Tristan Tomala
Names
| first: |
Tristan |
| last: |
Tomala |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
Research profile
author of:
- "The Emergence of Complex Social Networks", a Discussion (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2007:i:86:p:19-23)
by Tristan Tomala - Contracting over persistent information (RePEc:arx:papers:2007.05983)
by Wei Zhao & Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala - Social Learning in Nonatomic Routing Games (RePEc:arx:papers:2009.11580)
by Emilien Macault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala - Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games (RePEc:arx:papers:2107.06312)
by Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala - Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (RePEc:cor:louvco:2003033)
by GOSSNER, Olivier & TOMALA, Tristan - Contracting over Persistent Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16896)
by Renou, Ludovic & ZHAO, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Tomala, Tristan - Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1739)
by Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala - Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (RePEc:ebg:heccah:0921)
by Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes - Mechanism design and communication networks (RePEc:ebg:heccah:0926)
by Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic - Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1015)
by Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan - Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1074)
by Tomala , Tristan & Gensbittel , Fabien - Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1093)
by Lovo , Stefano & Tomala , Tristan - Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1244)
by Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan - Interactive Information Design (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1260)
by Tomala, Tristan & Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie - Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1288)
by Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan - Efficiency of Correlation in a Bottleneck Game (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1289)
by Rivera, Thomas J & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan - Zero-sum revision games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:504-522)
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Social learning in nonatomic routing games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:221-233)
by Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan - Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:310-324)
by Tomala, Tristan - Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:1:p:124-156)
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan - Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:2:p:313-344)
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan - Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:682-694)
by Tomala, Tristan - Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:222-234)
by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan - Secure message transmission on directed networks (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:1-18)
by Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan - Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1770-1795)
by Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan - Approximate implementation in Markovian environments (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:401-442)
by Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan - Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:400-424)
by Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan - Persuasion with limited communication capacity (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s0022053118305064)
by Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan - Belief-free price formation (RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:127:y:2018:i:2:p:342-365)
by Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan - Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:1:p:24-32)
by Gossner, Olivier & Tomala, Tristan - Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:14-21)
by Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan - Playing off-line games with bounded rationality (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:2:p:207-223)
by Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan - Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Payoffs Dependent on the Signal (RePEc:fth:pariem:94.58)
by Tomala, T. - Public Equilibria of Repeated Games with Signal-Dependent Payoffs (RePEc:fth:pariem:95.40)
by Tomala, T. - Pure Equilibria of Repreated Games with Public Information (RePEc:fth:pariem:96.06)
by Tomala, T - Repeated Proximity Games (RePEc:fth:pariem:97.14)
by Renault, J. & Tomala, T. - Finitely repeated games with semi-standard (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00580938)
by Tristan Tomala & Pauline Contou-Carrère - Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00524134)
by Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala - Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00459955)
by Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala - Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464537)
by Tristan Tomala - Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464542)
by Tristan Tomala - Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464554)
by Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner - Informationally optimal correlation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00485282)
by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala - Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00487954)
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala - Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00487960)
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala - Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00495690)
by Tristan Tomala & J. Hörner & S. Lovo - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00495923)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Secure Communication: A Mechanism Design Approach (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00496056)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - A Minority Game with Bounded Recall (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00538967)
by Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543571)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543601)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543602)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543603)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543604)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543605)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543606)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543607)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543608)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00543609)
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou - Selected topics in the theory of repeated games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00578327)
by Tristan Tomala - Finitely repeated games with semi-standard (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00580938)
by Tristan Tomala & Pauline Contou-Carrère - Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00630299)
by Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala - Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00632806)
by Tristan Tomala - Repeated Games with Complete Information (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00712075)
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala - Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00715606)
by Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan - Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00718046)
by Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala - Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01026126)
by Tristan Tomala - Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00524134)
by Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala - Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754314)
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala - Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01503768)
by Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Interactive Information Design (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01791918)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Long Information Design (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02400053)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Splitting games over finite sets (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03672222)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Informationally optimal correlation (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00485282)
by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala - Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00487954)
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala - Repeated Games with Complete Information (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00712075)
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala - Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754314)
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala - Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01503768)
by Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Interactive Information Design (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01791918)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Long Information Design (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02400053)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Splitting games over finite sets (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03672222)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Repeated games with public information revisited (RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-01285326)
by Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242940)
by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala - Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00489877)
by Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner - Mechanism design and communication networks (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00540799)
by Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou - Protocols for Fault Identifcation in Partially Known Networks (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00580147)
by Tristan Tomala - The controlled biased coin problem (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00584695)
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala - Reliability and security of multicast communication in general networks (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00584697)
by Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Informationally optimal correlation (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00587228)
by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala - On Subgame-Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect monitoring (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00587231)
by Tristan Tomala - Secret correlation in repeated games with signals (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00587232)
by Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner - Repeated games with public information revisited (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01285326)
by Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Efficiency of Correlation in a Bottleneck Game (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01933853)
by Thomas Rivera & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala - Interactive Information Design (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01933896)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02002783)
by Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala - Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02011419)
by Fabien Gensbittel & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala - Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02058241)
by Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala - Dynamic Congestion Games: The Price of Seasonality (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02058242)
by Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala - A belief-based approach to signaling (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-04455227)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:31:y:2006:i:1:p:13-30 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:413-424 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:32:y:2007:i:4:p:873-889 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:38:y:2013:i:4:p:617-637 (article)
- Interactive Information Design (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:47:y:2022:i:1:p:153-175)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala - Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems (RePEc:inm:oropre:v:59:y:2011:i:3:p:754-763)
by Tristan Tomala - Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (RePEc:lec:leecon:08/35)
by Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala - Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10073)
by Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala - Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (RePEc:pra:mprapa:25895)
by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan - General Properties of Long-Run Supergames (RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:2:p:319-350)
by Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:93-109)
by Tristan Tomala - Repeated proximity games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:4:p:539-559)
by JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:651-669)
by Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala - Long information design (RePEc:the:publsh:4557)
by Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Contracting over persistent information (RePEc:the:publsh:5056)
by Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan - Mechanism design and communication networks (RePEc:the:publsh:921)
by , & , - Splitting games over finite sets (RePEc:tse:wpaper:126754)
by Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Long information design (RePEc:tse:wpaper:127034)
by Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Zero-Sum Revision Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31319)
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan