H. Peyton Young

Names

first:	H.
middle:	Peyton
last:	Young

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

pyo43

Contact

homepage:

http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/young

Affiliations

Government of the United States / Department of the Treasury / Office of Financial Research (weight: 50%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Oxford University / Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:1:p:253-66)
by Young, H Peyton
Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:3:p:559-573)
by H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke
Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:1899-1924)
by H. Peyton Young
The Economics of Convention (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:10:y:1996:i:2:p:105-22)
by H. Peyton Young
Optimal Voting Rules (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:51-64)
by Peyton Young
Fair Representation in the European Parliament (RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:20:y:1982:i:4:p:361-373)
by M. L. BALINSKI & H. P. Young
Hedge Fund Wizards (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:5:y:2008:i:2:n:1)
by Foster Dean P. & Young H. Peyton
Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run (RePEc:cla:levarc:494)
by Peyton Young & Dean Foster
Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000676)
by Dean P Foster & Peyton Young
The Nucleolus as a Noncooperative Game Solution (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:478)
by Martin Shubik & H. Peyton Young
A Note on Preference Aggregation (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:42:y:1974:i:6:p:1129-31)
by Young, H Peyton
Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:4:p:757-65)
by Young, H Peyton
The Evolution of Conventions (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:1:p:57-84)
by Young, H Peyton
Individual learning and social rationality1 (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:651-663)
by Peyton Young, H.
Social norms and economic welfare1 (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:821-830)
by Peyton Young, H.
On the limits to rational learning (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:4-5:p:791-799)
by Young, H. Peyton
Cost allocation (RePEc:eee:gamchp:2-34)
by Young, H.P.
Introduction (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:103-110)
by Sigmund Karl & Young H. Peyton
Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:330-363)
by Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton
On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:1:p:79-96)
by Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton
Cooperation in the long-run (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:145-156)
by Peyton Young, H. & Foster, Dean
Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:1:p:50-96)
by Kaniovski, Yuri M. & Kryazhimskii, Arkadii V. & Young, H. Peyton
Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:73-96)
by Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton
Equilibrium selection in bargaining models (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:296-328)
by Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton
Ken Binmore, Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory, Oxford University Press (2007) ISBN 978-0-19-530057-4 639 pp (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:2:p:411-412)
by Young, H. Peyton
Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:382-382)
by Peyton Young, H.
Learning by trial and error (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:626-643)
by Young, H. Peyton
Commentary: John Nash and evolutionary game theory (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:12-13)
by Young, H. Peyton
Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:882-897)
by Pradelski, Bary S.R. & Young, H. Peyton
Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:39-67)
by Kreindler, Gabriel E. & Young, H. Peyton
Social Dynamics: TheorY AND Applications (RePEc:eee:hecchp:2-22)
by Young, H. Peyton
Extending Condorcet's rule (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:16:y:1977:i:2:p:335-353)
by Young, H. P.
Distributive justice in taxation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:44:y:1988:i:2:p:321-335)
by Young, H. P.
An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:59:y:1993:i:1:p:145-168)
by Young H. P.
An axiomatization of Borda's rule (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:9:y:1974:i:1:p:43-52)
by Young, H. P.
Interpreting von neumann model prices as marginal values (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:9:y:1974:i:4:p:449-463)
by Balinski, M. L. & Young, H. P.
Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:213-228)
by Peyton Young, H.
Progressive taxation and the equal sacrifice principle (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:32:y:1987:i:2:p:203-214)
by Young, H. P.
Learning with Hazy Beliefs (RePEc:els:esrcls:023)
by Dean Foster & Peyton Young
The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.50)
by Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & H. Peyton Young
Diffusion in Social Networks (RePEc:fth:brooki:2)
by Young, H.P.
The Emergence of Classes in a Multi-Agent Bargaining Model (RePEc:fth:brooki:9)
by Axtell, R. & Epstein, J.M. & Young, H.P.
Learning in a Black Box (RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-00817201)
by Heinrich H. Nax & Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew & Stuart A. West & H. Peyton Young
On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents (RePEc:jhu:papers:423)
by Dean Foster & H Peyton Young
The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks (RePEc:jhu:papers:437)
by H Peyton Young
Learning Hypothesis Testing and Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:jhu:papers:474)
by Peyton Young
Social Dynamics (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262541769)
by None
The Hedge Fund Game (RePEc:nuf:econwp:0801)
by Peyton Young & Dean P Foster
The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:304)
by H. Peyton Young
Social Norms (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:307)
by H. Peyton Young
Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:480)
by H Peyton Young & Bary S. R. Pradelski
Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:557)
by H Peyton Young & Jason R. Marden and Lucy Y. Pao
A Strategy-Proof Test of Portfolio Returns (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:567)
by H Peyton Young & Dean P. Foster
A Markov Test for Alpha (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:568)
by H Peyton Young & Dean P. Foster and Robert Stine
Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Equilibrium Selection (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:569)
by H Peyton Young & Gabriel E. Kreindler
Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:570)
by Itai Arieli & H Peyton Young
Rapid Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:626)
by H Peyton Young & Gabriel E. Kreindler
The Limits to Compensation in the Financial Sector (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:635)
by H Peyton Young & Thomas Noe
How Likely is Contagion in Financial Networks? (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:642)
by H Peyton Young & Paul Glasserman
The Evolution of Social Norms (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:726)
by H Peyton Young
Strategic Learning and its Limits (RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199269181)
by Young, H. Peyton
The Emergence of Economic Classes in an Agent-based Bargaining Model (RePEc:sce:scecf7:61)
by Robert Axtell, Joshua M. Epstein, & H. Peyton Young
A strategy-proof test of portfolio returns (RePEc:taf:quantf:v:12:y:2012:i:5:p:671-683)
by Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young
Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent (RePEc:the:publsh:199)
by , P. & , Peyton
Learning Equilibria in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations (RePEc:wop:iasawp:ir97017)
by Y.M. Kaniovski & A.V. Kryazhimskii & H.P. Young
On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents (RePEc:wop:safiwp:01-08-039)
by Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young

The profile is maintained by H. Peyton Young

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pyo43/