Mark Van Boening

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Affiliations

• University of Mississippi / Department of Economics
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:3:p:461-77)
  by Van Boening, Mark V & Wilcox, Nathaniel T
• Bargaining with Asymmetric Dispute Costs (RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:10:y:2014:i:1:p:28:n:5)
  by Pecorino Paul & Van Boening Mark
• Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game (RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:15:y:2019:i:2:p:32:n:4)
  by Pecorino Paul & Van Boening Mark
• An Experimental Examination of Spot Markets for Electricity (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:100:y:1990:i:403:p:1073-94)
  by Hahn, Robert W & Van Boening, Mark V
• Price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:41:y:1993:i:2:p:179-185)
  by Van Boening, Mark V. & Williams, Arlington W. & LaMaster, Shawn
• Exogenous Uncertainty Increases the Bid-Ask Spread in the Continuous Double Auction (RePEc:eee:expchp:1-03)
  by Smith, Vernon L. & Van Boening, Mark
• Off-floor Trading, Market Disintegration and Price Volatility in Bid/Ask Markets (RePEc:eee:expchp:1-27)
  by Smith, Vernon L. & Van Boening, Mark
• Costly voluntary disclosure in a screening game (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:44:y:2015:i:c:p:16-28)
  by Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark
• Bargaining with voluntary transmission of private information: An experimental analysis of final offer arbitration (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:191:y:2021:i:c:p:334-366)
  by Pecorino, Paul & Solomon, Michael & Van Boening, Mark
• The double auction: Institutions, theories and evidence : Daniel Friedman and John Rust, eds., Proceedings Volume XIV Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity (Addison-Wesley, Reading, (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:25:y:1994:i:3:p:480-482)
  by Van Boening, Mark V.
• An empirical analysis of litigation with discovery: The role of fairness (RePEc:eee:soceco:v:81:y:2019:i:c:p:172-184)
  by Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark
• Multi-Offer Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Mechanisms (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620220000021006)
  by Alexandros Vasios Sivvopoulos & Mark Van Boening
• Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:2:p:147-159)
  by Mark Van Boening & Stephen Rassenti & Vernon Smith
• An Empirical Analysis of the Signaling and Screening Models of Litigation (RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:20:y:2018:i:1:p:214-244.)
  by Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening
• A Limit of Bilateral Contracting Institutions (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:840-854)
  by Mark V. Van Boening & Nathaniel T. Wilcox
• Dividend timing and behavior in laboratory asset markets (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:16:y:2000:i:3:p:567-583)
  by Mark van Boening & Vernon L. Smith & Charissa P. Wellford
• Bargaining and Information: An Empirical Analysis of A Multistage Arbitration Game (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:19:y:2001:i:4:p:922-48)
  by Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark
• Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:53:y:2010:i:2:p:263-287)
  by Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening
• An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:33:y:2004:p:131-156)
  by Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening
• Off-Floor Trading, Disintegration, and the Bid-Ask Spread in Experimental Markets (RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:64:y:1991:i:4:p:495-522)
  by Campbell, Joseph & LaMaster, Shawn & Smith, Vernon L & Van Boening, Mark
• Benefit packages and individual behavior: choices over discrete goods with multiple attributes (RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:511-526)
  by Mark Van Boening & Tanja F. Blackstone & Michael McKee & Elisabet Rutstrom
• Determinants of Government Aid to Katrina Survivors: Evidence from Survey Data (RePEc:wly:soecon:v:74:y:2007:i:2:p:344-362)
  by William F. Chappell & Richard G. Forgette & David A. Swanson & Mark V. Van Boening