Remzi Sanver
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Remzi |
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Sanver |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
/ Laboratoire d'Analyse et Modélisation de Systèmes pour l'Aide à la Décision (LAMSADE)
Research profile
author of:
- Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter? (RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1643)
by Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver - Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited (RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1736)
by Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver - Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners (RePEc:bil:wpaper:0107)
by Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver - An Allocation Rule with Wealth‐Regressive Tax Rates (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:1:p:63-69)
by M. Remzi Sanver - Simple but Powerful Models of Stereotype Formation (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_736_1055)
by Denis Bouyssou & M. Remzi Sanver - Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05cc0019)
by M. Remzi Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver - A characterization of the Copeland solution (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:3:p:354-355)
by Sanver, M. Remzi & Selçuk, Özer - Absolute qualified majoritarianism: How does the threshold matter? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:153:y:2017:i:c:p:20-22)
by Ozkes, Ali Ihsan & Sanver, M. Remzi - Another characterization of the majority rule (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:75:y:2002:i:3:p:409-413)
by Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi - Maskin monotonic aggregation rules (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:91:y:2006:i:2:p:179-183)
by Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi - Nash implementation of the majority rule (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:91:y:2006:i:3:p:369-372)
by Remzi Sanver, M. - On the alternating use of "unanimity" and "surjectivity" in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:96:y:2007:i:1:p:140-143)
by Dogan, Emre & Sanver, M. Remzi - Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:298-300)
by Sanver, M. Remzi - Evaluationwise strategy-proofness (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:227-238)
by Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin - On combining implementable social choice rules (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:60:y:2007:i:1:p:20-30)
by Benoit, Jean Pierre & Ok, Efe A. & Sanver, M. Remzi - A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:880-892)
by Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi - On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:3:p:1050-1073)
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Sanver, Remzi & Sen, Arunava - A solution to the two-person implementation problem (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:194:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000788)
by Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M. - The relationship between Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems on restricted domains (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:114:y:2021:i:c:p:95-97)
by Kruger, Justin & Sanver, M. Remzi - Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:151-155)
by Sanver, M. Remzi - Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:3:p:304-317)
by Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M. - A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:54:y:2007:i:3:p:257-260)
by Sanver, M. Remzi - Stereotype formation as trait aggregation (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:2:p:226-237)
by Can, Burak & Sanver, M. Remzi - On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:1:p:67-73)
by Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav - Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:9-17)
by Núñez, Matías & Sanver, M. Remzi - Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:94:y:2018:i:c:p:32-34)
by Kruger, Justin & Remzi Sanver, M. - Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1 (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:149-162)
by Sertel, Murat R. & Sanver, M. Remzi - Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01498509)
by Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - Hyper-stable social welfare functions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01505809)
by Jean Lainé & Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517227)
by Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver - Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517236)
by Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver - Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517252)
by M. Remzi Sanver - Evaluationwise strategy-proofness (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517255)
by Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver & Shin Sato - Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517283)
by M. Remzi Sanver & Martin Osborne & Sean Horan - The Future of Economic Design (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517300)
by M. Remzi Sanver & William Zwicker & Hervé Moulin & Jean-François Laslier - On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03092402)
by Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver - Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03250759)
by Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu - Metrizable preferences over preferences (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03271221)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & M. Remzi Sanver - Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03341695)
by Ali Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver - Unknown item RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03341697 (paper)
- An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03347632)
by Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver - The relationship between Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems on restricted domains (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03464586)
by Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver - A solution to the two-person implementation problem (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03498370)
by Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver - Compromising as an equal loss principle (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03665048)
by Olivier Cailloux & Beatrice Napolitano & M. Remzi Sanver - Simple but powerful models of stereotype formation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03766376)
by Denis Bouyssou & M Remzi Sanver - Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03767264)
by Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu - Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03767266)
by M. Remzi Sanver - Uniform Random Dictatorship: A characterization without strategy-proofness (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04308099)
by Ali Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver - Compromise Rules Revisited (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02065282)
by Vincent Merlin & Ipek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver - The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02489653)
by Jean-François Laslier & Hervé Moulin & M Remzi Sanver - A solution to the two-person implementation problem (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03342559)
by Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver - The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02489653)
by Jean-François Laslier & Hervé Moulin & M Remzi Sanver - A solution to the two-person implementation problem (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03342559)
by Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver - A solution to the two-person implementation problem (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02173504)
by Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver - Measuring consensus in a preference-approval context (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00681297)
by Bora Erdamar & José Luis Garcia-Lapresta & David Pérez-Roman & Remzi Sanver - Hyper-Stable Social Welfare Functions (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00871312)
by Jean Lainé & Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - Revisiting The Connection Between The No-Show Paradox And Monotonicity (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01276072)
by Matías Núñez & Remzi Sanver - Monotonicity Violations Under Plurality With A Runoff: The Case Of French Presidential Elections (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03413280)
by Umut Keskin & M Remzi Sanver & H Berkay Tosunlu - Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter? (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01416727)
by Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01613138)
by Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - A solution to the two-person implementation problem (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02173504)
by Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver - A minimax procedure for electing committees (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:401-420)
by Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver - Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences (RePEc:kap:theord:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:123-144)
by Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver - Choosers as extension axioms (RePEc:kap:theord:v:67:y:2009:i:4:p:375-384)
by Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver - Simple Collective Identity Functions (RePEc:kap:theord:v:68:y:2010:i:4:p:417-443)
by Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver - A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions (RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:3:p:439-452)
by İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver - Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence (RePEc:msc:wpaper:201005)
by Ceyhun Coban & Remzi Sanver - Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives (RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-01)
by HORAN, Sean & OSBORNE, Martin J. & SANVER, M. Remzi - Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules and Majority Rule : A Generalization of May’s Theorem to Many Alternatives (RePEc:mtl:montec:03-2018)
by Sean HORAN & Martin J. OSBORNE & M. Remzi SANVER - Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices (RePEc:nea:journl:y:2009:i:1-2:p:37-61)
by Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & Remzi Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba - Ability or motivation? Voter registration and turnout in Burkina Faso (RePEc:osf:osfxxx:x5wbj)
by Ozdemir, Ugur & Ozkes, Ali & Sanver, Remzi - On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions (RePEc:siu:wpaper:07-2010)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Remzi Sanver & Arunava Sen - Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:13:y:2004:i:4:d:10.1023_b:grup.0000042925.01972.ad)
by İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver - Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:27:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-018-9562-1)
by M. Remzi Sanver - Compromise Rules Revisited (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:28:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-018-9598-2)
by Vincent Merlin & İpek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver - Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:453-460)
by M. Sanver - Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:39:y:2009:i:3:p:461-471)
by M. Sanver - One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:4:p:553-574)
by M. Sanver & William Zwicker - Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:21:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10058-016-0195-z)
by M. Remzi Sanver - Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:26:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-022-00307-5)
by M. Remzi Sanver - Compromising as an equal loss principle (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:27:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-022-00302-w)
by Olivier Cailloux & Beatrice Napolitano & M. Remzi Sanver - Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:4:p:307-316)
by M. Sanver - An individual manipulability of positional voting rules (RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:431-446)
by Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & M. Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba - Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:3:p:477-494)
by Barış Kaymak & M. Remzi Sanver - Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:22:y:2004:i:2:p:331-347)
by Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver - Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:1:p:31-42)
by Orhan Erdem & M. Sanver - Nash implementation via hyperfunctions (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:607-623)
by İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver - Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:211-219)
by İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver - Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:61-76)
by Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver - Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem? (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:439-442)
by Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver - Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:1:p:89-101)
by Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver - Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:495-506)
by Emre Doğan & M. Sanver - Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:1:p:159-171)
by M. Sanver - Sophisticated preference aggregation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:1:p:73-86)
by M. Sanver & Özer Selçuk - Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:371-398)
by M. Sanver & William Zwicker - Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:953-961)
by Ceyhun Coban & M. Sanver - Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:1:p:187-201)
by Sinan Ertemel & Levent Kutlu & M. Remzi Sanver - Hyper-stable social welfare functions (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:46:y:2016:i:1:p:157-182)
by Jean Lainé & Ali Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:51:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-018-1129-1)
by Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver - Metrizable preferences over preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01235-0)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & M. Remzi Sanver - Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:56:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01272-0)
by Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu - On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:56:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01293-9)
by Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver - Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01308-5)
by Ali I. Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver - Correction to: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01313-2)
by Ali I. Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver - An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01327-w)
by Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver - Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:59:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01397-4)
by Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu - How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-35605-9_6)
by D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver - Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-79128-7_12)
by Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver - Introduction to the Handbook on Approval Voting (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_1)
by Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver - Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_20)
by M. Remzi Sanver - The Basic Approval Voting Game (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_8)
by Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver - Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutions (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-662-46439-7_8)
by İpek Özkal-Sanver & Pelin Pasin & M. Remzi Sanver - Handbook on Approval Voting (RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-642-02839-7)
by None - Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-599)
by Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver - Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (RePEc:wiw:wus055:7507)
by Ozkes, Ali & Sanver, M. Remzi - Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules And Majority Rule: A Generalization Of May'S Theorem To Many Alternatives (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:4:p:1489-1504)
by Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver