Lixin Ye
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Affiliations
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Ohio State University
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Orchestrating Information Acquisition (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:4:p:420-65)
by Jingfeng Lu & Lixin Ye & Xin Feng - Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:1:p:142-75)
by Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye - Quality Disclosure And Competition (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:57:y:2009:i:1:p:167-196)
by Dan Levin & James Peck & Lixin Ye - Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Contract Variety (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:64:y:2016:i:1:p:64-108)
by Jian Shen & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye - Collusion through Coordination of Announcements (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:67:y:2019:i:2:p:209-241)
by Joseph E. Harrington & Lixin Ye - Search with learning: understanding asymmetric price adjustments (RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:547-564)
by Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye - Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.4:y:2004:i:1:n:8)
by Ye Lixin - Survival Auctions (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:414)
by Lixin Ye & John Kagel & Svetlana Pevnitska - Bad news can be good news: Early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:3:p:462-467)
by Levin, Dan & Peck, James & Ye, Lixin - Hybrid auctions revisited (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:591-594)
by Levin, Dan & Ye, Lixin - Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:1:p:181-207)
by Ye, Lixin - Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:2:p:697-721)
by Kagel, John & Pevnitskaya, Svetlana & Ye, Lixin - Auctions with entry and resale (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:79:y:2013:i:c:p:92-105)
by Xu, Xiaoshu & Levin, Dan & Ye, Lixin - Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:269-291)
by Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Xu, Xiaoshu & Ye, Lixin - Efficient and optimal mechanisms with radio spectrum sharing (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:60:y:2018:i:c:p:206-227)
by Zhang, Chenglin & Ye, Lixin & Johnson, Joel & Baker, Christopher & Wang, Huaiyi - Reserve price signaling (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:135:y:2007:i:1:p:253-268)
by Cai, Hongbin & Riley, John & Ye, Lixin - Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:393-408)
by Lu, Jingfeng & Ye, Lixin - Spectrum Buyouts:A Mechanism to Open Spectrum(revised December 2003) (RePEc:eti:dpaper:02002)
by IKEDA Nobuo & Lixin YE - Trademark Sales, Entry, And The Value Of Reputation (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:49:y:2008:i:2:p:547-576)
by Howard P. Marvel & Lixin Ye - Note on Optimal Procurement Mechanisms for Assembly (RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:26:y:2024:i:6:p:2231-2236)
by Xi Shan & Lixin Ye & Chenglin Zhang - Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities (RePEc:pra:mprapa:47060)
by Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Xu, Xiaoshu & Ye, Lixin - Survival auctions (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:33:y:2007:i:1:p:103-119)
by John Kagel & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Lixin Ye - Auctions with synergy and resale (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:2:p:397-426)
by Xiaoshu Xu & Dan Levin & Lixin Ye - Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry (RePEc:the:publsh:1944)
by Ye, Lixin & Zhang, Chenglin - Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition (RePEc:the:publsh:336)
by , & , - Deciding Between Competition and Collusion (RePEc:tpr:restat:v:85:y:2003:i:4:p:971-989)
by Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye - Trademark Sales, Entry, And The Value Of Reputation (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:49:y:2008:i:2:p:547-576)
by Howard P. Marvel & Lixin Ye - Competition Versus Collusion in Procurement Auctions: Identification and Testing (RePEc:wop:stanec:01001)
by Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye - Deciding Between Competition and Collusion (RePEc:wop:stanec:01008)
by Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye