Daniel R. Vincent
Names
| first: |
Daniel |
| middle: |
R. |
| last: |
Vincent |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Maryland
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:82:y:1992:i:2:p:512-18)
by McAfee, R Preston & Vincent, Daniel - Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:2:y:1993:i:4:p:449-482)
by R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent & Michael A. Williams & Melanie Williams Havens - How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:50:y:2002:i:4:p:391-416)
by R. Preston McAfee & Daniel C. Quan & Daniel R. Vincent - Platform Competition With Cash‐Back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:68:y:2020:i:2:p:298-327)
by Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. Vincent - Punishment Schedules for Capital Flight (RePEc:bla:worlde:v:21:y:1998:i:5:p:629-638)
by Uzi Segal & Daniel R. Vincent - Mixed Bundling and Mergers (RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:22:y:2024:i:3:p:115-144:n:2)
by Vincent Daniel R. - The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network (RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:5:y:2006:i:1:n:6)
by Schwartz Marius & Vincent Daniel R. - Optimal Procurement Mechanisms (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:3:p:591-620)
by Manelli, Alejandro M & Vincent, Daniel R - Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:6:p:1905-1938)
by Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent - Sequentially Optimal Auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:246-276)
by McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel - Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:423-437)
by Fershtman, Chaim & Safra, Zvi & Vincent, Daniel - Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:127:y:2006:i:1:p:1-35)
by Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R. - Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:137:y:2007:i:1:p:153-185)
by Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R. - Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:6:p:2492-2493)
by Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R. - Bargaining with common values (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:47-62)
by Vincent, Daniel R. - The Declining Price Anomaly (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:60:y:1993:i:1:p:191-212)
by McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel - Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:65:y:1995:i:2:p:575-584)
by Vincent Daniel R. - Duality in procurement design (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:40:y:2004:i:3-4:p:411-428)
by Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R. - Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:82:y:2019:i:c:p:214-226)
by Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R. - Factor Price Differences and Multinational Activity (RePEc:elg:eechap:3503_7)
by Ignatius J. Horstmann & Daniel R. Vincent - Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.153)
by Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent - Same Price, Cash, or Card: Vertical Control by Payment Networks (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~02-02-01)
by Marius Schwartz & Daniel Vincent - Platform Competition With User Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~17-17-07)
by Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. Vincent - Platform Competition With Cash-back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~19-19-03)
by Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. Vincent - Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:39:y:1998:i:2:p:275-93)
by Vincent, Daniel R - The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:4:p:1035-1052)
by Motty Perry & Daniel R. Vincent - Sequentially Optimal Auctions (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1104)
by R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent - Dynamic Auctions (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:770)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Bargaining with Common Values (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:775)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:832)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:838)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:867)
by Chaim Fershtman & Zvi Safra & Daniel Vincent - Modeling Competitive Behavior (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:893)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Principals and Partners: The Structure of Syndicates (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:909)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Price Regulation and Quality of Service (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:920)
by Morton I. Kamien & Daniel R. Vincent - The Afternoon Effect (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:961)
by R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent - Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:977)
by R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent - Optimal Procurement Mechanisms (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:999)
by Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent - Dynamic Auctions (RePEc:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:1:p:49-61.)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97cra)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97cra1b)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98cra2)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Modelling Competitive Behavior (RePEc:rje:randje:v:23:y:1992:i:winter:p:590-599)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Tariffying Auctions (RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:spring:p:158-179)
by R. Preston McAfee & Wendy Takacs & Daniel R. Vincent - Optimal versus satisfactory decision making: a case study of sales with a target (RePEc:spr:comgts:v:9:y:2012:i:2:p:233-254)
by Jacek Krawczyk & Christopher Sissons & Daniel Vincent - Daniel R. Vincent on Hugo F. Sonnenschein (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-74057-5_23)
by Daniel R. Vincent - Let's Agree that All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad (RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9611)
by Segal, U. - The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations (RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9614)
by Perry, M. & Vincent, D.R.