Matthew James Van Essen
Names
| first: |
Matthew |
| middle: |
James |
| last: |
Van Essen |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Tennessee-Knoxville
/ Haslam College of Business
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Hold-Up: With A Vengeance (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:1:p:896-908)
by Martin Dufwenberg & Alec Smith & Matt Van Essen - Bartering Games in the Kolm Triangle (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:17:y:2015:i:3:p:297-310)
by Matt Van Essen - King of the Hill: Giving Backward Induction its Best Shot (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6169)
by Martin Dufwenberg & Matt Van Essen - A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:3:p:396-399)
by Lazzati, Natalia & Van Essen, Matt - A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:6-19)
by Van Essen, Matthew & Walker, Mark - King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:112:y:2018:i:c:p:125-138)
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Van Essen, Matt - Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:366-381)
by Van Essen, Matthew & Lazzati, Natalia & Walker, Mark - Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:186-206)
by Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John - Dissolving a partnership dynamically (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:166:y:2016:i:c:p:212-241)
by Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John - Allocating positions fairly: Auctions and Shapley value (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:196:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001320)
by Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John - Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:102:y:2019:i:c:p:15-23)
by Jindapon, Paan & Van Essen, Matt - An Equilibrium Analysis of Knaster’s Fair Division Procedure (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:4:y:2013:i:1:p:21-37:d:22968)
by Matt Van Essen - Dual Auctions for Assigning Winners and Compensating Losers (RePEc:nad:wpaper:20180013)
by John Wooders & Matt Van Essen - Allocating Positions Fairly: An Auction and its Relationship to the Shapley Value (RePEc:nad:wpaper:20180019)
by Matt Van Essen & John Wooders - A Simple Supermodular Mechanism that Implements Lindahl Allocations (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12781)
by Van Essen, Matthew J. - A Simple Bargaining Model where Parties Make Errors (RePEc:pra:mprapa:58952)
by Van Essen, Matthew - Making efficient public good decisions using an augmented Ausubel auction (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:1:y:2013:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-013-0007-3)
by Matt Van Essen - Dissolving a partnership securely (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:69:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01177-9)
by Matt Essen & John Wooders - Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:16:y:2012:i:1:p:15-40)
by Matt Van Essen - A note on the stability of Chen’s Lindahl mechanism (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:2:p:365-370)
by Matt Van Essen - A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:2:p:309-327)
by Matt Essen - Dissolving a Partnership Dynamically (RePEc:uts:ecowps:32)
by Matt Van Essen & John Wooders - Blind Stealing: Experience and Expertise in a Mixed-Strategy Poker Experiment (RePEc:uts:ecowps:6)
by Matt Van Essen & John Wooders - Tacit Collusion in Price‐Setting Oligopoly: A Puzzle Redux (RePEc:wly:soecon:v:79:y:2013:i:3:p:703-726)
by Matt Van Essen & William B. Hankins - Regulating the Anticommons: Insights from Public‐Expenditure Theory (RePEc:wly:soecon:v:80:y:2013:i:2:p:523-539)
by Matt Van Essen