Donald Wittman
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Donald |
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Wittman |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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University of California-Santa Cruz (UCSC)
/ Economics Department
Research profile
author of:
- Efficient Rules in Highway Safety and Sports Activity (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:72:y:1982:i:1:p:78-90)
by Wittman, Donald - Nations and States: Mergers and Acquisitions; Dissolutions and Divorce (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:2:p:126-29)
by Wittman, Donald - Is Status Quo Bias Consistent With Downward‐Sloping Demand? (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:46:y:2008:i:2:p:283-288)
by Donald Wittman - The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis and Psychological Advice (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:58:y:2005:i:1:p:121-144)
by Donald Wittman - Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt0r38m12v)
by Wittman, Donald - Is Status Quo Bias Consistent With Downward Sloping Demand? (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt2rk9t2ck)
by Wittman, Donald - Candidate Quality, Pressure Group Endorsements, And The Nature Of Political Advertising (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt2tw043ff)
by Wittman, Donald - Voting on Income Redistribution: How a Little Bit of Altruism Creates Transitivity (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt6x11511s)
by Wittman, Donald - Pressure Groups And Political Advertising: How Uninformed Voters Can Use Strategic Rules Of Thumb (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt7t32483f)
by Wittman, Donald - Litigation With Symmetric Bargaining And Two-Sided Incomplete Information (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt7vj7k9f6)
by Friedman, Daniel & Wittman, Donald - The Organization Of Family Interactions: Minimizing Transaction Costs And Strategic Behavior (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt9xg179zp)
by Wittman, Donald - Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1001)
by Daniel Friedman & Donald Wittman - Parties as Utility Maximizers (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:67:y:1973:i:02:p:490-498_14)
by Wittman, Donald A. - Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:77:y:1983:i:01:p:142-157_24)
by Wittman, Donald - Arms Control Verification and Other Games Involving Imperfect Detection (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:03:p:923-945_08)
by Wittman, Donald - Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions (RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:44:y:2014:i:04:p:717-739_00)
by Wittman, Donald - Various Concepts of Power Equivalence Among Ostensibly Unrelated Approaches (RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:6:y:1976:i:04:p:449-462_00)
by Wittman, Donald - Economic Foundations of Law and Organization (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521685245)
by Wittman,Donald - Economic Foundations of Law and Organization (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521859172)
by Wittman,Donald - Nonmyoptic Equilibria (RePEc:cvs:starer:80-10)
by Brams, Steven J. & Wittman, DOnald - How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:540:p:1324-1343)
by Donald Wittman - Should compensation be based on costs or benefits? (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:5:y:1985:i:2:p:173-185)
by Wittman, Donald - Pigovian taxes which work in the small-number case (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:12:y:1985:i:2:p:144-154)
by Wittman, Donald - Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:14:y:1977:i:1:p:180-189)
by Wittman, Donald - Counter-intuitive results in game theory (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:1:y:1985:i:1:p:77-89)
by Wittman, Donald - Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:2:p:360-378)
by Wittman, Donald - District versus at-large voting: Why district voting results in worse policy for minorities (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:81:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000041)
by Wittman, Donald - Nash equilibrium vs. maximin : A comparative game statics analysis (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:9:y:1993:i:4:p:559-565)
by Wittman, Donald - Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:57:y:1995:i:1:p:67-83)
by Friedman, Daniel & Wittman, Donald - Reply to Caplan: On the Methodology of Testing for Voter Irrationality (RePEc:ejw:journl:v:2:y:2005:i:1:p:22-31)
by Donald Wittman - Second Reply to Caplan: The Power and the Glory of the Median Voter (RePEc:ejw:journl:v:2:y:2005:i:2:p:186-195)
by Donald Wittman - The Economics of Governance (RePEc:elg:eebook:16812)
by None - Normative public finance without guilt: why normative public finance is positive public finance (RePEc:elg:eechap:2805_6)
by Donald Wittman - Final-Offer Arbitration (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:32:y:1986:i:12:p:1551-1561)
by Donald Wittman - Economic Contests with Incomplete Information and Optimal Contest Design (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:34:y:1988:i:4:p:528-540)
by Nirvikar Singh & Donald Wittman - Book Reviews (RePEc:kap:decono:v:152:y:2004:i:1:p:133-145)
by Donald A. Wittman (ed.) - Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property: A diagrammatic exposition (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:365-382)
by Donald Wittman - Cheating and control (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:14:y:1973:i:1:p:137-142)
by Charles Nichols & Donald Wittman - Reviews (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:17:y:1974:i:1:p:115-129)
by Donald Wittman & Bruno Frey & Richard Rosett & Ray Whitman & Gordon Tullock & David Marwick & John Wanat & George Furstenberg & Oran Young - Multi-candidate equilibria (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:43:y:1984:i:3:p:287-291)
by Donald Wittman - Book reviews (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:1:p:93-100)
by Mark Toma & G. Choate & William Mitchell & Michael Munger & Randall Holcombe & Donald Wittman - Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis (RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:5:y:2003:i:1:p:61-93)
by Donald Wittman - Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:23:y:2007:i:1:p:98-126)
by Daniel Friedman & Donald Wittman - The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199548477)
by Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald - Theocracy and the Evolution of Morals (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62006-3_8)
by Donald Wittman - Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games (RePEc:sae:compsc:v:6:y:1981:i:1:p:39-62)
by Steven J. Brams & Donald Wittman - How a War Ends (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:23:y:1979:i:4:p:743-763)
by Donald Wittman - The Wealth and Size of Nations (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:44:y:2000:i:6:p:868-884)
by Donald Wittman - Targeted political advertising and strategic behavior by uninformed voters (RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:9:y:2008:i:1:p:87-100)
by Donald Wittman - What is Wrong with Phelps’s Analysis of the West’s Economies? (RePEc:spr:homoec:v:33:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-016-0015-2)
by Donald Wittman - Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:711-744)
by Nirvikar Singh & Donald Wittman - original papers : Implementation with partial verification (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:1:p:63-84)
by Nirvikar Singh & Donald Wittman - The Power to Propose versus the Power to Oppose (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-73382-9_13)
by Donald A. Wittman - The Peak Income Hypothesis: An Econometric Reinvestigation (RePEc:tpr:restat:v:65:y:1983:i:2:p:358-60)
by Wittman, Donald - The Myth of Democratic Failure (RePEc:ucp:bkecon:9780226904238)
by Wittman, Donald A. - Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections: Comment (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:18:y:1975:i:3:p:735-41)
by Wittman, Donald - The Price of Negligence under Differing Liability Rules (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:29:y:1986:i:1:p:151-63)
by Wittman, Donald - Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit? (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:13:y:1984:i:1:p:57-80)
by Donald Wittman - Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:313-52)
by Wittman, Donald - Learning Liability Rules (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:145-64)
by Wittman, Donald & Friedman, Daniel & Crevier, Stephanie & Braskin, Aaron - Two Views of Procedure (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:3:y:1974:i:1:p:249-256)
by Donald Wittman - Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:6:p:1395-1424)
by Wittman, Donald - Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely? (RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:3:p:588-602)
by Donald Wittman - How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:540:p:1324-1343)
by Donald Wittman