Takuro Yamashita
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Takuro |
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Yamashita |
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Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Research profile
author of:
- On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:494-514)
by Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu - Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations (RePEc:aea:apandp:v:112:y:2022:p:444-51)
by Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita - Information Design in Smooth Games (RePEc:arx:papers:2202.10883)
by Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita - Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:29:y:2020:i:1:p:173-186)
by Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita - First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition (RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_377)
by Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu - Information Design in Concave Games (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17066)
by Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro - Information Design in Games: Certification Approach (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18282)
by Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro - Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1247)
by Chia-Hui Chen & Hulya Eraslan & Junichiro Ishida & Takuro Yamashita - Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:2:p:791-801)
by Takuro Yamashita - Maximal miscommunication (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300124)
by Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro - Auction design with heterogeneous priors (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:413-425)
by Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro - Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:267-279)
by Yamashita, Takuro - Order on types based on monotone comparative statics (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:189:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120300776)
by Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro - Revenue-capped efficient auctions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03049103)
by Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita - On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03863573)
by Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu - Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04047796)
by Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita - Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04050661)
by Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita - A mediator approach to mechanism design with limited commitment (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04051960)
by Takuro Yamashita & Niccolò Lomys - Information design in concave games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04141179)
by Takuro Yamashita & Alexey Smolin - Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure (RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-18)
by MORIYA, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利 & YAMASHITA, Takuro & 山下, 拓朗 - A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality (RePEc:osp:wpaper:20e002)
by Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita - Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes (RePEc:osp:wpaper:21e006)
by Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita - Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:18:y:2020:i:3:p:1284-1320.)
by Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita - Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism (RePEc:oup:restud:v:82:y:2015:i:3:p:1223-1246.)
by Takuro Yamashita - Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem (RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:74:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s42973-022-00119-w)
by Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita - Optimal student allocation with peer effects (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:28:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-024-00349-x)
by Roberto Sarkisian & Takuro Yamashita - Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency (RePEc:the:publsh:2275)
by Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro - Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling (RePEc:the:publsh:4663)
by Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Smorodinsky, Rann & Yamashita, Takuro - Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125877)
by Yamashita, Takuro & Sarkisian, Roberto - Type-contingent Information Disclosure (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125878)
by Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang - Optimal Trade Mechanism with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125925)
by Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi - A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125926)
by Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi - Auction Design with Heterogeneous Priors (RePEc:tse:wpaper:126163)
by Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro - First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition (RePEc:tse:wpaper:126165)
by Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang - Information Design in Concave Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:126692)
by Yamashita, Takuro & Smolin, Alex - On the veil-of-ignorance principle: welfare-optimal information disclosure in Voting (RePEc:tse:wpaper:128424)
by Van Der Straeten, Karine & Yamashita, Takuro - Optimal Investment in Network Infrastructures (RePEc:tse:wpaper:129665)
by Bianchi, Milo & Yamashita, Takuro - Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade (RePEc:tse:wpaper:28370)
by Yamashita, Takuro - Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation (RePEc:tse:wpaper:28371)
by Yamashita, Takuro - Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency (RePEc:tse:wpaper:30563)
by Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro - Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32879)
by Yamashita, Takuro - Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32880)
by Yamashita, Takuro - On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32881)
by Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang - Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32882)
by Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro - Revenue-capped efficient auctions (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32883)
by Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro & Yamashita, Takuro - Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32884)
by Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro - Order on Types based on Monotone Comparative Statics (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32885)
by Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro - First best implementation with costly information acquisition (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:22064)
by Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang