Patrick W. Schmitz
Names
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Patrick |
| middle: |
W. |
| last: |
Schmitz |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Universität zu Köln
/ Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Research profile
author of:
- Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:4:p:1027)
by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W - Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:422-434)
by Patrick W. Schmitz - Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (RePEc:awi:wpaper:0463)
by Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases (RePEc:awi:wpaper:0465)
by Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory (RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:53:y:2001:i:1:p:1-17)
by Schmitz, Patrick W - Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? (RePEc:bla:econom:v:74:y:2007:i:296:p:573-585)
by Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz - Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (RePEc:bla:randje:v:44:y:2013:i:1:p:56-74)
by Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz - Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:808-830)
by Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz - How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:123:y:2021:i:1:p:238-266)
by Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz - Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation (RePEc:cgr:cgsser:02-02)
by Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer & Patrick W. Schmitz - Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10110)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10207)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10249)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10686)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11002)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva - The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11215)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J. - Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11217)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne - The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11276)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11632)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel - Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12174)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12258)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13204)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J. - How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13406)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & , - Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13841)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13881)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15492)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra - Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15514)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15567)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel - On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15970)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16003)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17109)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17885)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18048)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18208)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19177)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2679)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2698)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3428)
by Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W. - On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3774)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4031)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4263)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4264)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5145)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5292)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5417)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5747)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Garbled Elections (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5958)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas - Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6207)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6322)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6467)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Mylovanov, Tymofiy - Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6476)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Roider, Andreas - Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6478)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6725)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne - Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6807)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Roider, Andreas & Oechssler, Joerg - Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6988)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7056)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva - Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7205)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva - Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7252)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva - The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7331)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva - Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7584)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7681)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva - Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7976)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8167)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva & Kusterer, David J - Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8241)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra - Investments as Signals of Outside Options (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8366)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne - The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9050)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9065)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9141)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9281)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9287)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva - Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9396)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9510)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva - Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9676)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:117:y:2007:i:520:p:637-653)
by Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz - Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:3:p:268-271)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:103:y:2009:i:1:p:33-35)
by Wichardt, Philipp C. & Schunk, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:58-62)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:642-645)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:841-843)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:1:p:94-96)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:28-31)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:3:p:336-339)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:3:p:533-536)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:1:p:21-24)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:129:y:2015:i:c:p:116-120)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:33-37)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:88-92)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:96-99)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:22)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519302393)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:202:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521001002)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:224:y:2023:i:c:s016517652300037x)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:226:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001283)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:241:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003148)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:63:y:1999:i:2:p:181-185)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:97:y:2007:i:3:p:208-214)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:1:p:119-122)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:577-580)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:211-222)
by Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:157:y:2023:i:c:s001429212300140x)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:169-188)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:5:p:1027-1046)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:4:p:859-870)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:57:y:2013:i:c:p:108-117)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:87:y:2016:i:c:p:92-107)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The management of innovation: Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:706-725)
by Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:544-564)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:153-173)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:186-199)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:2:p:651-665)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas - Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:1000-1008)
by Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:17-33)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - On synergies and vertical integration (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:8:p:1281-1295)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk - On the joint use of liability and safety regulation (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:3:p:371-382)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:4:p:575-575)
by Schmitz, P. W. - Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:144:y:2017:i:c:p:153-165)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:177:y:2020:i:c:p:514-532)
by Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:182:y:2021:i:c:p:100-112)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:184:y:2021:i:c:p:653-669)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - "Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:43:y:2000:i:1:p:115-125)
by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:72:y:2009:i:1:p:147-152)
by Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:89:y:2013:i:c:p:145-166)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:2:p:444-460)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:106:y:2002:i:1:p:177-189)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Investments as signals of outside options (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:150:y:2014:i:c:p:683-708)
by Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages (RePEc:eee:labeco:v:12:y:2005:i:6:p:727-738)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - On second-price auctions and imperfect competition (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:39:y:2003:i:8:p:901-909)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:807-816)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:132:y:2015:i:c:p:23-31)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:198:y:2021:i:c:s0047272721000608)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:3-4:p:258-268)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00696620)
by Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz - Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern (RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1998:p:233-243)
by Patrick W. Schmitz & Dirk Sliwka - Endogenous Punishments In Agency With Verifiable Ex Post Information (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:46:y:2005:i:4:p:1207-1231)
by Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann & Patrick W. Schmitz - Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3481)
by Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:11:y:2001:i:1:p:23-28)
by Patrick Schmitz - Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:26:y:2023:i:5:d:10.1007_s10683-023-09813-x)
by Petra Nieken & Patrick W. Schmitz - Book reviews (RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:71:y:2000:i:3:p:316-342)
by R. Luce & M. Raith & E. Rasmusen & S. Grosskopf & K. Velupillai & W. Pauwels & E. Furubotn & P. Schmitz & S. Napel - Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law (RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:81:y:2004:i:1:p:87-92)
by P. W. Schmitz - Randomization in Coalition Contracts (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:3-4:p:341-53)
by Schmitz, Patrick W - Randomization in coalition contracts (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:3:p:341-353)
by Patrick Schmitz - Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered (RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200108)57:4_394:ppaict_2.0.tx_2-q)
by Patrick W. Schmitz - Book Review (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200609)162:3_535:ct_2.0.tx_2-w)
by Patrick W. Schmitz - Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201512)171:4_565:coindi_2.0.tx_2-v)
by Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz - Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (RePEc:mnh:spaper:2071)
by Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases (RePEc:mnh:spaper:2073)
by Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W. - How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:132:y:2022:i:647:p:2563-2577.)
