Aggey Semenov
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Aggey |
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Semenov |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Université d'Ottawa
/ Département d'Économie
Research profile
author of:
- Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares (RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:57:y:2018:i:2:p:142-153)
by Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov - Exclusion via Non-Exclusive Contracts (RePEc:cje:issued:v:47:y:2014:i:1:p:325-347)
by Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright - Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent (RePEc:cje:issued:v:51:y:2018:i:1:p:64-93)
by Aggey Semenov - A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire (RePEc:eee:deveco:v:88:y:2009:i:2:p:258-268)
by Diakité, Daouda & Semenov, Aggey & Thomas, Alban - Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:18-22)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars - On the Dynamic Analysis of Cournot–Bertrand Equilibria (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:30)
by Semenov, Aggey & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste - Continuity in mechanism design without transfers (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:93:y:2006:i:2:p:182-189)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey - The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:155-161)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey - Common agency with risk-averse agent (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:1:p:38-49)
by Semenov, Aggey - Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:456-481)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey - The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:7:p:1541-1563)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey - A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243467)
by Daouda Diakité & Aggey Semenov & Alban Thomas - A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01509602)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01630253)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01885428)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01509602)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01630253)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01885428)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:1:p:165-180)
by Aggey Semenov - Social Pricing and Water Provision in Côte d'Ivoire (RePEc:ler:wpaper:06.14.207)
by DIAKITE Daouda & SEMENOV Aggey & THOMAS Alban - Vertical Limit pricing (RePEc:ott:wpaper:1104e)
by Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright - Entry deterrrence via renegotiation-proof non-exclusive contracts (RePEc:ott:wpaper:1105e)
by Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright - Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent (RePEc:ott:wpaper:1215e)
by Aggey Semenov - On imperfect commitment in contracts (RePEc:ott:wpaper:1503e)
by Aggey Semenov - Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares (RePEc:ott:wpaper:1610e)
by Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov - A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games (RePEc:ott:wpaper:1618e)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - Charitable Giving and NPOs Investment Decision in a Stochastic Dynamic Economy (RePEc:ott:wpaper:2113e)
by Han Jiang & Aggey Simons - Charitable Giving and NPOs Investment Decision in a Stochastic Dynamic Economy (RePEc:ott:wpaper:2402e)
by Han Jiang & Aggey Simons - A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement (RePEc:ott:wpaper:e1304e)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - Existence and continuity of the optimal contract in adverse selection models with constraints (RePEc:ott:wpaper:e1402e)
by Aggey Semenov - A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement (RePEc:oup:restud:v:84:y:2017:i:2:p:816-852.)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole - Delegation to potentially uninformed agent (RePEc:pra:mprapa:42080)
by Semenov, Aggey - A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement (RePEc:pra:mprapa:53504)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars - A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:66620)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars - Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6988)
by Semenov, Aggey - The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6989)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey - Common Agency with Risk-Averse Agent (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6991)
by Semenov, Aggey - Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6992)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey - A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game (RePEc:pra:mprapa:80870)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars - Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying (RePEc:pra:mprapa:8519)
by Semenov, Aggey & Martimort, David - The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S (RePEc:red:sed014:1265)
by Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz - A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game (RePEc:the:publsh:2266)
by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars A. - Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:2-3:p:614-623)
by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov - Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts (RePEc:wly:canjec:v:47:y:2014:i:1:p:325-347)
by Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright - Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent (RePEc:wly:canjec:v:51:y:2018:i:1:p:64-93)
by Aggey Semenov