Francisco Silva
Names
| first: | Francisco |
| last: | Silva |
Identifer
| RePEc Short-ID: | psi931 |
Contact
| homepage: | http://sites.google.com/site/franciscosilva2909/ |
Affiliations
-
Deakin University
/ Business School
/ Department of Economics
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Research profile
author of:
- The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:12:y:2020:i:4:p:99-113)
by Francisco Silva - Inducing Overconfidence (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:1:p:451-460)
by Francisco Silva - A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Voluntary Euthanasia And Physician Assisted Suicide (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:58:y:2020:i:2:p:745-763)
by Rodrigo Harrison & Francisco Silva - Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit? (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:61:y:2023:i:3:p:720-737)
by Francisco Silva - Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:71:y:2023:i:1:p:192-211)
by Samir Mamadehussene & Francisco Silva - The role of information in collective decisions (RePEc:col:000089:020508)
by Nicolás Figueroa & José-Alberto Guerra & Francisco Silva - The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:379-388)
by Silva, Francisco - Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit? (RePEc:ioe:doctra:477)
by Francisco Silva - Euthanasia: The Fear of Becoming a Burden (RePEc:ioe:doctra:478)
by Francisco Silva - Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit? (RePEc:ioe:doctra:538)
by Francisco Silva - Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation (RePEc:ioe:doctra:540)
by Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra - The Equivalence Between Sequential and Simultaneous Firm Decisions (RePEc:ioe:doctra:541)
by Francisco Silva & Samir Mamadehussene - Self-evaluations (RePEc:ioe:doctra:554)
by Francisco Silva - Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification (RePEc:the:publsh:3190)
by Silva, Francisco - Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (RePEc:the:publsh:5088)
by Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco - Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification (RePEc:the:publsh:5578)
by Silva, Francisco - Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (RePEc:ude:wpaper:0420)
by Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva - If We Confess Our Sins (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:3:p:1389-1412)
by Francisco Silva