by Patrick W Schmitz - Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:21:y:2005:i:2:p:315-329)
by Patrick W. Schmitz - Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study (RePEc:oup:restud:v:80:y:2013:i:4:p:1516-1544)
by Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz - Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information (RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:52:y:1997:i:1:p:89-101)
by Schmitz, Patrick W - Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information (RePEc:pra:mprapa:105106)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract (RePEc:pra:mprapa:106427)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries (RePEc:pra:mprapa:106947)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:pra:mprapa:107609)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts (RePEc:pra:mprapa:112839)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:116220)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory (RePEc:pra:mprapa:117065)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts (RePEc:pra:mprapa:117742)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:121333)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12530)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12531)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12532)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12533)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - "Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12534)
by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W. - On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12536)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12562)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - On Randomization in Coalition Contracts (RePEc:pra:mprapa:13446)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered (RePEc:pra:mprapa:13447)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment (RePEc:pra:mprapa:13448)
by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W. - On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (RePEc:pra:mprapa:23157)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality (RePEc:pra:mprapa:28823)
by Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule (RePEc:pra:mprapa:32716)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas - Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered (RePEc:pra:mprapa:36914)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods (RePEc:pra:mprapa:41730)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (RePEc:pra:mprapa:41966)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability (RePEc:pra:mprapa:43407)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study (RePEc:pra:mprapa:44240)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach (RePEc:pra:mprapa:44953)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach (RePEc:pra:mprapa:45243)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered (RePEc:pra:mprapa:53712)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (RePEc:pra:mprapa:53717)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6549)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6929)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6930)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6934)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6936)
by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6937)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6941)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk - Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6943)
by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6944)
by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6945)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6947)
by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6971)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6972)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6973)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6975)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) (RePEc:pra:mprapa:6977)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström
[Contract Theory: On the Contributions of the 2016 Nobel Laureates Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström] (RePEc:pra:mprapa:75233)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs (RePEc:pra:mprapa:90784)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (RePEc:pra:mprapa:90790)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted (RePEc:pra:mprapa:90792)
by Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments (RePEc:pra:mprapa:90800)
by Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives (RePEc:pra:mprapa:90801)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered (RePEc:pra:mprapa:91457)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information (RePEc:pra:mprapa:91458)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm (RePEc:pra:mprapa:91460)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects (RePEc:pra:mprapa:95615)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory (RePEc:pra:mprapa:95618)
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership (RePEc:pra:mprapa:95637)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm (RePEc:pra:mprapa:97912)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions (RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:2:p:318-336)
by Patrick W. Schmitz - Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments (RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:56:y:2004:i:1:p:72-89)
by Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz - Task scheduling and moral hazard (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:37:y:2008:i:2:p:307-320)
by Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz - Garbled Elections (RePEc:trf:wpaper:195)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas - Signaling an Outside Option (RePEc:trf:wpaper:281)
by Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick - Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (RePEc:trf:wpaper:372)
by Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Reserve prices in auctions as reference points (RePEc:use:tkiwps:0514)
by S. Rosenkranz & P. Schmitz - Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:53:y:2012:i:2:p:433-452)
by Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz - Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases (RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:08-05)
by Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:08-06)
by Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:192000)
by Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick - Reserve prices in auctions as reference points (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:242005)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:252005)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:262005)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:272005)
by Schmitz, Patrick W. - Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:72006)
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W. - Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining (RePEc:zur:iewwpx:398)
by Philipp C. Wichardt & Daniel Schunk & Patrick W. Schmitz