Roy Radner

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author of:

• Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale (repec:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:25-26:p:265-298)
  by Roy Radner & Timothy Van Zandt
• Demand and Supply in U. S. Higher Education: A Progress Report (repec:aea:aecrev:v:60:y:1970:i:2:p:326-34)
  by Radner, Roy & Miller, L S
• Problems in the Theory of Markets under Uncertainty (repec:aea:aecrev:v:60:y:1970:i:2:p:454-60)
  by Radner, Roy
• Hierarchy: The Economics of Management (repec:aea:jeclit:v:30:y:1992:i:3:p:1382-415)
  by Radner, Roy
• Profit Maximization and the Market Selection Hypothesis (repec:att:wimass:9425)
  by Dutta, P.K. & Radner, R.
• Petty corruption: A game‐theoretic approach (repec:bla:ijethy:v:4:y:2008:i:2:p:273-297)
  by Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices (repec:cla:levarc:1594)
  by Roy Radner
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship (repec:cla:levarc:617)
  by R. Radner
• Repeated Principal Agent Games With Discounting (repec:cla:levarc:618)
  by R. Radner
• The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study (repec:cvs:starer:87-41)
  by Radner, Roy & Schotter, Andrew
• Joint Exploitation Of A Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach (repec:cvs:starer:88-17)
  by Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy
• Hierarchy: The Economics On Managing (repec:cvs:starer:90-07)
  by Radner, Roy
• Behavior And Efficiency In The Sealed-Bid Mechanism (repec:cvs:starer:90-51)
  by Linhart, Peter & Radner, Roy & Schotter, Andrew
• A Theory of the Movement and Solution of Problems within an Organization (repec:cwl:cwldpp:18)
  by Roy Radner
• Minimax Estimation for Linear Regressions (repec:cwl:cwldpp:28)
  by Roy Radner
• The Application of Linear Programming to Team Decision Problems (repec:cwl:cwldpp:32)
  by Roy Radner
• Team Decision Problems (repec:cwl:cwldpp:5)
  by Roy Radner & Jacob Marschak
• Limit Distributions of Failure Time for Series -- Parallel Systems (repec:cwl:cwldpp:55)
  by Roy Radner
• Economic Theory of Teams. Chapter 1 (repec:cwl:cwldpp:59a)
  by Jacob Marschak & Roy Radner
• Economic Theory of Teams. Chapter 2 (repec:cwl:cwldpp:59b)
  by Jacob Marschak & Roy Radner
• Economic Theory of Teams. Chapter 3 (repec:cwl:cwldpp:59c)
  by Jacob Marschak & Roy Radner
• Economic Theory of Teams. Chapter 5 (repec:cwl:cwldpp:59e)
  by Jacob Marschak & Roy Radner
• Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of the Firm (repec:ecj:econjl:v:106:y:1996:i:438:p:1360-73)
  by Radner, Roy
• The Internal Economy of Large Firms (repec:ecj:econjl:v:96:y:1986:i:380a:p:1-22)
  by Radner, Roy
• Petty Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Approach (repec:ecl:corcae:08-09)
  by Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majudar, Mukul & Radner, Roy
• Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary (repec:ecl:corcae:08-11)
  by Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy
• Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:40:y:1972:i:2:p:289-303)
  by Radner, Roy
• A Stochastic Decentralized Resource Allocation Process: Part I (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:43:y:1975:i:2:p:187-221)
  by Hurwicz, Leonid & Radner, Roy & Reiter, Stanley
• A Stochastic Decentralized Resource Allocation Process: Part II (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:43:y:1975:i:3:p:363-93)
  by Hurwicz, Leonid & Radner, Roy & Reiter, Stanley
• Allocation of Resources in Large Teams (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:47:y:1979:i:2:p:361-85)
  by Arrow, K J & Radner, R
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:47:y:1979:i:3:p:655-78)
  by Radner, Roy
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:49:y:1981:i:5:p:1127-48)
  by Radner, Roy
• Stationary Optimal Policies with Discounting in a Stochastic Activity Analysis Model (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:51:y:1983:i:6:p:1821-37)
  by Majumdar, Mukul K & Radner, Roy
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:5:p:1173-98)
  by Radner, Roy
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:5:p:1109-46)
  by Radner, Roy
• Nonconvex Production Technology and Price Discrimination (repec:ecm:nasm04:513)
  by Bing Jing & Roy Radner
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats (repec:eee:deveco:v:83:y:2007:i:2:p:351-367)
  by Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy
• Risk vs. profit potential: A model for corporate strategy (repec:eee:dyncon:v:20:y:1996:i:8:p:1373-1393)
  by Radner, Roy & Shepp, Larry
• Profit maximization with bankruptcy and variable scale (repec:eee:dyncon:v:22:y:1998:i:6:p:849-867)
  by Radner, Roy
• Moral hazard (repec:eee:gamchp:2-26)
  by Dutta, Prajit K. & Radner, Roy
• The Design and Performance of Sharing Rules for a Partnership in Continuous Time (repec:eee:gamebe:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:245-265)
  by Rustichini, Aldo & Radner, Roy
• Monopolists and viscous demand (repec:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:442-464)
  by Radner, Roy & Richardson, Thomas J.
