Stephen Walter Salant

Names

first:	Stephen
middle:	Walter
last:	Salant

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

psa604

Contact

homepage:

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ssalant/

Affiliations

University of Michigan / Economics Department (weight: 96%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Resources for the Future (RFF) (weight: 4%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (RePEc:ads:wpaper:0069)
by Emre Ozdenoren & Stephen Salant & Dan Silverman
Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:74:y:1984:i:1:p:247-50)
by Salant, Stephen W
Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:3:p:658-65)
by Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W
Cartel Quotas under Majority Rule (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:1:p:82-102)
by Cave, Jonathan & Salant, Stephen W
Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:3:p:585-604)
by Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant
Restricting the Trash Trade (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:2:p:243-246)
by Molly Macauley & Eduardo Ley & Stephen W. Salant
Intertemporal Depletion of Resource Sites by Spatially Distributed Users (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:4:p:1149-1159)
by Gerard Gaudet & Michel Moreaux & Stephen W. Salant
The Dynamics of Pollution Permits (RePEc:anr:reseco:v:7:y:2015:p:61-79)
by Makoto Hasegawa & Stephen Salant
THE DESIGN OF A SELF‐ENFORCING MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT AMONG OIL‐lMPORTING COUNTRlES (RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:2:y:1984:i:5:p:58-75)
by Stephen W. Salant
Should Congestion Tolls be Set by the Government or by the Private Sector? The Knight–Pigou Debate Revisited (RePEc:bla:econom:v:85:y:2018:i:339:p:428-448)
by Stephen Salant & Nathan Seegert
Willpower And The Optimal Control Of Visceral Urges (RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:10:y:2012:i:2:p:342-368)
by Emre Ozdenoren & Stephen W. Salant & Dan Silverman
Regulating an Experience Good Produced in the Formal Sector of a Developing Country when Consumers Cannot Identify Producers (RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:16:y:2012:i:4:p:512-526)
by Timothy McQuade & Stephen Salant & Jason Winfree
Unknown item RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:02-19-09 (paper)
The economics of mutualisms: optimal utiliztion of mycorrhizal mutualistic partners by plants (RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt14b5d950)
by Salant, Stephen W.
Willpower and Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001355)
by Emre Ozdenoren & Stephen Salant & Dan Silverman
Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000034)
by Emre Ozdenoren & Steve Salant & Dan Silverman
Partnerships: A Potential Solution to the Common-Property Problem but a Problem for a Antitrust Authorities (RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000040)
by Martin D. Heintzelman & Stephen W. Salant & Stephan Schott
Litigation of Settlement Demands Questioned by Bayesian Defendants (RePEc:clt:sswopa:516)
by Salant, Stephen W.
The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition: Further Results (RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9203)
by Gérard Gaudet & Stephen Salant
The welfare costs of unreliable water service (RePEc:eee:deveco:v:92:y:2010:i:1:p:1-12)
by Baisa, Brian & Davis, Lucas W. & Salant, Stephen W. & Wilcox, William
Mergers of producers of perfect complements competing in price (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:39:y:1992:i:3:p:359-364)
by Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W.
The effects of “nonbinding” price floors (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:145:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122000605)
by Salant, Stephen & Shobe, William & Uler, Neslihan
The effects of seemingly nonbinding price floors: An experimental analysis (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:159:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123002118)
by Salant, Stephen & Shobe, William & Uler, Neslihan
Balancing the carbon budget for oil: The distributive effects of alternative policies (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:99:y:2017:i:c:p:191-215)
by Fischer, Carolyn & Salant, Stephen W.
Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:16:y:1998:i:2:p:195-208)
by W. Salant, Stephen & Shaffer, Greg
Markets with untraceable goods of unknown quality: Beyond the small-country case (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:100:y:2016:i:c:p:112-119)
by McQuade, Timothy & Salant, Stephen W. & Winfree, Jason
Spatially and Intertemporally Efficient Waste Management: The Costs of Interstate Trade Restrictions (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:188-218)
by Ley, Eduardo & Macauley, Molly K. & Salant, Stephen W.
Private Storage of Common Property (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:280-302)
by Gaudet, Gerard & Moreaux, Michel & Salant, Stephen W.
Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:57:y:2009:i:3:p:309-320)
by Heintzelman, Martin D. & Salant, Stephen W. & Schott, Stephan
A free lunch in the commons (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:61:y:2011:i:3:p:245-253)
by Kotchen, Matthew J. & Salant, Stephen W.
Forest loss, monetary compensation, and delayed re-planting: The effects of unpredictable land tenure in China (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:78:y:2016:i:c:p:49-66)
by Salant, Stephen W. & Yu, Xueying
What ails the European Union׳s emissions trading system? (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:80:y:2016:i:c:p:6-19)
by Salant, Stephen W.
The effects of periodic quotas limiting the stock of imports of durables (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:109:y:2003:i:2:p:402-419)
by Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W.
The length of optimal extraction programs when depletion affects extraction costs (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:31:y:1983:i:2:p:364-374)
by Salant, Stephen & Eswaran, Mukesh & Lewis, Tracy
Diversify or focus? Spending to combat infectious diseases when budgets are tight (RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:31:y:2012:i:4:p:658-675)
by Anderson, Soren T. & Laxminarayan, Ramanan & Salant, Stephen W.
Cap-and-trade programs under delayed compliance: Consequences of interim injections of permits (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:119:y:2014:i:c:p:24-34)
by Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen
The equilibrium price path of timber in the absence of replanting: does Hotelling rule the forests too? (RePEc:eee:resene:v:35:y:2013:i:4:p:572-581)
by Salant, Stephen W.
The benefits of expediting government gold sales (RePEc:eee:revfin:v:16:y:2007:i:3:p:235-258)
by Henderson, Dale W. & Salant, Stephen W. & Irons, John S. & Thomas, Sebastian
Cartels (RePEc:elg:eebook:2572)
by None
Cartel Quotas under Majority Rule (RePEc:eme:ceazzz:s0573-8555(1996)0000234013)
by Jonathan Cave & Stephen W. Salant
Spatially and intertemporally efficient waste management: The costs of interstate flow control (RePEc:fda:fdaddt:9707)
by Eduardo Ley & Molly K. Macauley & Stephen W. Salant
Staving off the backstop: dynamic limit-pricing with a kinked demand curve (RePEc:fip:fedgif:110)
by Stephen W. Salant
Transversality conditions in infinite horizon models (RePEc:fip:fedgif:172)
by Jo Anna Gray & Stephen W. Salant
Profitable speculation, price stability, and welfare (RePEc:fip:fedgif:54)
by Stephen W. Salant
Can government gold be put to better use?: Qualitative and quantitative policies (RePEc:fip:fedgif:582)
by Dale W. Henderson & John S. Irons & Stephen W. Salant & Sebastian Thomas
Nash-Cournot equilibrium for an exhaustible resource like oil (RePEc:fip:fedgif:63)
by Stephen W. Salant
Gains from trade under uncertainty, once again (RePEc:fip:fedgif:72)
by Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Stephen W. Salant
No end to the 'age of zinc': the length of the optimal program when depletion affects extraction costs (RePEc:fip:fedgif:73)
by Stephen W. Salant
Hirshleifer on speculation (RePEc:fip:fedgif:75)
by Stephen W. Salant
Market anticipations, government policy, and the price of gold (RePEc:fip:fedgif:81)
by Dale W. Henderson & Stephen W. Salant
Search theory and duration data: a theory of sorts (RePEc:fip:fedgsp:42)
by Stephen W. Salant
Pacman Refutes The Coase Conjecture: Durable-Goods Monopoly With Discrete Demand (RePEc:fth:michet:88-5)
