Jérôme Renault
Names
first: |
Jérôme |
last: |
Renault |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Research profile
author of:
- The Repairman Problem Revisited (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2016:i:121-122:p:7-24)
by Claude Crampes & Jérôme Renault - Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games (RePEc:ebg:heccah:0966)
by Renault, Jerome & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - How many markets for wholesale electricity when supply ispartially flexible? (RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:81:y:2019:i:c:p:465-478)
by Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme - Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:100:y:2016:i:c:p:1-23)
by Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme - Optimal dynamic information provision (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:329-349)
by Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Zero-sum revision games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:504-522)
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:122-139)
by Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno - Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:1:p:124-156)
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan - Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:2:p:313-344)
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan - A folk theorem for minority games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:53:y:2005:i:2:p:208-230)
by Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco - Secure message transmission on directed networks (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:1-18)
by Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan - Dynamic sender–receiver games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:502-534)
by Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:1:p:44-74)
by Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco - Playing off-line games with bounded rationality (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:2:p:207-223)
by Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan - Repeated Proximity Games (RePEc:fth:pariem:97.14)
by Renault, J. & Tomala, T. - On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Signals (RePEc:fth:pariem:97.72)
by Renault, J. - Strategic Transmission of Information: A Chracterization (RePEc:fth:pariem:97.79)
by Renault, J. - On the values of repeated games with signals (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01006951)
by Hugo Gimbert & Jérôme Renault & Sylvain Sorin & Xavier Venel & Wieslaw Zielonka - Long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a new distance for probability spaces (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01396680)
by Jérôme Renault & Xavier Venel - Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00365583)
by Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault - A Minority Game with Bounded Recall (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00538967)
by Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini - Dynamic sender-receiver games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00804028)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Jérôme Renault - On the values of repeated games with signals (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01006951)
by Hugo Gimbert & Jérôme Renault & Sylvain Sorin & Xavier Venel & Wieslaw Zielonka - Long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a new distance for probability spaces (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01396680)
by Jérôme Renault & Xavier Venel - Value-Based Distance Between Information Structures (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01869139)
by Fabien Gensbittel & Marcin Peski & Jérôme Renault - Strategic information transmission with sender's approval (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02440627)
by Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault - Representation formulas for limit values of long run stochastic optimal controls (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02929156)
by R. Buckdahn & Jin Li & Marc Quincampoix & Jérôme Renault - Long Information Design (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02400053)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Unknown item RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03342880 (paper)
- Splitting games over finite sets (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03672222)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - On the values of repeated games with signals (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01006951)
by Hugo Gimbert & Jérôme Renault & Sylvain Sorin & Xavier Venel & Wieslaw Zielonka - Long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a new distance for probability spaces (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01396680)
by Jérôme Renault & Xavier Venel - Long Information Design (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02400053)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Unknown item RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03342880 (paper)
- Splitting games over finite sets (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03672222)
by Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Unknown item RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02400053 (paper)
- Reliability and security of multicast communication in general networks (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00584697)
by Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Unknown item RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01869139 (paper)
- The Large Space Of Information Structures (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02075905)
by Fabien Gensbittel & Marcin Peski & Jérôme Renault - Unknown item RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02400053 (paper)
- A folk theorem for minority games (RePEc:icr:wpmath:10-2003)
by Jerome Renault & Sergio Scarlatti & Marco Scarsini - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:25:y:2000:i:4:p:552-572 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:26:y:2001:i:4:p:832-850 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:31:y:2006:i:3:p:490-512 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:32:y:2007:i:4:p:873-889 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:37:y:2012:i:1:p:154-179 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:40:y:2015:i:4:p:820-841 (article)
- Long-Term Values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a New Distance for Probability Spaces (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:42:y:2017:i:2:p:349-376)
by Jérôme Renault & Xavier Venel - Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:45:y:2020:i:3:p:889-895)
by Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:45:y:2020:i:4:p:1237-1257 (article)
- General Properties of Long-Run Supergames (RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:2:p:319-350)
by Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala - Repeated proximity games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:4:p:539-559)
by JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala - 3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:221-245)
by Jérôme Renault - Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00757-1)
by Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault - Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games (RePEc:ste:nystbu:13-16)
by Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault - Long information design (RePEc:the:publsh:4557)
by Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Value-based distance between information structures (RePEc:the:publsh:4782)
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Pęski, Marcin & Renault, Jérôme - The large space of information structures (RePEc:tse:wpaper:122929)
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Renault, Jérôme & Peski, Marcin - Representation formulas for limit values of long run stochastic optimal controls (RePEc:tse:wpaper:122930)
by Li, Jin & Quincampoix, Marc & Renault, Jérôme & Buckdahn, Rainer - Imperfect competition in electricity markets with partially flexible technologies (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125447)
by Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme - Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125607)
by Renault, Jérôme & Forges, Françoise - Splitting games over finite sets (RePEc:tse:wpaper:126754)
by Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Long information design (RePEc:tse:wpaper:127034)
by Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Supply Flexibility and risk transfer in electricity markets (RePEc:tse:wpaper:127219)
by Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme - A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring (RePEc:tse:wpaper:128536)
by Hörner, Johannes & Renault, Jérôme - A distance for probability spaces, and long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31315)
by Renault, Jérôme & Venel, Xavier - Optimal Dynamic Information Provision (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31316)
by Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Hidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31318)
by Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno - Zero-Sum Revision Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31319)
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan - Acyclic Gambling Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31512)
by Laraki, Rida & Renault, Jérôme - Supply flexibility in electricity markets (RePEc:tse:wpaper:33094)
by Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme