Cédric Wasser
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Cédric |
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Wasser |
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Affiliations
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Universität Basel
/ Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum
Research profile
author of:
- Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:622-64)
by Stefan Terstiege & Cédric Wasser - Efficient resolution of partnership disputes (RePEc:bla:randje:v:54:y:2023:i:4:p:543-569)
by Daniel Fershtman & Béla Szabadi & Cédric Wasser - Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures (RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_034)
by Stefan Terstiege & Cédric Wasser - Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6274)
by Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser - On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:211-214)
by Seel, Christian & Wasser, Cédric - Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:104:y:2018:i:c:p:22-37)
by Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric - Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:138:y:2023:i:c:p:90-111)
by Wasser, Cédric & Zhang, Mengxi - Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:350-368)
by Wasser, Cédric - Buyer-optimal extensionproof information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118303570)
by Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric - Experiments versus distributions of posteriors (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:125:y:2023:i:c:p:58-60)
by Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric - A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:2:p:180-182)
by Wasser, Cédric - Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:1:p:239-268)
by Cédric Wasser - Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships (RePEc:the:publsh:2608)
by Loertscher, Simon & Wasser, Cédric - Signaling in Auctions among Competitors (RePEc:trf:wpaper:293)
by Scarpatetti, Benedikt von & Wasser, Cédric - Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:trf:wpaper:311)
by Wasser, Cédric - Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests (RePEc:trf:wpaper:331)
by Wasser, Cédric - Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests (RePEc:zbw:rwirep:524)
by Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric - Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships (RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113112)
by Wasser, Cédric & Loertscher, Simon