Shigehiro Serizawa
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Serizawa |
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Osaka University of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage (RePEc:alo:isipdp:17-03)
by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa - Mechanism design without quasilinearity (RePEc:alo:isipdp:17-04)
by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa - Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good (RePEc:aub:autbar:353.96)
by Berga, D & Serizawa, S - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (RePEc:aub:autbar:358.96)
by Barbera, S & Masso, J & Serizawa, S - A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:38-49)
by Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa - An IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IN PURE PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMIES WITH FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS: VOTING BY COMMITTEES IN NON-RECTANGULAR FEASIBLE SETS (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:47:y:1996:i:4:p:368-383)
by SHIGEHIRO Serizawa - Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0628)
by Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa - Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0629)
by Shigehiro Serizawa - Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0631)
by Chew Soo Hong & Shigehiro Serizawa - Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0646)
by Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0648)
by Shigehiro Serizawa - An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0677)
by Shohei Takagi & Shigehiro Serizawa - Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0686)
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa - Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0740r)
by Kenju Akai & Shigehiro Serizawa - An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0743r)
by Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa - Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling:Theoretical and Experimental Results (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0747)
by R'obert F. Vesztegy, Serizawa & Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa - A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Commodities and Agents (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0769)
by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching - A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0809)
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0852)
by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa - Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0927)
by Hikaru Kondo & Shigehiro Serizawa - Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0943)
by Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0971)
by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1001r)
by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa - Mechanism design without quasilinearity (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1005)
by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa - Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1047)
by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa - A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1048r)
by Takehito Masuda & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama - Serial Vickrey Mechanism (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1095)
by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa - Multi-unit Object Allocation Problems with Money for (Non)Decreasing Incremental Valuations: Impossibility and Characterization Theorems (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1097r)
by Hiroki Shinozaki & Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1107)
by Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa - The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1109rr)
by Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama - On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1112)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Jordi Massó & Shigehiro Serizawa - Unknown item RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1116 (paper)
- Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1116r)
by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa - A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1120)
by Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa - A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1134)
by Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa - A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1161)
by Yuya Wakabayashi & Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa - Toward an Understanding of Dominated Bidding in a Vickrey Auction Experiment (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1229r)
by Shigehiro Serizawa & Natsumi Shimada & Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse - Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:1:p:121-146)
by Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:327-363)
by Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro - Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:210-228)
by Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:272-291)
by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S. - Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:106:y:2002:i:2:p:219-241)
by Serizawa, Shigehiro - Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:109:y:2003:i:2:p:246-263)
by Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A. - Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118305866)
by Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro - Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:67:y:1995:i:2:p:599-608)
by Serizawa Shigehiro - A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:78:y:1998:i:1:p:157-166)
by Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro - Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:39-61)
by Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro - The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09736-5)
by Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama - Correction to: The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:26:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-022-09746-x)
by Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama - Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:33:y:2007:i:2:p:393-406)
by Soo Chew & Shigehiro Serizawa - Vickrey allocation rule with income effect (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:35:y:2008:i:2:p:391-401)
by Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:501-12)
by Serizawa, Shigehiro - Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (*) (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:501-512)
by Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:379-380)
by Shigehiro Serizawa - A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:153-168)
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa - Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:2:p:305-331)
by Shigehiro Serizawa - Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:195-210)
by Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa - Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:3:p:423-447)
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa - An impossibility theorem for matching problems (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:2:p:245-266)
by Shohei Takagi & Shigehiro Serizawa - Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:3:p:531-542)
by Itai Ashlagi & Shigehiro Serizawa - A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:3:p:871-911)
by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching - Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:47:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0986-8)
by Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01333-y)
by Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage (RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e116)
by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa - Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule (RePEc:the:publsh:1470)
by , & , - Mechanism design without quasilinearity (RePEc:the:publsh:2910)
by Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro - Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees (RePEc:van:wpaper:0216)
by Shigehiro Serizawa & John A. Weymark