Martin Pollrich
Names
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Martin |
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Pollrich |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Université Paris-Saclay
/ Graduate School of Economics and Management
/ Centre for Economics at Paris-Saclay (CEPS) (weight: 95%)
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École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay (ENS)
/ Département de sciences sociales (weight: 5%)
Research profile
author of:
- The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification (RePEc:aea:aerins:v:6:y:2024:i:1:p:55-72)
by Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz - The irrelevance of fee structures for certification (RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0017)
by Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz - Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation (RePEc:bdp:wpaper:1)
by Martin Pollrich & Robert Schmidt - Informational opacity and honest certication (RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2013001)
by Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner - Mediated Audits (RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2015003)
by Martin Pollrich - The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version - (RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2015004)
by Martin Pollrich - Mediated audits (RePEc:bla:randje:v:48:y:2017:i:1:p:44-68)
by Martin Pollrich - Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations (RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_019v2)
by Colin von Negenborn & Martin Pollrich - Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders (RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_158)
by Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich - Gütesiegel: zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern (RePEc:diw:diwwob:80-19-3)
by Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner - Informational Opacity and Honest Certification (RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1291)
by Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner - Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:89:y:2016:i:c:p:345-360)
by Pollrich, Martin & Wagner, Lilo - Information design in sequential procurement (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:79-85)
by Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin - Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:189:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120300703)
by von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin - Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:7:p:5146-5161)
by Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich - Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations (RePEc:rco:dpaper:100)
by Pollrich, Martin & von Negenborn, Colin - On the (Ir)Relevance of Fee Structures in Certification (RePEc:rco:dpaper:391)
by Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz - Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation (RePEc:trf:wpaper:480)
by Pollrich, Martin & Schmidt, Robert C. - Informational opacity and honest certification (RePEc:trf:wpaper:481)
by Pollrich, Martin & Wagner, Lilo - Mediated Audits (RePEc:trf:wpaper:809)
by Pollrich, Martin - An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation (RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79741)
by Schmidt, Robert & Pollrich, Martin & Stiel, Caroline - An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation (RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100314)
by Pollrich, Martin & Schmidt, Robert - Sequential procurement with limited commitment (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:19030)
by Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin - Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:19040)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin - Optimal auctions with signaling bidders (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:20091)
by Bos, Olivier & Pollrich, Martin