Michael Waldman

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Affiliations

• Cornell University / Johnson Graduate School of Management
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Performance, Career Dynamics, and Span of Control (RePEc:aah:aarhec:2013-02)
  by Valerie Smeets & Michael Waldman & Frederic Warzynski
• Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:75:y:1985:i:3:p:326-40)
  by Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael
• Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:5:p:1345-51)
  by Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael
• Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:84:y:1994:i:3:p:482-97)
  by Waldman, Michael
• Task-Specific Human Capital (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:2:p:203-207)
  by Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman
• Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:12:y:2020:i:1:p:125-55)
  by Michael Waldman & Ori Zax
• Self-Reported Signaling (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:3:p:78-117)
  by Thomas Jungbauer & Michael Waldman
• Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:1:p:230-55)
  by Hodaka Morita & Michael Waldman
• Why Tie a Product Consumers Do Not Use? (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:3:p:85-105)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman
• Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:17:y:2003:i:1:p:131-154)
  by Michael Waldman
• Mergers In Durable-Goods Industries: A Re-Examination Of Market Power And Welfare Effects (RePEc:bep:alecam:1038)
  by Ari Gerstle & Michael Waldman
• The total compensation gap, wage gap and benefit gap between workers with and without a disability (RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:60:y:2022:i:1:p:3-31)
  by Kevin F. Hallock & Xin Jin & Michael Waldman
• Optimal Copyright Length And Ex Post Investment: A Mickey Mouse Approach (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:2:p:1101-1122)
  by Nodir Adilov & Michael Waldman
• Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:13:y:2004:i:2:p:273-302)
  by Hodaka Morita & Michael Waldman
• Standard promotion practices versus up‐or‐out contracts (RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:2:p:301-325)
  by Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman
• Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1306)
  by Michael Waldman
• Optimal Pricing Given Transaction Costs: The Case of Reserve Versus General Admission Seating (RePEc:cla:uclawp:284)
  by Michael Waldman
• Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency (RePEc:cla:uclawp:286)
  by Michael Waldman
• Interpreting Real World Contracts: An Investigation of Ex Post Mutually Beneficial Agreements (RePEc:cla:uclawp:290)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• The Social Welfare Consequences of Limiting Nonexcludability: An Analytical Approach (RePEc:cla:uclawp:295)
  by Ian Novos & Michael Waldman
• Why Bad Wokers Receive Raises (RePEc:cla:uclawp:301)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity (RePEc:cla:uclawp:303)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• Limited Collusion and Entry Deterence (RePEc:cla:uclawp:306)
  by Michael Waldman
• Rational Expectations in the Aggregate (RePEc:cla:uclawp:327)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• The Pros and Cons of Renegotiation (RePEc:cla:uclawp:338)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview (RePEc:cla:uclawp:348)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• The Role of Integrity in Economic Interaction (RePEc:cla:uclawp:350)
  by Michael Waldman
• Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem (RePEc:cla:uclawp:364)
  by Michael Waldman
• Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption (RePEc:cla:uclawp:370)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• Information on Worker Ability: An Analysis of Inverstment Within the Firm (RePEc:cla:uclawp:375)
  by Michael Waldman
• Limited Rationality and Synergism: The IMplications for Macroeconomics (RePEc:cla:uclawp:389)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• The Role of Altruism in Economic Interaction (RePEc:cla:uclawp:391)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma (RePEc:cla:uclawp:402)
  by Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman
• Complementarity and Partial Nonexcludability: An Analysis of the Software/Computer Market (RePEc:cla:uclawp:403)
  by Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman
• The Emergence of Copying Technologies: What Have We Learned (RePEc:cla:uclawp:408)
  by Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman
• Border Enforcement Versus Internal Enforcement: A Study in the Economics of Illegal Migration (RePEc:cla:uclawp:443)
  by Sule Ozler & Michael Waldman
• Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why (RePEc:cla:uclawp:456)
  by Michael Waldman
• What Would Darwin Say About Rational Expectations? (RePEc:cla:uclawp:478)
  by Michael Waldman
• Interpreting Evidence on Returns to Tenure: The Significance of Quasi-Specific Human Capital (RePEc:cla:uclawp:479)
  by Michael Waldman
• The Simple Case of Entry Deterrence Reconsidered (RePEc:cla:uclawp:517)
  by Michael Waldman
• Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic (RePEc:cla:uclawp:532)
  by Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman
• Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective (RePEc:cla:uclawp:556)
  by Michael Waldman
• The New Perspective on Keynesian Coordination Failure: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:cla:uclawp:559)
  by Seongwan Oh & Michael Waldman
• Keynesian Coordination Failure and Persistence (RePEc:cla:uclawp:570)
  by Seonghwan Oh & Michael Waldman
• A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles (RePEc:cla:uclawp:599)
  by Michael Waldman
• Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and Bundling (RePEc:doj:eagpap:200801)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman
• Standard Promotion Practices vs Up-Or-Out Contracts (RePEc:ecj:ac2004:132)
  by Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman
• Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:101:y:1991:i:408:p:1085-1102)
  by Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael
• Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of Tying (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:122:y:2012:i:561:p:675-706)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman
• Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further theory and experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:188-208)
  by Cooper, Kristen B. & Schneider, Henry S. & Waldman, Michael
• Information on worker ability : An analysis of investment within the firm (RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:4:y:1989-1990:i:1:p:57-80)
  by Waldman, Michael
• Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:31:y:2013:i:3:p:198-210)
  by Waldman, Michael
• The role of altruism in economic interaction (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:21:y:1993:i:1:p:1-15)
  by Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael
• Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:31:y:1996:i:3:p:419-429)
  by Waldman, Michael
• Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence (RePEc:eee:labchp:3-36)
  by Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael
• The dual avenues of labor market signaling (RePEc:eee:labeco:v:41:y:2016:i:c:p:120-134)
  by Waldman, Michael
• Mergers in durable-goods industries: A re-examination of market power and welfare effects (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:70:y:2016:i:4:p:677-692)
  by Gerstle, Ari D. & Waldman, Michael
• Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further evidence from a pricing game (RePEc:eee:soceco:v:90:y:2021:i:c:s2214804320306753)
  by Cooper, Kristen & Schneider, Henry & Waldman, Michael
• Returns to Tenure; Conceptual and Empirical Issues (RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:23:y:1997:i:3:p:337-345)
  by Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman
• The Index of Leading Economic Indicators as a Source of Expectational Shocks (RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:75-95)
  by Seonghwan Oh & Michael Waldman
• Learning in Labour Markets (RePEc:elg:eebook:17336)
  by None
• Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes (RePEc:elg:eebook:3898)
  by None
• What limits indirect appropriability? (RePEc:elg:eechap:14240_2)
  by Michael Waldman
• Piracy of Intellectual Property: Past, Present, and Future (RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:10575)
  by Michael Waldman & Ian Novos
• Standard Promotion Practices Versus Up-Or-Out Contracts (RePEc:fal:wpaper:06007)
  by Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman
• The Macroeconomic Effects Of False Announcements (RePEc:fth:callaa:17)
  by Oh, S. & Waldman, M.
• Aggregate Fluctuations And False Announcements: The Role Of Expectations (RePEc:fth:callaa:30)
  by Oh, S. & Waldman, M.
• Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms (RePEc:mit:sloanp:3537)
  by Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael
• Tying, Upgrades, and Switching Costs in Durable-Goods Markets (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11407)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman
• Does Television Cause Autism? (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12632)
  by Michael Waldman & Sean Nicholson & Nodir Adilov
• Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use? (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13339)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman
• Assessing the Anticompetitive Effects of Multiproduct Pricing (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14199)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Patrick Greenlee & Michael Waldman
• Positive and Negative Mental Health Consequences of Early Childhood Television Watching (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17786)
  by Michael Waldman & Sean Nicholson & Nodir Adilov
• The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28379)
  by Thomas Jungbauer & Sean Nicholson & June Pan & Michael Waldman & Lucy Xiaolu Wang
• Overcoming Discrimination: Harassment and Discrimination Dynamics (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33065)
  by Yi Chen & Adam Dearing & Michael Waldman
• A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6454)
  by Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman
• The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6831)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman
• Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8086)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman
• Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9849)
  by Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman
• Rational Expectations in the Aggregate (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:27:y:1989:i:4:p:619-36)
  by Haltiwanger, John C & Waldman, Michael
• Strategic Complementarity Slows Macroeconomic Adjustment to Temporary Shocks (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:2:p:318-29)
  by Oh, Seonghwan & Waldman, Michael
• Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:1:p:27-41)
  by Michael Waldman
• Bonuses and Promotion Tournaments: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:129:y:2019:i:622:p:2342-2389.)