by Bagnoli, M. & Salant, S.W. & Swierzbinski, J.E.
The Profitability Of Exogenous Output Contactions (RePEc:fth:michet:89-09)
by Gaudet, G. & Salant, S.
Uniqueness Of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results From Old Methods (RePEc:fth:michet:89-10)
by Gaudet, G. & Salant, S.
Towards A Theory Of Horizontal Mergers (RePEc:fth:michet:89-24)
by Gaudet, G. & Salant, S.
Predicting Committee Behavior In Majority-Rule Voting Experiments (RePEc:fth:michet:89-25)
by Salant, S.W. & Goodstein, E.
For Sale by Owner: When to Use a Realtor and How to Price the House (RePEc:fth:michet:90-14)
by Salant, S.W.
Price Discrimination and Intertemporal Self-Selection (RePEc:fth:michet:91-1)
by Bagnoli, M. & Salant, S.W. & Swierzbinski, J.E.
Surviving Winter: A Fitness-Based Explanation of Hoarding and Hibernation (RePEc:fth:michet:92-02)
by Salant, S. & Kalat, K. & Wheatcroft, A.
The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition: Further Results (RePEc:fth:michet:92-03)
by Salant, S. & Gaudet, G.
Cartel Quotas Under Majority Rule (RePEc:fth:michet:92-04)
by Cave, J. & Salant, S.
Intertemporal Self-Selection with Multiple Buyers Under Complete and Incomplete Information (RePEc:fth:michet:92-05)
by Bagholi, M. & Salant, S.W. & Swierzbinski, J.E.
Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures: A Comment on the Literature (RePEc:fth:michet:93-06)
by Salant, S.W. & Shaffer, G.
Deducing Implications of Fitness Maximization when a Tradeoff Exists Among Alternative Currencies (RePEc:fth:michet:95-09)
by Salant, S. & kalat, K.L. & Wheatcroft, A.M.
When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction Under Free Access Correct? -- A Game - Theoretic Justification for Non Game-Theoretic Analyses (RePEc:fth:michet:95-10)
by Brooks, R. & Controneo, J. & Murray, M. & Salant, S.
Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures (RePEc:fth:michet:97-06)
by Salant, S.W. & Shaffer, G.
Intertemporal and Spatial Depletion of Landfills (RePEc:fth:michet:97-07)
by Gaudet, G. & Moreaux, M. & Salant, S.W.
Private Storage of Common Property (RePEc:fth:michet:97-08)
by Gaudet, G. & Moreaux, M. & Salant, S.W.
Imperfect Competition in the International Energy Market: A Computerized Nash-Cournot Model (RePEc:inm:oropre:v:30:y:1982:i:2:p:252-280)
by Stephen W. Salant
Modeling Nonrenewable Resources Use with Multiple Demands and Multiple Sources (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:70:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10640-016-0003-9)
by Gérard Gaudet & Stephen W. Salant
Experimental departures from self-interest when competing partnerships share output (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:18:y:2015:i:1:p:89-115)
by Josh Cherry & Stephen Salant & Neslihan Uler
For Sale by Owner: When to Use a Broker and How to Price the House (RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:4:y:1991:i:2:p:157-73)
by Salant, Stephen W
The strategic use of early bird discounts for dealers (RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:14:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s11129-016-9167-4)
by Desmond (Ho-Fu) Lo & Stephen W. Salant
The Profitability Of Exogeneous Output Contractions: A Comparative- Static Analysis With Application To Strikes, Mergers And Export Subsidies (RePEc:lvl:laeccr:8817)
by Gaudet, G. & Salant, S.W.
Uniqueness Of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results From Old Methods (RePEc:lvl:laeccr:8818)
by Gaudet, G. & Salant, S.W.
The Effects of Periodic Quotas Limiting the Stock of Imports of Durables (RePEc:mtl:montde:2002-09)
by GAUDET, Gérard & SALANT, Stephen W.
The hotelling model with multiple demands (RePEc:mtl:montde:2014-04)
by GAUDET, Gérard & SALANT, Stephen W.
Private Storage of Common Property (RePEc:mtl:montde:9704)
by GAUDET, Gérard & MOREAUX, Michel & SALANT, Stephen W.
Intertemporal and Spatial Depletion of Landfills (RePEc:mtl:montde:9718)
by GAUDET, Gérard & MOREAUX, Michel & SALANT, Stephen W.
The Hotelling Model with Multiple Demands (RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2014)
by Gérard GAUDET & Stephen W. SALANT
Intertemporal and Spatial Depletion of Landfills (RePEc:mtl:montec:9718)
by Gaudet, G. & Moreaux, M. & Salant, S.W.
Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12278)
