 (paper)
• Unknown item RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp734 (paper)
• Reputation and Cooperation in Defense (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:57:y:2013:i:2:p:327-355)
  by David Hugh-Jones & Ro’i Zultan
• Job search costs and incentives (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-019-00176-2)
  by Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro’i Zultan
• Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:4:p:789-800)
  by Ro’i Zultan
• Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox” (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:65-88)
  by M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro’i Zultan
• Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation, and Production Technology (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:28:y:2010:i:4:p:747-772)
  by Sebastian J. Goerg & Sebastian Kube & Ro'i Zultan
• Humans reciprocate intentional harm by discriminating against group peers (RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2017_03)
  by David Hugh-Jones & Itay Ron & Ro'i Zultan
• Costly Superstitious Beliefs: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:0114)
  by Ya’akov M. Bayer, Bradley J. Ruffle, Ze’ev Shtudiner, Ro’i Zultan
• Time preferences of older people with mild cognitive impairment (RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:0115)
  by Y. Bayer, B.J. Ruffle, R. Zultan, T. Dwolatzky
• The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited (RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:05-29)
  by Schmidt, Carsten & Zultan, Ro´i
• Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:172007)
  by Goerg, Sebastian J. & Kube, Sebastian & Zultan, Ro'i
• Manipulation and (mis)trust in prediction markets (RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:122019)
  by Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zultan, Ro'i