• Dynamic games in organization theory (repec:eee:jeborg:v:16:y:1991:i:1-2:p:217-260)
  by Radner, Roy
• A strategic analysis of global warming: Theory and some numbers (repec:eee:jeborg:v:71:y:2009:i:2:p:187-209)
  by Dutta, Prajit K. & Radner, Roy
• On the allocation of effort (repec:eee:jetheo:v:10:y:1975:i:3:p:358-376)
  by Radner, Roy & Rothschild, Michael
• Viscous demand (repec:eee:jetheo:v:112:y:2003:i:2:p:189-231)
  by Radner, Roy
• Robert W. Rosenthal (repec:eee:jetheo:v:112:y:2003:i:2:p:365-368)
  by Radner, Roy & Ray, Debraj
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives (repec:eee:jetheo:v:22:y:1980:i:2:p:136-154)
  by Radner, Roy
• Climate payments: A Coase theorem (repec:eee:jetheo:v:228:y:2025:i:c:s002205312500078x)
  by Dutta, Prajit K. & Radner, Roy
• Rational expectations in microeconomic models: An overview (repec:eee:jetheo:v:26:y:1982:i:2:p:201-223)
  by Jordan, James S. & Radner, Roy
• Allocation of resources in a team (repec:eee:jetheo:v:4:y:1972:i:3:p:415-441)
  by Groves, Theodore & Radner, Roy
• Introduction: Symposium on Noncooperative Bargaining (repec:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:1-17)
  by Linhart, Peter & Radner, Roy & Satterthwaite, Mark
• Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables (repec:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:152-178)
  by Linhart, P. B. & Radner, R.
• The sealed-bid mechanism: An experimental study (repec:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:179-220)
  by Radner, Roy & Schotter, Andrew
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information (repec:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:63-106)
  by Leininger, W. & Linhart, P. B. & Radner, R.
• Optimal stationary consumption with stochastic production and resources (repec:eee:jetheo:v:6:y:1973:i:1:p:68-90)
  by Radner, Roy
• Equilibrium under uncertainty (repec:eee:matchp:2-20)
  by Radner, Roy
• Satisficing (repec:eee:mateco:v:2:y:1975:i:2:p:253-262)
  by Radner, Roy
• Linear Models Of Economic Survival Under Production Uncertainty (repec:fth:cornel:427)
  by Radner, R.
• A Profit-Center Game with incomplete Information (repec:fth:pariem:95.10)
  by Ichiishi, T. & Radner, R.
• Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Bureaucrats and Entrepreneurs (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00754220)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Petty Corruption A Game Theoretic Approach (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00754288)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00754385)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Bureaucrats and Entrepreneurs (repec:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754220)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Petty Corruption A Game Theoretic Approach (repec:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754288)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (repec:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754385)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (repec:hal:psewpa:halshs-00587715)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Radner Roy
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats (repec:hal:psewpa:halshs-00590706)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00587715)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Radner Roy
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats (repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590706)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• Dynamic Games in Organization Theory (repec:hhs:iuiwop:0228)
  by Radner, Roy
• Opportunistic Replacement of a Single Part in the Presence of Several Monitored Parts (repec:inm:ormnsc:v:10:y:1963:i:1:p:70-84)
  by Roy Radner & Dale W. Jorgenson
• The Application of Linear Programming to Team Decision Problems (repec:inm:ormnsc:v:5:y:1959:i:2:p:143-150)
  by Roy Radner
• Unknown
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• Education as an Industry (repec:nbr:nberbk:jami76-1)
  by Joseph T. Froomkin & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Introduction to "Education as an Industry" (repec:nbr:nberch:4487)
  by Joseph T. Froomkin & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• The Ph.D. Production Process (repec:nbr:nberch:4488)
  by David W. Breneman & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Scholastic Achievement: Its Determinants and Effects in the Education Industry (repec:nbr:nberch:4489)
  by Dennis J. Dugan & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Graduation, Graduate School Attendance, and Investments in College Training (repec:nbr:nberch:4490)
  by Lewis J. Perl & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Concepts of Economic Efficiency and Educational Production (repec:nbr:nberch:4491)
  by Henry M. Levin & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• A Study of the Relationship of Instructional Process and Program Organization to the Success of Compensatory Education Projects in California (repec:nbr:nberch:4493)
  by Herbert J. Kiesling & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Demand for Higher Education in the United States: A Second Progress Report (repec:nbr:nberch:4494)
  by Leonard S. Miller & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Productivity Trends in Higher Education (repec:nbr:nberch:4495)
  by June O'Neill & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Instructional Costs of University Outputs (repec:nbr:nberch:4496)
  by Robert M. Oliver & David S. P. Hopkins & Roy Radner
• Faculty-Student Ratios in U.S. Higher Education (repec:nbr:nberch:4497)
  by Roy Radner & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Policy Issues in the Education Industry (repec:nbr:nberch:4498)
  by Joseph N. Froomkin & Dean T. Jamison & Roy Radner
• Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing and Returns to Scale (repec:nwu:cmsems:1233)
  by Timothy Van Zandt & Roy Radner
• Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain (repec:nwu:cmsems:760)
  by Steven R. Williams & Roy Radner
• Informational Externalities and the Scope of Efficient Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (repec:nwu:cmsems:761)
  by Steven R. Williams & R. Radner
• A Profit-Center Game With Incomplete Information (repec:osu:osuewp:011)
  by Tatsuro Ichiishi & Roy Radner
• Neo-Schumpeterian and other theories of the firm: a comment and personal retrospective (repec:oup:indcch:v:15:y:2006:i:2:p:373-380)
  by Roy Radner
• Costly and Bounded Rationality in Individual and Team Decision-Making (repec:oup:indcch:v:9:y:2000:i:4:p:623-58)
  by Radner, Roy
• Prices and the Turnpike: III. Paths of Economic Growth that are Optimal with Regard only to Final States: A Turnpike Theorem (repec:oup:restud:v:28:y:1961:i:2:p:98-104.)
  by Roy Radner
• Efficiency Prices for Infinite Horizon Production Programmes (repec:oup:restud:v:34:y:1967:i:1:p:51-66.)
  by R. Radner
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting (repec:oup:restud:v:53:y:1986:i:1:p:43-57.)
  by Roy Radner
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria (repec:oup:restud:v:53:y:1986:i:1:p:59-69.)
  by Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin
• Profit Maximization and the Market Selection Hypothesis (repec:oup:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:4:p:769-798.)
  by Prajit K. Dutta & Roy Radner
• Dynamic Programming of Economic Growth (repec:pal:intecp:978-1-349-08461-6_4)
  by Roy Radner
• Intertemporal General Equilibrium (repec:pal:intecp:978-1-349-11029-2_26)
  by Roy Radner
• Survival under Production Uncertainty (repec:pal:palchp:978-1-349-11696-6_8)
  by Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• A Note on Unanimity of Stockholders' Preferences among Alternative Production Plans: A Reformulation of the Ekern-Wilson Model (repec:rje:bellje:v:5:y:1974:i:spring:p:181-184)
  by Roy Radner
• A Behavioral Model of Cost Reduction (repec:rje:bellje:v:6:y:1975:i:spring:p:196-215)
  by Roy Radner
• Optimal Pricipal Agent Contracts for a Class of Incitive chemes: A Characterization and the Rate of Approach to Efficency (repec:roc:rocher:300)
  by Dutta, P.K. & Radner, R.
• Learning About the Learning Curve: A Computational Model (repec:sce:scecf7:151)
  by V. Bala & R. Radner
• Linear Models of Economic Survival under Production Uncertainty (repec:spr:joecth:v:1:y:1991:i:1:p:13-30)
  by Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy
• The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach (repec:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:2:p:155-90)
  by Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy
• Foreword to the Symposium (repec:spr:joecth:v:29:y:2006:i:2:p:249-250)
  by Charalambos Aliprantis & Tapan Mitra & Kazuo Nishimura & Roy Radner
• Population growth and technological change in a global warming model (repec:spr:joecth:v:29:y:2006:i:2:p:251-270)
  by Prajit Dutta & Roy Radner
• Optimal Principal Agent Contracts for a Class of Incentive Schemes: A Characterization and the Rate of Approach to Efficiency (repec:spr:joecth:v:4:y:1994:i:4:p:483-503)
  by Dutta, Prajit K & Radner, Roy
• Capital growth in a global warming model: will China and India sign a climate treaty? (repec:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:2:p:411-443)
  by Prajit Dutta & Roy Radner
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (repec:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:45-57)
  by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner
• A profit-center game with incomplete information (repec:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:307-343)
  by Roy Radner & Tatsuro Ichiishi
• Capital Growth in a Global Warming Model: Will China and India Sign a Climate Treaty? (repec:spr:steccp:978-3-319-31943-8_14)
  by Prajit K. Dutta & Roy Radner
• Nonconvex Production Technology and Price Discrimination (repec:ste:nystbu:04-04)
  by Bing Jing & Roy Radner
• Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats (repec:ste:nystbu:04-22)
  by Roy Radner & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Makul Majumdar
• A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming: Theory and Some Numbers (repec:ste:nystbu:05-03)
  by Roy Radner & Prajit K. Dutta
• Dynamic Pricing of Network Goods with Boundedly Rational Consumers (repec:ste:nystbu:10-13)
  by Roy Radner & Ami Radunskaya & Arun Sundararajan
• Bounded Rationality, Indetriminacy, and The Managerial Theory of The Firm (repec:ste:nystbu:97-05)
  by Roy Radner
• Profit Maximization with Bankruptcy and Variable Scale (repec:ste:nystbu:97-06)
  by Roy Radner
• Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing Returns to Scale (repec:ste:nystbu:97-07)
  by Roy Radner & Timothy Van Zandt
• Profit Maximization and The Market Selection Hypothesis (repec:ste:nystbu:97-08)
  by Roy Radner & Prajit K. Dutta
• Viscous Demand (repec:ste:nystbu:99-10)
  by Roy Radner