  by Emre Ekinci & Antti Kauhanen & Michael Waldman
• Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:54-91)
  by Michael Waldman
• An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:32:y:2016:i:1:p:119-149.)
  by Michael Waldman & Ori Zax
• Lateral Moves, Promotions, and Task-Specific Human Capital: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:36:y:2020:i:1:p:1-46.)
  by Xin Jin & Michael Waldman
• Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for Macroeconomics (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:104:y:1989:i:3:p:463-483.)
  by John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman
• The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:1:p:155-165.)
  by Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman
• The Macroeconomic Effects of False Announcements (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:4:p:1017-1034.)
  by Seonghwan Oh & Michael Waldman
• A New Perspective on Planned Obsolescence (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:108:y:1993:i:1:p:273-283.)
  by Michael Waldman
• A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:4:p:1321-1358.)
  by Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman
• Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution (RePEc:oup:restud:v:51:y:1984:i:1:p:95-109.)
  by Michael Waldman
• Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem (RePEc:oup:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:2:p:301-310.)
  by Michael Waldman
• Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs (RePEc:pra:mprapa:1426)
  by Morita, Hodaka & Waldman, Michael
• The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence (RePEc:pra:mprapa:1550)
  by DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael
• Optimal copyright length and ex post investment: a Mickey Mouse approach (RePEc:pra:mprapa:1551)
  by Adilov, Nodir & Waldman, Michael
• What Limits Indirect Appropriability? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:44690)
  by Waldman, Michael
• Theory and evidence in internal labor markets (RePEc:pra:mprapa:5113)
  by Waldman, Michael
• An exploration of the promotion signaling distortion (RePEc:pra:mprapa:60656)
  by Waldman, Michael & Zax, Ori
• Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets
  [The Handbook of Organizational Economics] (RePEc:pup:chapts:9889-13)
  by Michael Waldman
• The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma (RePEc:qed:wpaper:650)
  by Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman
• Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency (RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:summer:p:255-267)
  by Michael Waldman
• The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence (RePEc:rje:randje:v:22:y:1991:i:autumn:p:446-453)
  by Michael Waldman
• Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision (RePEc:rje:randje:v:27:y:1996:i:autumn:p:583-595)
  by Michael Waldman
• The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries (RePEc:rje:randje:v:33:y:2002:i:summer:p:194-220)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman
• Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks (RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:2:p:247-65)
  by Johnson, Justin P & Waldman, Michael
• Book Review: Human Resources, Personnel, and Organizational Behavior: The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:46:y:1992:i:1:p:206-207)
  by Michael Waldman
• The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/662072)
  by Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman
• Performance, Career Dynamics, and Span of Control (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/703147)
  by Valerie Smeets & Michael Waldman & Frederic Warzynski
• Promotions, Adverse Selection, and Efficiency (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/726065)
  by Michael Waldman & Zhenda Yin
• Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:24:y:2006:i:1:p:59-108)
  by Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman
• Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:4:y:1986:i:3:p:355-75)
  by Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael
• Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:8:y:1990:i:2:p:230-50)
  by Waldman, Michael
• Robert Bork's Contributions to Antitrust Perspectives on Tying Behavior (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/675861)
  by Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman
• The Role and Growth of New-Car Leasing: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/679338)
  by Justin P. Johnson & Henry S. Schneider & Michael Waldman
• Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:40:y:1997:i:1:p:61-92)
  by Waldman, Michael
• Leasing, Lemons, and Moral Hazard (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:53:y:2010:i:2:p:307-328)
  by Justin P. Johnson & Michael Waldman
• Durable Goods Pricing When Quality Matters (RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:69:y:1996:i:4:p:489-510)
  by Waldman, Michael
• The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:92:y:1984:i:2:p:236-46)
  by Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael
• The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries (RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:145)
  by Carlton, Dennis W. & Waldman, Michael
• Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets (RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:164)
  by Carlton, Dennis W. & Waldman, Michael