Markus Walzl
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Markus |
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Walzl |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck
/ Fakultät für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik
/ Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie, -politik und -geschichte (weight: 90%)
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Maastricht University
/ School of Business and Economics
/ Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) (weight: 10%)
Research profile
author of:
- The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:aub:autbar:694.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1115)
by Markus Walzl & Flip Klijn - The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:bge:wpaper:296)
by Bettina Klaus & Markus Walzl & Flip Klijn - Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:357)
by Bettina Klaus & Markus Walzl & Flip Klijn - Farsighted House Allocation (RePEc:bge:wpaper:384)
by Bettina Klaus & Markus Walzl & Flip Klijn - Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:385)
by Bettina Klaus & Markus Walzl & Flip Klijn - Why it Pays to Conceal: On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information (RePEc:bla:germec:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:100-123)
by Eberhard Feess & Michael Schieble & Markus Walzl - Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:13:y:2011:i:6:p:921-933)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:115:y:2013:i:2:p:508-548)
by Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl - Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:116:y:2014:i:2:p:570-590)
by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl - Why it Pays to Conceal: On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information (RePEc:bpj:germec:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:100-123)
by Feess Eberhard & Walzl Markus & Schieble Michael - On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2012)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger & Markus Walzl - Where to Look for the Morals in Markets? (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6022)
by Matthias Sutter & Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler & Matthias Stefan & Markus Walzl - Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods (RePEc:cor:louvco:2007061)
by BOCHET, Olivier & KLAUS, Bettina & WALZL, Markus - On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5538)
by Kirchsteiger, Georg & Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Walzl, Markus - On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:120:y:2010:i:543:p:215-243)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger & Markus Walzl - Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:148-150)
by Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus - Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:82:y:2004:i:1:p:77-82)
by Feess, Eberhard & Walzl, Markus - Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:280:y:2020:i:3:p:1108-1121)
by Feess, Eberhard & Grund, Christian & Walzl, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:113:y:2015:i:c:p:1-12)
by Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus - Stochastic stability for roommate markets (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2218-2240)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus - Optimal contracts based on subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity (RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:47:y:2015:i:c:p:62-76)
by Sebald, Alexander & Walzl, Markus - Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:7-8:p:422-434)
by Klaus, Bettina & Walzl, Markus - Farsighted house allocation (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:817-824)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus - A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:84-98)
by Klaus, Bettina & Bochet, Olivier & Walzl, Markus - The Impact of the Irrelevant: Temporary Buy-Options and Bidding Behavior in Auctions (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:7:y:2016:i:1:p:8-:d:64825)
by Ronald Peeters & Martin Strobel & Dries Vermeulen & Markus Walzl - Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-046)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Markus Walzl - Farsighted House Allocation (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-129)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-135)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2011-28)
by Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl - Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2012-15)
by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl - Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2012-16)
by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl - Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2012-17)
by Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl - Competing Trade Mechanisms and Monotone Mechanism Choice (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2014-28)
by Eberhard Feess & Christian Grund & Markus Walzl & Ansgar Wohlschlegel - Stochastic Stability in a Learning Dynamic with Best Response to Noisy Play (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2015-15)
by Christopher Kah & Markus Walzl - Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2016-20)
by Christina Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl - Where to look for the morals in markets? (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2018-18)
by Matthias Sutter & Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler & Matthias Stefan & Markus Walzl - Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-06)
by Matthias Stefan & Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler & Matthias Sutter & Markus Walzl - Differentiation and Risk-Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-15)
by Christina E. Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl - Social Comparison and Optimal Contracts in the Competition for Managerial Talent (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-19)
by Anna Ulrichshofer & Markus Walzl - Customer Disputes, Misconduct, and Reputation Building in the Market for Financial Advice (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-20)
by Anna Ulrichshofer & Markus Walzl - Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13345)
by Stefan, Matthias & Huber, Jürgen & Kirchler, Michael & Sutter, Matthias & Walzl, Markus - Technology Choice and Price Signaling in Markets for Label Credence Goods (RePEc:jku:econwp:2025-11)
by Martin Obradovits & Markus Walzl - Where to look for the morals in markets? (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-019-09608-z)
by Matthias Sutter & Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler & Matthias Stefan & Markus Walzl - Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values (RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:12:y:2005:i:3:p:265-279)
by Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl - Unfair contests (RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:93:y:2008:i:3:p:267-291)
by E. Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser & M. Walzl - How Ego-threats Facilitate Contracts Based on Subjective Evaluations (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0819)
by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl - Subjective Performance Evaluations, Self-esteem, and Ego-threats in Principal-agent Relations (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1018)
by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl - A Dynamic Recontracting Process for Multiple-Type Housing Markets (RePEc:lau:crdeep:10.02)
by Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet & Markus Walzl - Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2020-0044)
by Christina E. Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl - Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200606)162:2_277:haos_2.0.tx_2-6)
by Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl - Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201012)166:4_573:edofri_2.0.tx_2-v)
by Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl - Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect (RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_10)
by Matthias Stefan & Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler & Matthias Sutter & Markus Walzl - The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent-Model (RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:57:y:2005:i:1:p:29-45)
by Eberhard Feess & Sonja Ossig & Markus Walzl - Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01312-3)
by Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl & Christopher Kah - On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/149586)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger & Markus Walzl - An analysis of corporte leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004037)
by Feess, E. & Walzl, M. - Panel unit root tests in the presence of cross-1 sectional dependencies: comparison and implications for medelling (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004039)
by Palm, F.C. & Gengenbach, C. & Urbain, J.R.Y.J. - When should principals acquire verifiable information? (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004047)
by Feess, E. & Schieble, M. & Walzl, M. - Unfair contests (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004048)
by Feess, E. & Muehlheusser, G. & Walzl, M. - Strategic delegation in oligopoly : the market share case (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004049)
by Jansen, T.L. & van Lier, A. & van Witteloostuijn, A. - The communication complexity of private value single item auctions (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004050)
by Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P.J.J. & Müller, R.J. & Vermeulen, A.J. - On the evolution of market institutions: the platform design paradox (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006004)
by Alos-Ferrer, C. & Kirchsteiger, G. & Walzl, M. - Why it pays to conceal - on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006020)
by Feess, E. & Walzl, M. - Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006042)
by Klaus, B.E. & Walzl, M. - The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007012)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Walzl, M. - Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007018)
by Bochet, O.L.A. & Klaus, B.E. & Walzl, M. - Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007019)
by Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Vorsatz, M. & Walzl, M. - The impact of the irrelevant - Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in online auctions (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007027)
by Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Strobel, M. & Vermeulen, A.J. & Walzl, M. - Truth, trust, and sanctions: on institutional selection in sender-receiver games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007034)
by Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Vorsatz, M. & Walzl, M. - Stochastic stability for roommate markets (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008010)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Walzl, M. - Quid-pro-quo or winner-takes-it-all? : an analysis of corporate leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008057)
by Feess, E. & Walzl, M. - When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:142002)
by Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Walzl, Markus