Shigehiro Serizawa

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• Osaka University of Economics
  • EDIRC entry
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Research profile

author of:

• Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage (repec:alo:isipdp:17-03)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Mechanism design without quasilinearity (repec:alo:isipdp:17-04)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences (repec:arx:papers:2602.16211)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good (repec:aub:autbar:353.96)
  by Berga, D & Serizawa, S
• Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (repec:aub:autbar:358.96)
  by Barbera, S & Masso, J & Serizawa, S
• A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems (repec:bla:ijethy:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:38-49)
  by Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa
• An IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IN PURE PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMIES WITH FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS: VOTING BY COMMITTEES IN NON-RECTANGULAR FEASIBLE SETS (repec:bla:jecrev:v:47:y:1996:i:4:p:368-383)
  by SHIGEHIRO Serizawa
• Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies (repec:dpr:wpaper:0628)
  by Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation (repec:dpr:wpaper:0629)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa
• Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction (repec:dpr:wpaper:0631)
  by Chew Soo Hong & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect (repec:dpr:wpaper:0646)
  by Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule (repec:dpr:wpaper:0648)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa
• An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems (repec:dpr:wpaper:0677)
  by Shohei Takagi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods (repec:dpr:wpaper:0686)
  by Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods (repec:dpr:wpaper:0686r)
  by Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods (repec:dpr:wpaper:0686rr)
  by Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting (repec:dpr:wpaper:0740)
  by Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting (repec:dpr:wpaper:0740r)
  by Kenju Akai & Shigehiro Serizawa
• An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices (repec:dpr:wpaper:0743)
  by Kenju Akai, & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa
• An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices (repec:dpr:wpaper:0743r)
  by Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling:Theoretical and Experimental Results (repec:dpr:wpaper:0747)
  by R'obert F. Vesztegy, Serizawa & Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa
• A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Commodities and Agents (repec:dpr:wpaper:0769)
  by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching
• The Research Rankings of Major Economics Departments and Institutions in Japan: Evaluation by the Publications and Citation Output (in Japanese:「主要経済系部局の研究業績比較（2009年)｣) (repec:dpr:wpaper:0802)
  by Kouichi Futagami & Kazuya Kamiya & Souichi Ohta & Yasuyuki Sawada & Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata
• A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (repec:dpr:wpaper:0809)
  by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa
• A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (repec:dpr:wpaper:0809r)
  by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule (repec:dpr:wpaper:0852)
  by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems (repec:dpr:wpaper:0927)
  by Hikaru Kondo & Shigehiro Serizawa
• The Research Rankings of Major Economics Departments and Institutions in Japan, 2014: Evaluation by the Publications and Citation Output, (in Japanese:「5大学経済学研究科及び附置研究所の研究業績比較調査（2014年）」) (repec:dpr:wpaper:0934)
  by Koichi Futagami & Kazuya Kamiya & Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata
• Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences (repec:dpr:wpaper:0943)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule (repec:dpr:wpaper:0971)
  by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa
• The Research Rankings of Major Economics Departments and Institutions in Japan, 2015: Evaluation by the Publications and Citation Output (in Japanese:「９大学経済学研究科及び附置研究所の研究業績比較調査（2015年）」) (repec:dpr:wpaper:0974)
  by Koichi Futagami & Kazuya Kamiya & Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata
• The Research Productivity Rankings of Major Economics Departments and Institutions in Japan, 2016: Evaluation by the Publications and Citation Output (in Japanese: 「9大学経済学研究科・附置研究所の研究生産性比較調査（2016年）」) (repec:dpr:wpaper:0998)
  by Koichi Futagami & Kazuya Kamiya & Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata
• Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage (repec:dpr:wpaper:1001)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences (repec:dpr:wpaper:1001r)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Mechanism design without quasilinearity (repec:dpr:wpaper:1005)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa
• The Productivity Rankings of Research Institutions of Economics and Social Sciences in Japan Compared to NUS, 2017: Evaluation by the Publications in Major Academic Journals (in Japanese: 「国内５大学附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（2017年）」) (repec:dpr:wpaper:1031)
  by Koichi Futagami & Kazuya Kamiya & Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata & Satoru Takahashi
• Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market (repec:dpr:wpaper:1047)
  by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa
• A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction (repec:dpr:wpaper:1048)
  by Takehito Masuda & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama
• A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction (repec:dpr:wpaper:1048r)
  by Takehito Masuda & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama
• The Productivity Rankings of Research Institutions of Economics and Social Sciences in Japan Compared to NUS, 2018: Evaluation by the Publications in Major Academic Journals (in Japanese: 「国内５大学附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（2018年）」) (repec:dpr:wpaper:1057)
  by Koichi Futagami & Kazuya Kamiya & Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata & Satoru Takahashi
• The Productivity Rankings of Research Institutions of Economics and Social Sciences in Japan Compared to NUS and HKU, 2019: Evaluation by the Publications in Major Academic Journals （in Japanese:「経済・社会科学系４附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部、香港大学経営経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（20 (repec:dpr:wpaper:1086)
  by Koichi Futagami & Kazuya Kamiya & Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata & Satoru Takahashi
• Serial Vickrey Mechanism (repec:dpr:wpaper:1095)
  by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Unit Object Allocation with Money: (Non)decreasing Marginal Valuations without Guasi-Linearity (repec:dpr:wpaper:1097)
  by Hiroki Shinozaki & Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Multi-unit Object Allocation Problems with Money for (Non)Decreasing Incremental Valuations: Impossibility and Characterization Theorems (repec:dpr:wpaper:1097r)
  by Hiroki Shinozaki & Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: (repec:dpr:wpaper:1107)
  by Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa
• The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction (repec:dpr:wpaper:1109)
