William H. Sandholm
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Sandholm |
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Research profile
author of:
- The evolution of preferences and rapid social change (RePEc:att:wimass:199828)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Markov evolution with inexact information (RePEc:att:wimass:199915)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Potential games with continuous player sets (RePEc:att:wimass:199923)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium (RePEc:att:wimass:199937)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing (RePEc:att:wimass:199938)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Evolution with diverse preferences (RePEc:att:wimass:20005)
by Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H. - Negative externalities and evolutionary implementation (RePEc:att:wimass:200115)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation (RePEc:att:wimass:200116)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs (RePEc:att:wimass:20015)
by Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H. - Cultural integration and its discontents (RePEc:att:wimass:200220)
by Kuran,T. & Sandholm,W.H. - Potential dynamics and stable games (RePEc:att:wimass:200221)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs (RePEc:att:wimass:200320)
by Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H. - Evolution in Bayesian games II : stability of purified equilibria (RePEc:att:wimass:200321)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games (RePEc:att:wimass:20035)
by Sandholm,W.H. - Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, I: Theory (RePEc:bie:wpaper:505)
by Sandholm, William H. & Staudigl, Mathias - Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, II: The Logit Model (RePEc:bie:wpaper:506)
by Sandholm, William H. & Staudigl, Mathias - Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000210)
by William H. Sandholm - Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games (RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000042)
by Bill Sandholm - On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:6:p:2265-2294)
by Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm - Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:61:y:1998:i:2:p:165-170)
by Sandholm, William H. - Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics (RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:703-778)
by Sandholm, William H. - An introduction to ABED: Agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:434-462)
by Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Sandholm, William H. - Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:22:y:1998:i:1:p:84-120)
by Sandholm, William H. & Pauzner, Ady - Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:343-378)
by Sandholm, William H. - Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:53:y:2005:i:1:p:83-109)
by Ely, Jeffrey C. & Sandholm, William H. - Simple formulas for stationary distributions and stochastically stable states (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:154-162)
by Sandholm, William H. - H. Peyton Young, Strategic Learning and Its Limits , Oxford Univ. Press (2004) 165 pages (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:417-420)
by Sandholm, William H. - The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:565-590)
by Lahkar, Ratul & Sandholm, William H. - The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:666-683)
by Sandholm, William H. & DokumacI, Emin & Lahkar, Ratul - Decompositions and potentials for normal form games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:446-456)
by Sandholm, William H. - Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:124:y:2005:i:2:p:149-170)
by Sandholm, William H. - Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:367-382)
by Sandholm, William H. - Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:47-69)
by Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H. - Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:641-667)
by Sandholm, William H. - Stable games and their dynamics (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1665-1693.e4)
by Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H. - Large population potential games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1710-1725)
by Sandholm, William H. - Large deviations and multinomial probit choice (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:2151-2158)
by Dokumacı, Emin & Sandholm, William H. - Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:2056-2071)
by Sandholm, William H. - Riemannian game dynamics (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:177:y:2018:i:c:p:315-364)
by Mertikopoulos, Panayotis & Sandholm, William H. - Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:185:y:2020:i:c:s0022053119301073)
by Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R. - Nested replicator dynamics, nested logit choice, and similarity-based learning (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:220:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000875)
by Mertikopoulos, Panayotis & Sandholm, William H. - Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:97:y:2001:i:1:p:81-108)
by Sandholm, William H. - Ross Cressman, Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2003) (RePEc:eee:reveco:v:15:y:2006:i:1:p:136-140)
by Sandholm, William H. - Pairwise Comparison Dynamics and Evolutionary Foundations for Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2009:i:1:p:3-17:d:6406)
by William H. Sandholm - Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01157537)
by Oyama Daisuke & William H. Sandholm & Olivier Tercieux - Unknown item RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01157537 (paper)
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01157537)
by Oyama Daisuke & William H. Sandholm & Olivier Tercieux - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:41:y:2016:i:4:p:1297-1324 (article)
- Sample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:43:y:2018:i:4:p:1348-1377)
by William H. Sandholm & Mathias Staudigl - Hamilton-Jacobi Equations with Semilinear Costs and State Constraints, with Applications to Large Deviations in Games (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:47:y:2022:i:1:p:72-99)
by William H. Sandholm & Hung V. Tran & Srinivas Arigapudi - Simple and Clever Decision Rules in Single Population Evolutionary Models (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1158)
by William H. Sandholm - An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1198)
by William H. Sandholm - Evolution with Diverse Preferences (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1317)
by Jeffery C. Ely & William H. Sandholm - Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing (RePEc:oup:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:3:p:667-689)
by William H. Sandholm - Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation (RePEc:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:3:p:885-915)
by William H. Sandholm - Cultural Integration and Its Discontents (RePEc:oup:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:201-228)
by Timur Kuran & William H. Sandholm - Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change (RePEc:red:issued:v:4:y:2001:i:3:p:637-679)
by William H. Sandholm - History-Independent Prediction In Evolutionary Game Theory (RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:10:y:1998:i:3:p:303-326)
by William H. Sandholm - Preface: Second DGAA Special Issue on Evolutionary Games (RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:2:y:2012:i:1:p:1-3)
by Ross Cressman & William Sandholm & Christine Taylor - Probabilistic Interpretations of Integrability for Game Dynamics (RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:4:y:2014:i:1:p:95-106)
by William Sandholm - Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:107-116)
by William H. Sandholm - Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (RePEc:the:publsh:1405)
by , & , H. & , - Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit (RePEc:the:publsh:1905)
by Sandholm, William H. & Staudigl, Mathias - Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game (RePEc:the:publsh:3565)
by Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R. - Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics (RePEc:the:publsh:505)
by , H. - Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability (RePEc:the:publsh:554)
by , H. - Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics (RePEc:the:publsh:771)
by , & , H. - Unknown item RePEc:vie:viennp:0205 (paper)
- Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0205)
by Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm