Michael Richter
Names
| first: |
Michael |
| last: |
Richter |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
City University of New York (CUNY)
/ Baruch College
/ Zicklin School of Business (weight: 50%)
-
Royal Holloway
/ Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:8:p:2570-94)
by Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein - Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies (RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275833)
by Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel - Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:115:y:2019:i:c:p:30-47)
by Richter, Michael - An experiment on aspiration-based choice (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:119:y:2015:i:c:p:512-526)
by Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael - Costly switching from a status quo (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:156:y:2018:i:c:p:55-70)
by Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael - Fully absorbing dynamic compromise (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:152:y:2014:i:c:p:92-104)
by Richter, Michael - Aspiration-based choice (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:935-956)
by Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael & Tsur, Matan - The permissible and the forbidden (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120300405)
by Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel - Holding a Group Together: Non-Game Theory Versus Game Theory (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:131:y:2021:i:638:p:2629-2641.)
by Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein - Choosing the two finalists (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:46:y:2011:i:2:p:211-219)
by Kfir Eliaz & Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein - Ordinal allocation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01280-0)
by Christopher P. Chambers & Michael Richter - "Convex preferences": a new definition (RePEc:the:publsh:3286)
by Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel - Games with switching costs and endogenous references (RePEc:the:publsh:4169)
by Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael