Péter Vida
Names
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Universität Mannheim
/ Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Research profile
author of:
- A Detail-Free Mediator (RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2012/10)
by Vida, P ter & Azacis, Helmuts - Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction (RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2012/11)
by Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, P ter - Fighting Collusion: An Implementation Theory Approach (RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2021/19)
by Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Peter - Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3360)
by Péter Vida & Francoise Forges - Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:102-112)
by Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu - A detail-free mediator (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:101-115)
by Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts - Repeated implementation: A practical characterization (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:336-367)
by Āzacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter - Designing Interrogations (RePEc:ema:worpap:2021-02)
by Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida - Strong Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games (RePEc:ema:worpap:2022-08)
by Peter Vida & Takakazu Honryo & Helmuts Azacis - Good cop-bad cop: delegating interrogations (RePEc:ema:worpap:2022-12)
by Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida - Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case (RePEc:ema:worpap:2024-07)
by Marie Laclau & Péter Vida & Helmuts Azacis - Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01252955)
by Vida Peter & Francoise Forges - Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03637788)
by Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida - A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case (RePEc:has:discpr:0511)
by Peter Vida - Designing Interrogations (RePEc:oup:restud:v:91:y:2024:i:6:p:3504-3531.)
by Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida - Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:58:y:2015:i:1:p:125-160)
by Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida - Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00772-2)
by Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida - Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:329-352)
by Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida - Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case (RePEc:the:publsh:944)
by , & , - Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria (RePEc:trf:wpaper:438)
by Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter - Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions (RePEc:trf:wpaper:517)
by Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter - Repeated Implementation (RePEc:trf:wpaper:518)
by Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter - Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1409)
by Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida