Andrzej Skrzypacz
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Andrzej |
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Skrzypacz |
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Affiliations
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Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) (weight: 1%)
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Stanford University
/ Graduate School of Business (weight: 99%)
Research profile
author of:
- Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:3:p:802-36)
by William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:6:p:2425-49)
by Joseph E. Harrington & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:8:p:2400-2420)
by Ilan Guttman & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:9:p:2528-51)
by Jonathan Levin & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Test Design and Minimum Standards (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:6:p:2173-2207)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:936-959)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:5:p:1794-1823)
by Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:10:y:2018:i:2:p:58-82)
by Iván Marinovic & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Felipe Varas - Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:4:p:219-43)
by William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Mechanisms for Repeated Trade (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:4:p:252-93)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & Juuso Toikka - Yuliy Sannikov: Winner of the 2016 Clark Medal (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:31:y:2017:i:2:p:237-56)
by Susan Athey & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design (RePEc:arx:papers:2202.05947)
by Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Disclosing a Random Walk (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:79:y:2024:i:2:p:1123-1146)
by Ilan Kremer & Amnon Schreiber & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Collusion under monitoring of sales (RePEc:bla:randje:v:38:y:2007:i:2:p:314-331)
by Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp796)
by M. Bigoni & M. Casari & A. Skrzypacz & G. Spagnolo - Dynamic Oligopoly with Network Effects (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt3z59c4p7)
by Economides, Nicholas & Mitchell, Matthew & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Selling Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000680)
by Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories (RePEc:cla:najeco:843644000000000079)
by Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Ratings, certifications and grades: dynamic signaling and market breakdown (RePEc:cla:uclatw:121473000000000010)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz - It's Payback time: new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16912)
by Bigoni, Maria & Casari, Marco & Salvanti, Andrea & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Selling Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1743)
by Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Selling Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1743r)
by Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Selling Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1743r2)
by Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Transparency and Distressed Sales under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1986)
by William Fuchs & Aniko Ory & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions (RePEc:ecl:stabus:1698r2)
by Hopenhayn, Hugo A. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown (RePEc:ecl:stabus:1814r2)
by Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Kremer, Ilan - Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares (RePEc:ecl:stabus:1879)
by Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Mitchell, Matthew F. - Collusion under Monitoring of Sales (RePEc:ecl:stabus:1885)
by Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Harrington, Joseph E. - Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production (RePEc:ecl:stabus:1887)
by Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Sannikov, Yuliy - Limited Records and Reputation (RePEc:ecl:stabus:2030)
by Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (RePEc:ecl:stabus:2088)
by Bigoni, Maria & Casari, Marco & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (RePEc:ecl:stabus:2088r)
by Bigoni, Maria & Casari, Marco & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure (RePEc:ecl:stabus:2102)
by Guttman, Ilan & Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Rules with Discretion and Local Information (RePEc:ecl:stabus:2117)
by Bowen, T. Renee & Kreps, David M. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market (RePEc:ecl:stabus:2133)
by Fuchs, William & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3371)
by Marinovic, Ivan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Varas, Felipe - Persuading the Regular to Wait (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3406)
by Orlov, Dmitry & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Zryumov, Pavel - Dynamic Trading: Price Inertia and Front-Running (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3487)
by Sannikov, Yuliy & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Design of Macro-prudential Stress Tests (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3548)
by Orlov, Dmitry & Zryumov, Pavel & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction (RePEc:ecl:stabus:4043)
by Ostrovsky, Michael & Skrzypacz, Andy - Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:73:y:2005:i:1:p:69-91)
by Yossi Feinberg & Andrzej Skrzypacz - The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:3:p:847-882)
by Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:637)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer - Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:641)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer - Learning, Search and Arbitrage - Evidence from a Natural Experiment (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1131)
by Jerzy D. Konieczny & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Inflation and Price Setting in a Natural Experiment (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1132)
by Jerzy D. Konieczny & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Recall and private monitoring (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:162-170)
by Phelan, Christopher & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Auctions with contingent payments — An overview (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:31:y:2013:i:5:p:666-675)
by Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Tacit collusion in repeated auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:114:y:2004:i:1:p:153-169)
by Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo - Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169] (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:114:y:2004:i:2:p:370-371)
by Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo - Dynamic signaling and market breakdown (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:58-82)
by Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:3:p:1226-1236)
by Fuchs, William & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Limited records and reputation bubbles (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:151:y:2014:i:c:p:2-29)
by Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:158:y:2015:i:pa:p:371-406)
by Fuchs, William & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Inflation and price setting in a natural experiment (RePEc:eee:moneco:v:52:y:2005:i:3:p:621-632)
by Konieczny, Jerzy D. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands: Transaction costs, competition, and flexibility (RePEc:eee:telpol:v:45:y:2021:i:7:s0308596121000719)
by Rosston, Gregory L. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (RePEc:eie:wpaper:1116)
by Maria Bigoni & Marco Casari & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Giancarlo Spagnolo - Private monitoring with infinite histories (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:383)
by Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz - A Theory of Market Pioneers, Dynamic Capabilities, and Industry Evolution (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:61:y:2015:i:7:p:1598-1614)
by Matthew Mitchell & Andrzej Skrzypacz - It’s Payback Time: New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15023)
by Bigoni, Maria & Casari, Marco & Salvanti, Andrea & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Collusion under Monitoring of Sales (RePEc:jhu:papers:509)
by Joseph E Harrington & Jr Andrzej Skrzypacz - Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices (RePEc:jhu:papers:555)
by Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Unknown item RePEc:nbr:nberch:14767 (chapter)
- Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10891)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20487)
by Jonathan Levin & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Rules with Discretion and Local Information (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:128:y:2013:i:3:p:1273-1320)
by T. Renee Bowen & David M. Kreps & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Beliefs and Private Monitoring (RePEc:oup:restud:v:79:y:2012:i:4:p:1637-1660)
by Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring (RePEc:oup:restud:v:87:y:2020:i:6:p:2893-2937.)
by Felipe Varas & Iván Marinovic & Andrzej Skrzypacz - The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:36:y:2023:i:11:p:4460-4501.)
by Dmitry Orlov & Pavel Zryumov & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Itay Goldstein - The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07c700mhz)
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - Economic Comments on the Design of the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07d700mhz)
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - Economist Letter to NTIA on 700 MHz Spectrum Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07el700mhz)
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Simon Wilkie & Robert Wilson - Comments on the FCC’s Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73 (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07fcc700mhz)
by Peter Cramton & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07rev700)
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11ckrs)
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market (RePEc:red:issued:18-277)
by William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production (RePEc:red:sed004:418)
by Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Search, Costly Price Adjustment and the Frequency of Price Changes – Theory and Evidence (RePEc:red:sed005:782)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & Jerzy D. Konieczny - Market Structure and the Direction of Technological Change (RePEc:red:sed006:422)
by Matthew Mitchell & Andy Skrzypacz - Sequential Equilibria with Infinite Histories (RePEc:red:sed006:484)
by Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz - The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions (RePEc:red:sed006:871)
by Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders (RePEc:red:sed007:186)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & William Fuchs - Bargaining with Deadlines (RePEc:red:sed009:159)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & William Fuchs - Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers (RePEc:red:sed011:87)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & Simon Board - Transparency and Distressed Sales under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:red:sed015:73)
by Aniko Oery & Andrzej Skrzypacz & William Fuchs - Design of Macro-prudential Stress Tests (RePEc:red:sed018:913)
by Dmitry Orlov & Andy Skrzypacz & Pavel Zryumov - Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions (RePEc:roc:rocher:463)
by Skrzypacz, A. & Hopenhayn, H. - Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-015)
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction (RePEc:sip:dpaper:14-002)
by Jonathan Levin & Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz - Network externalities and long-run market shares (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:29:y:2006:i:3:p:621-648)
by Matthew Mitchell & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Dynamic Bargaining with Private Information (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-76666-5_4)
by William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Standards Coalitions Formation and Market Structure in Network Securities (RePEc:ste:nystbu:03-08)
by Nicholas Economides & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information (RePEc:the:publsh:2237)
by Fuchs, William & Öry, Aniko & Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/661939)
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/686713)
by Simon Board & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Selling Information (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/688874)
by Johannes Hörner & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Persuading the Principal to Wait (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/706687)
by Dmitry Orlov & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Pavel Zryumov - Search, Costly Price Adjustment and the Frequency of Price Changes - Theory and Evidence (RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0054)
by J. Konieczny, A. Skrzpacz - Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i::p:587-616)
by Maria Bigoni & Marco Casari & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Giancarlo Spagnolo - Standards Coalitions Formation and Market Structure in Network Industries (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0407008)
by Nicholas Economides & Andrzej Skrzypacz