  by Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama
• The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction (repec:dpr:wpaper:1109r)
  by Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama
• The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction (repec:dpr:wpaper:1109rr)
  by Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama
• On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy (repec:dpr:wpaper:1112)
  by Shurojit Chatterji & Jordi Massó & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples (repec:dpr:wpaper:1116)
  by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples (repec:dpr:wpaper:1116r)
  by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa
• A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems (repec:dpr:wpaper:1120)
  by Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa
• The Productivity Rankings of Research Institutions of Economics and Social Sciences in Japan Compared to NUS and HKU, 2020: Evaluation by the Publications in Major Academic Journals （in Japanese:「経済・社会科学系４附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部、香港大学経営経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（20 (repec:dpr:wpaper:1129)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata & Satoru Takahashi
• A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects (repec:dpr:wpaper:1134)
  by Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa
• A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects (repec:dpr:wpaper:1161)
  by Yuya Wakabayashi & Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa
• The Productivity Rankings of Research Institutions of Economics and Social Sciences in Japan Compared to NUS and HKU, 2021: Evaluation by the Publications in Major Academic Journals （in Japanese:「経済・社会科学系４附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部、香港大学経営経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（20 (repec:dpr:wpaper:1173)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata & Satoru Takahashi
• The Productivity Rankings of Research Institutions of Economics and Social Sciences in Japan Compared to NUS and HKU, 2022: Evaluation by the Publications in Major Academic Journals （in Japanese:「経済・社会科学系４附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部、香港大学経営経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（20 (repec:dpr:wpaper:1208)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa & Akihisa Shibata & Satoru Takahashi
• Toward an Understanding of Dominated Bidding in a Vickrey Auction Experiment (repec:dpr:wpaper:1229r)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa & Natsumi Shimada & Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse
• Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money (repec:dpr:wpaper:1292)
  by Hiroki Shinozaki & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money (repec:dpr:wpaper:1292r)
  by Hiroki Shinozaki & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences (repec:dpr:wpaper:1304)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:1:p:121-146)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule (repec:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:327-363)
  by Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples (repec:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:210-228)
  by Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function (repec:eee:gamebe:v:149:y:2025:i:c:p:164-169)
  by Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A.
• A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices (repec:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:1-26)
  by Wakabayashi, Yuya & Sakai, Ryosuke & Serizawa, Shigehiro
• On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem (repec:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:48-70)
  by Chatterji, Shurojit & Massó, Jordi & Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (repec:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:272-291)
  by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S.
• Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies (repec:eee:jetheo:v:106:y:2002:i:2:p:219-241)
  by Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees (repec:eee:jetheo:v:109:y:2003:i:2:p:246-263)
  by Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A.
• Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences (repec:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118305866)
  by Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof (repec:eee:jetheo:v:67:y:1995:i:2:p:599-608)
  by Serizawa Shigehiro
• A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules (repec:eee:jetheo:v:78:y:1998:i:1:p:157-166)
  by Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good (repec:eee:jetheo:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:39-61)
  by Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro
• The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction (repec:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09736-5)
  by Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama
• Correction to: The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction (repec:kap:expeco:v:26:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-022-09746-x)
  by Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction (repec:spr:joecth:v:33:y:2007:i:2:p:393-406)
  by Soo Chew & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect (repec:spr:joecth:v:35:y:2008:i:2:p:391-401)
  by Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies (repec:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:501-12)
  by Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (*) (repec:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:501-512)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (repec:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:379-380)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa
• A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (repec:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:153-168)
  by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation (repec:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:2:p:305-331)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa
• Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies (repec:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:195-210)
  by Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods (repec:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:3:p:423-447)
  by Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• An impossibility theorem for matching problems (repec:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:2:p:245-266)
  by Shohei Takagi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity (repec:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:3:p:531-542)
  by Itai Ashlagi & Shigehiro Serizawa
• A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents (repec:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:3:p:871-911)
  by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching
• Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (repec:spr:sochwe:v:47:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0986-8)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects (repec:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01333-y)
  by Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage (repec:tcr:wpaper:e116)
  by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule (repec:the:publsh:1470)
  by , & ,
• Mechanism design without quasilinearity (repec:the:publsh:2910)
  by Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees (repec:van:wpaper:0216)
  by Shigehiro Serizawa & John A. Weymark