Solymosi Tamás

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Affiliations

• Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem / Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem / Operáció és Döntés Intézet / Operációkutatás és Aktuáriustudományok Tanszék (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility (RePEc:arx:papers:2109.05456)
  by Ata Atay & Eric Bahel & Tam'as Solymosi
• Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes (RePEc:arx:papers:2210.17373)
  by Tam'as Solymosi
• Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games (RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2014/15)
  by Nunez, Marina & Solymosi, Tamás
• Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions (RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2016/12)
  by Solymosi, Tamás
• On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:167:y:2018:i:c:p:99-103)
  by Atay, Ata & Solymosi, Tamás
• On the nucleolus of neighbor games (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:146:y:2003:i:1:p:1-18)
  by Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Vermeulen, Dries
• Computing the nucleolus of cyclic permutation games (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:162:y:2005:i:1:p:270-280)
  by Solymosi, Tamas & Raghavan, T. E. S. & Tijs, Stef
• A method for determining the weights of criteria: The centralized weights (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:26:y:1986:i:1:p:35-41)
  by Solymosi, Tamas & Dombi, Jozsef
• On the Shapley value of liability games (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:300:y:2022:i:1:p:378-386)
  by Csóka, Péter & Illés, Ferenc & Solymosi, Tamás
• Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:231-239)
  by Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Pere Villar, Joan
• Core stability in chain-component additive games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:116-139)
  by van Velzen, Bas & Hamers, Herbert & Solymosi, Tamas
• Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:126:y:2023:i:c:p:1-12)
  by Solymosi, Tamás
• The kernel is in the least core for permutation games (RePEc:has:discpr:1402)
  by Tamas Solymosi
• On the Core of Directed Acyclic Graph Games (RePEc:has:discpr:1418)
  by Balázs Sziklai & Tamás Fleiner & Tamás Solymosi
• Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games (RePEc:has:discpr:1425)
  by Marina Núnez & Tamás Solymosi
• Universal Characterization Sets for the Nucleolus in Balanced Games (RePEc:has:discpr:1512)
  by Tamas Solymosi & Balazs Sziklai
• On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games (RePEc:has:discpr:1805)
  by Ata Atay & Tamas Solymosi
• Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions (extended version) (RePEc:has:discpr:1914)
  by Tamás Solymosi
• On the Shapley value of liability games (RePEc:has:discpr:2001)
  by Peter Csoka & Ferenc Illes & Tamas Solymosi
• Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:23:y:1998:i:4:p:983-1009 (article)
• Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:254:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-017-2435-1)
  by Marina Núñez & Tamás Solymosi
• Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:322:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-022-05111-6)
  by Ata Atay & Eric Bahel & Tamás Solymosi
• Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games (RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:16:y:2008:i:4:p:425-440)
  by Tamás Solymosi
• The kernel is in the least core for permutation games (RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:23:y:2015:i:4:p:795-809)
  by Tamás Solymosi
• An Algorithm for Finding the Nucleolus of Asignment Games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:2:p:119-43)
  by Solymosi, Tamas & Raghavan, Tirukkannamangai E S
• On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:229-240)
  by TamÂs Solymosi
• Assignment games with stable core (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:177-185)
  by T. E. S. Raghavan & Tamás Solymosi
• The bargaining set of four-person balanced games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:1-11)
  by Tamás Solymosi
• Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:3:p:447-460)
  by Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs
• Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00689-x)
  by Tamás Solymosi
• Neighbor games and the leximax solution (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:58:y:2003:i:2:p:191-208)
  by Flip Klijn & Dries Vermeulen & Herbert Hamers & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs & Joan Pere Villar
• Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:62:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-023-01477-z)
  by Tamás Solymosi
• Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:15:y:2007:i:1:p:78-88)
  by Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs
• On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:24d16e9c-4dab-4284-8b39-f21cd2a39d03)
  by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Vermeulen, D.
• Core Stability in Chain-Component Additive Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:2d0a2864-74ce-435b-b66f-b35e21539f3b)
  by van Velzen, S. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T.
• Type Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Multi-Glove Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:2fed3103-b346-4023-a36d-fcb58a2cdc45)
  by Brânzei, R. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H.
• On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:7579f715-83ed-4532-aa3d-4f246f26b161)
  by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J.
• Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:b9f5b0ab-bfc5-4ad3-a4ba-8e17abb96e59)
  by Klijn, F. & Vermeulen, D. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J.
• Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d2db812a-b13a-4e83-9198-274d912fc02e)
  by Brânzei, R. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H.
• On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:24d16e9c-4dab-4284-8b39-f21cd2a39d03)
  by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Vermeulen, D.
• Core Stability in Chain-Component Additive Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2d0a2864-74ce-435b-b66f-b35e21539f3b)
  by van Velzen, S. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T.
• Type Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Multi-Glove Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2fed3103-b346-4023-a36d-fcb58a2cdc45)
  by Brânzei, R. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H.
• On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7579f715-83ed-4532-aa3d-4f246f26b161)
  by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J.
• Bargaining sets and the core in permutation games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a14f6955-62c4-4bf0-8a54-faeea07da1ad)
  by Solymosi, T. & Raghavan, T.E.S. & Tijs, S.H.
• Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b9f5b0ab-bfc5-4ad3-a4ba-8e17abb96e59)
  by Klijn, F. & Vermeulen, D. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J.
• Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d2db812a-b13a-4e83-9198-274d912fc02e)
  by Brânzei, R. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H.
• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa property (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:da67df69-7b64-4f98-ba8a-8e2c29896a22)
  by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J.
• Type monotonic allocation schemes for multi-glove games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e703d813-b316-40dc-b1b1-fbdca25003df)
  by Brânzei, R. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H.
• Introduction (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:21:y:2019:i:01:n:s0219198919020018)
  by Vito Fragnelli & Stefano Moretti & Tamás Solymosi