by Emre Ozdenoren & Stephen Salant & Dan Silverman
A Free Lunch in the Commons (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15086)
by Matthew J. Kotchen & Stephen W. Salant
Hotelling Under Pressure (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20280)
by Soren T. Anderson & Ryan Kellogg & Stephen W. Salant
Spending and Pricing to Deter Arbitrage (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:134:y:2024:i:662:p:2638-2654.)
by Stephen W Salant
When is Inducing Self-Selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist? (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:104:y:1989:i:2:p:391-397.)
by Stephen W. Salant
Hirshleifer on Speculation (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:90:y:1976:i:4:p:667-675.)
by Stephen W. Salant
Search Theory and Duration Data: A Theory of Sorts (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:91:y:1977:i:1:p:39-57.)
by Stephen W. Salant
Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:98:y:1983:i:2:p:185-199.)
by Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds
Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results From Old Methods (RePEc:oup:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:2:p:399-404.)
by Gérard Gaudet & Stephen W. Salant
The Economics of Natural Resource Extraction: A Primer for Development Economists (RePEc:oup:wbrobs:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:93-111)
by Salant, Stephen W
Recurrence of a modified random walk and its application to an economic model (RePEc:pra:mprapa:11171)
by Salant, Stephen W. & Wenocur, Roberta S.
Imperfect competition in the international energy market: a computerized Nash-Cournot model (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12021)
by Salant, Stephen W.
Diversify or focus: spending to combat infectious diseases when budgets are tight (RePEc:pra:mprapa:21860)
by Anderson, Soren & Laxminarayan, Ramanan & Salant, Stephen W.
Markets with untraceable goods of unknown quality: a market failure exacerbated by globalization (RePEc:pra:mprapa:21874)
by McQuade, Timothy & Salant, Stephen W. & Winfree, Jason
Using Lorenz curves to represent firm heterogeneity in Cournot games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:21876)
by Salant, Stephen W. & Shaffer, Greg
Putting Free-Riding to Work: A Partnership Solution to the Common-Property Problem (RePEc:pra:mprapa:9804)
by Heintzelman, Martin & Salant, Stephen W. & Schott, Stephan
The Welfare Costs of Unreliable Water Service (RePEc:pra:mprapa:9812)
by Baisa, Brian & Davis, Lucas & Salant, Stephen W. & Wilcox, William
Towards a theory of horizontal mergers (RePEc:pra:mprapa:9875)
by Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W.
Game Theory and the Law: Is Game Theory Ready for Prime Time? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:9884)
by Salant, Stephen W. & Sims, Theodore
Game theory and the law: ready for prime time? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:9900)
by Salant, Stephen W. & Sims, Theodore
A Free Lunch in the Commons (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-09-30)
by Salant, Stephen W. & Kotchen, Matthew J.
Markets with Untraceable Goods of Unknown Quality: A Market Failure Exacerbated by Globalization (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-09-31)
by McQuade, Timothy & Salant, Stephen W. & Winfree, Jason
Diversity or Focus? Spending to Combat Infectious Diseases When Budgets Are Tight (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-15)
by Anderson, Soren & Laxminarayan, Ramanan & Salant, Stephen W.
Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-35)
by Ozdenoren, Emre & Salant, Stephen & Silverman, Dan
Size Matters (in Output-Sharing Groups): Voting to End the Tragedy of the Commons (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-43)
by Cherry, Josh & Salant, Stephen & Uler, Neslihan
Regulating an Experience Good Produced in the Formal Sector of a Developing Country when Consumers Cannot Identify Producers (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-52-rev)
by McQuade, Timothy & Salant, Stephen W. & Winfree, Jason
Alternative Climate Policies and Intertemporal Emissions Leakage: Quantifying the Green Paradox (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-12-16)
by Fischer, Carolyn & Salant, Stephen
Cap-and-Trade Programs under Delayed Compliance (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-12-32)
by Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen
Cap-and-Trade Programs under Delayed Compliance (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-12-32-rev)
by Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen W.
Cap-and-Trade Programs under Continual Compliance (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-12-33)
by Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen
The Equilibrium Price Path of Timber in the Absence of Replanting (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-12-38)
by Salant, Stephen
Experimental Departures from Self-Interest when Competing Partnerships Share Output (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-13-07)
by Cherry, Josh & Salant, Stephen & Uler, Neslihan
The Effect of Stochastic Oscillations in Property Rights Regimes on Forest Output in China (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-13-08)
by Salant, Stephen W. & Yu, Xueying
The Effect of Stochastic Oscillations in Property Rights Regimes on Forest Output in China (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-13-08-rev)
by Salant, Stephen W. & Yu, Xueying
Hotelling under Pressure (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-14-20)
by T. Anderson, Soren & Kellog, Ryan & W. Salant, Stephen
The Hotelling Model with Multiple Demands (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-14-21)
by Gaudet, Gérard & Salant, Stephen
The Dynamics of Pollution Permits (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-15-20)
by Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen
What Ails the European Union's Emissions Trading System? Two Diagnoses Calling for Different Treatments (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-15-30)
by Salant, Stephen W.
Arbitrage Deterrence: A Theory of International Drug Pricing (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-21-07)
by Salant, Stephen
Spending and Pricing to Deter Arbitrage (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-24-03)
by Salant, Stephen
Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority Rule Voting Experiments (RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:summer:p:293-313)
by Stephen W. Salant & Eban Goodstein
How Much is a Nonearning Asset with No Current Capital Gains Worth? (RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:14:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s13235-023-00536-5)
by Stephen Salant & Joshua Keller
Intertemporal Self-Selection with Multiple Buyers (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:5:y:1995:i:3:p:513-26)
by Bagnoli, Mark & Salant, Stephen W & Swierzbinski, Joseph E
Book Review (RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:55:y:2007:p:848-852)
by Stephen W. Salant
Hotelling under Pressure (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/697203)
by Soren T. Anderson & Ryan Kellogg & Stephen W. Salant
When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:107:y:1999:i:4:p:843-858)
by Robin Brooks & Michael Murray & Stephen Salant & Jill C. Weise
Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:84:y:1976:i:5:p:1079-93)
by Salant, Stephen W
Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:86:y:1978:i:4:p:627-48)
by Salant, Stephen W & Henderson, Dale W
The Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Schemes to Speculative Attack (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:91:y:1983:i:1:p:1-38)
by Salant, Stephen W
Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:95:y:1987:i:6:p:1326-36)
by Salant, Stephen W
Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:6:p:1459-78)
by Bagnoli, Mark & Salant, Stephen W & Swierzbinski, Joseph E
The benefits of expediting government gold sales (RePEc:wly:revfec:v:16:y:2007:i:3:p:235-258)
by Dale W. Henderson & Stephen W. Salant & John S. Irons & Sebastian Thomas
Spatially and Intertemporally Efficient Waste Management: The Costs of Interstate Flow Control (RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9606001)
by Eduardo Ley & Molly K. Macauley & Stephen W. Salant

The profile is maintained by Stephen Walter Salant

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/psa604/