Alex Smolin
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Affiliations
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Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Research profile
author of:
- The Design and Price of Information (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:1:p:1-48)
by Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin - Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:2:p:250-76)
by Gleb Romanyuk & Alex Smolin - Dynamic Evaluation Design (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:4:p:300-331)
by Alex Smolin - The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing (RePEc:arx:papers:2107.10323)
by Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin - Persuasion and Welfare (RePEc:arx:papers:2109.03061)
by Laura Doval & Alex Smolin - Information Design in Smooth Games (RePEc:arx:papers:2202.10883)
by Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita - Data Provision to an Informed Seller (RePEc:arx:papers:2204.08723)
by Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin - Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption (RePEc:arx:papers:2309.12122)
by Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin - Disclosure and pricing of attributes (RePEc:bla:randje:v:54:y:2023:i:4:p:570-597)
by Alex Smolin - The Design and Price of Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11412)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro & Smolin, Alex - The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16394)
by Bonatti, Alessandro & Bergemann, Dirk & Haupt, Andreas & Smolin, Alex - Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16543)
by Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura - Information Design in Concave Games (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17066)
by Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro - Data Collection by an Informed Seller (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17239)
by Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota - Data Provision to an Informed Seller (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17963)
by Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota - Persuasion and Welfare (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18104)
by Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura - Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1952)
by Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin - The Design and Price of Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2049)
by Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin - The Design and Price of Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2049r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin - The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2290)
by Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin - The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2290r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin - Dynamic communication with biased senders (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:330-339)
by Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex - Optimal technology design (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:209:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000170)
by Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs - Optimal technology design (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04224372)
by Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alexey Smolin & Balazs Szentes - Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04547880)
by Alex Smolin - Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption (RePEc:net:wpaper:2302)
by Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin - Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes (RePEc:pra:mprapa:84132)
by Smolin, Alex - Dynamic Evaluation Design (RePEc:pra:mprapa:84133)
by Smolin, Alex - Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders (RePEc:pra:mprapa:84134)
by Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex - Cream Skimming and Information Design in Marching Markets (RePEc:pra:mprapa:86713)
by Romanyuk, Gleb & Smolin, Alexey - Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125927)
by Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura - Information Design in Concave Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:126692)
by Yamashita, Takuro & Smolin, Alex - Data Collection by an Informed Seller (RePEc:tse:wpaper:126871)
by Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota - Persuasion and Welfare (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/729067)
by Laura Doval & Alex Smolin