Charles Zheng

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Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• University of Western Ontario / Department of Economics
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Goethe's secret reserve price (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:12:y:2016:i:1:p:41-48)
  by Charles Z. Zheng
• The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:21)
  by Zheng Charles Zhoucheng
• Optimal Auction with Resale (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:6:p:2197-2224)
  by Charles Zhoucheng Zheng
• Collusion via Resale (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:77:y:2009:i:4:p:1095-1136)
  by Rodney J. Garratt & Thomas Trˆger & Charles Z. Zheng
• Optimal search auctions (RePEc:ecm:nasm04:615)
  by Charles Zhoucheng Zheng & Jacques Cremer & Yossef Spiegel
• Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0296)
  by Charles Zheng
• Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:93:y:2006:i:1:p:94-100)
  by Cremer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Z.
• Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:648-664)
  by Zheng, Charles Z.
• High Bids and Broke Winners (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:100:y:2001:i:1:p:129-171)
  by Zheng, Charles Z.
• Optimal search auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:226-248)
  by Cremer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Core equivalence theorem with production (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:137:y:2007:i:1:p:246-270)
  by Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:135-166)
  by Zheng, Charles Z.
• Bidding collusion without passive updating (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:85:y:2019:i:c:p:70-77)
  by Zheng, Charles Z.
• Optimal Search Auctions (RePEc:ide:wpaper:5301)
  by Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Z.
• Optimal Selling Mechanisms wth Costly Information Acquisition (RePEc:ide:wpaper:611)
  by Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Z.
• Optimal Search Auctions (RePEc:isu:genres:12662)
  by Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types (RePEc:isu:genres:12663)
  by Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Optimal Auction with Resale (RePEc:isu:genres:12664)
  by Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• High Bids and Broke Winners (RePEc:isu:genres:12665)
  by Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Application of Mechanism Design to Electric Power Markets (RePEc:isu:genres:12686)
  by Silva, Carlos & Wollenberg, Bruce & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Core Equivalence Theorem with Production (RePEc:isu:genres:12697)
  by Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions (RePEc:isu:genres:12698)
  by Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition (RePEc:isu:genres:12709)
  by Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Stochastic Blocking and Core Convergence in Nonconvex Production Economies (RePEc:isu:genres:12711)
  by Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Collusion Via Resale (RePEc:isu:genres:12829)
  by Garratt, Rod & Troger, Thomas & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Interactive Blocking in Arrow-Debreu Economies (RePEc:isu:genres:12882)
  by Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• A Coase Theorem Based on a New Concept of the Core (RePEc:isu:genres:13051)
  by Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan (RePEc:isu:genres:13056)
  by Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Debt- Versus Equity-Financing in Auction Designs (RePEc:isu:genres:31517)
  by Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Stochastic blocking and core convergence in nonconvex production economies (RePEc:isu:genstf:200701210800001177)
  by Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Interactive blocking in Arrow-Debreu economies (RePEc:isu:genstf:200811020700001162)
  by Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• A Coase Theorem based on a new concept of the core (RePEc:isu:genstf:201005140700001134)
  by Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Debt- versus equity-financing in auction designs (RePEc:isu:genstf:201005220700001110)
  by Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1282)
  by Charles Z. Zheng
• An Optimal Auction When Resale Cannot Be Prohibited (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1303)
  by Charles Zheng
• Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1420)
  by Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng
• Optimal Search Auctions (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1421)
  by Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng
• Corrigendum to “Core equivalence theorem with production†[J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007) 246–270] (RePEc:spa:wpaper:2022wpecon13)
  by David Turchick & Siyang Xiong & Charles Z. Zheng
• Auctions with costly information acquisition (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:38:y:2009:i:1:p:41-72)
  by Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng
• Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:75:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-022-01442-4)
  by Mingshi Kang & Charles Z. Zheng
• Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:52:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-022-00815-2)
  by Fredrik Ødegaard & Charles Z. Zheng
• Existence of Monotone Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Resale (RePEc:uwo:epuwoc:20141)
  by Charles Z. Zheng