michel poitevin

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Affiliations

• Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ) (weight: 10%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Université de Montréal / Département de Sciences Économiques (weight: 80%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des Organisations (CIRANO) (weight: 10%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Should a Non-Rival Public Good Always Be Provided Centrally? (RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1444)
  by Nicolas Gravel & Michel Poitevin
• A theory of (de)centralization (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:24:y:2022:i:3:p:417-451)
  by Peter Klibanoff & Michel Poitevin
• Éducation et frais de scolarité (RePEc:cir:cirbur:2013rb-01)
  by Rui Castro & Michel Poitevin
• Relance de l’économie et autonomie alimentaire - Éléments de réflexions (RePEc:cir:circah:2020pr-04)
  by JoAnne Labrecque & Ingrid Peignier & Henri-Paul Rousseau & Lota Tamini & Patrick Mundler & Michel Poitevin & Annie Royer & Meryem Bezzaz & Elizabeth Brisebois-Lacoste & Christophe Mondin & Molivann Pa
• Impartition : Fondements et analyses (RePEc:cir:cirmon:1999mo-01)
  by Gamal Atallah & Benoit Aubert & Mario Bourgault & Marcel Boyer & Marie-Hélène Constantin & Patrick González & Pierre Lasserre & Michel Moreaux & Michel Patry & Michel Poitevin & Suzanne Rivard & Berna
• Le Québec économique 7 : Éducation et capital humain (RePEc:cir:cirmon:2018mo-01)
  by Marcelin Joanis & Claude Montmarquette & Christian Belzil & Brahim Boudarbat & Bryan Campbell & Rui Castro & Jean-Claude Cloutier & Marie Connolly & David D’Arrisso & François Delorme & Pouya Ebrahimi
• L'impartition municipale : l'argumentaire (RePEc:cir:cirpro:1996rp-01)
  by Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Michel Patry & Michel Poitevin & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
• Bank Value and Financial Fragility (RePEc:cir:cirpro:2002rp-07)
  by Karine Gobert & Patrick González & Michel Poitevin & Alexandra Lai
• Concurrence fiscale et biens publics (RePEc:cir:cirpro:2018rp-09)
  by Michel Poitevin
• Tarification optimale du gaz carbonique et élasticités dans les transports (RePEc:cir:cirpro:2020rp-20)
  by Alexandre Pavlov & Charles Vaillancourt & Michel Poitevin
• Autonomie alimentaire - Définitions et concepts (RePEc:cir:cirpro:2020rp-33)
  by Michel Poitevin & Meryem Bezzaz
• Autonomie alimentaire et volatilité des prix : une comparaison internationale (RePEc:cir:cirpro:2023rp-19)
  by Benoit Perron & Michel Poitevin & Arthur Adam & Xénia Sozonoff
• Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization? (RePEc:cir:cirwor:2000s-32)
  by Michel Poitevin
• Organizational Design of R&D Activities (RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-38)
  by Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin
• Should a non-rival public good always be provided centrally (RePEc:cir:cirwor:2015s-53)
  by Nicolas Gravel & Michel Poitevin
• Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings (RePEc:cir:cirwor:95s-01)
  by Tracy R. Lewis & Michel Poitevin
• Using Ex Ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts (RePEc:cir:cirwor:95s-02)
  by Céline Gauthier & Michel Poitevin
• Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design (RePEc:cir:cirwor:95s-03)
  by Michel Poitevin
• Contrat dynamique de partage de risque avec contraintes d'engagement et épargne (RePEc:cir:cirwor:97s-23)
  by Karine Gobert & Michel Poitevin
• Effects of the Fiscal Treatment of Tax Losses on the Efficiency of Markets and the Incidence of Mergers (RePEc:cir:cirwor:98s-33)
  by Michel Poitevin
• Environmental Risks: Should Banks Be Liable? (RePEc:cir:cirwor:98s-39)
  by Karine Gobert & Michel Poitevin
• Collusion and the Banking Structure of a Duopoly (RePEc:cje:issued:v:22:y:1989:i:2:p:263-77)
  by Michel Poitevin
• Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory (RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:2:p:302-35)
  by Paul Beaudry & Michel Poitevin
• Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? (RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:4:p:878-906)
  by Michel Poitevin
• News of the Association / Chronique de l'Association Minutes of the 36th Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Economics Association / L'Association Canadienne d'Economique, Sunday 2 June 2002, Unive (RePEc:cje:issued:v:35:y:2002:i:4:p:906-912)
  by Michel Poitevin & Charles Beach
• Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities? (RePEc:cje:issued:v:50:y:2017:i:5:p:1573-1594)
  by Kim Nguyen & Michael Peters & Michel Poitevin
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:4:p:745-82)
  by Beaudry, Paul & Poitevin, Michel
• Organizational Design of R & D Activities (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0190)
  by Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin
• Incentives, Informational Economies of Scale, and Benchmarking (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1688)
  by Rym Ben Hamadi & Michel Poitevin
• Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:451-460)
  by Gravel, Nicolas & Poitevin, Michel
• Strategic financial signalling (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:8:y:1990:i:4:p:499-518)
  by Poitevin, Michel
• Ex Ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:76:y:1997:i:1:p:106-144)
  by Gauthier, Celine & Poitevin, Michel & Gonzalez, Patrick
• The progressivity of equalization payments in federations (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:8-9:p:1725-1743)
  by Gravel, Nicolas & Poitevin, Michel
• Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02283840)
  by Nicolas Gravel & Michel Poitevin
• Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02638008)
  by Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin
• Should a Non-Rival Public Good Always Be Provided Centrally? (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01063191)
  by Nicolas Gravel & Michel Poitevin
• The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations (RePEc:iep:wpidep:0408)
  by Nicolas Gravel & Michel Poitevin
• Marketing vs Engineering: Who Should Decide ? (RePEc:ler:wpaper:08.22.266)
  by AMBEC Stefan & POITEVIN Michel
• Bank Value and Financial Fragility (RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0206)
  by Gobert, Karine & González, Patrick & Poitevin, Michel
• Endogenous Value and Financial Fragility (RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0306)
  by Gobert, Karine & González, Patrick & Lai, Alexandra & Poitevin, Michel
• Bank Value and Financial Fragility (RePEc:lvl:lagrcr:0202)
  by Gobert, Karine & Gonzalez, Patrick & Poitevin, Michel
• Endogenous Value and Financial Fragility (RePEc:lvl:lagrcr:0306)
  by Gobert, Karine & González, Patrick & Lai, Alexandra & Poitevin, Michel
• Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable? (RePEc:mtl:montde:1198)
  by GOBERT, Karine & POITEVIN, Michel
• Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization? (RePEc:mtl:montde:2000-13)
  by POITEVIN, Michel
• Organizational Design of R&D Activities (RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-12)
  by AMBEC, Stefan & POITEVIN, Michel
• The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations (RePEc:mtl:montde:2004-12)
  by GRAVEL, Nicolas & POITEVIN, Michel
• Should a non-rival public good always be provided centrally? (RePEc:mtl:montde:2015-06)
  by GRAVEL, Nicolas & POITEVIN, Michel
• Collusion and Banking Structure of a Duopoly (RePEc:mtl:montde:8751)
  by Poitevin, M.
• Financial Signalling and the "Deep Pocket" Argument (RePEc:mtl:montde:8754)
  by Poitevin, M.
• Strategic Financial Signalling (RePEc:mtl:montde:8755)
  by Poitevin, M.
• Managerial Compensation and the Agency Costs of Debt Finance (RePEc:mtl:montde:8827)
  by Brander, J.A. & Poitevin, M.
• Moral Hazard and the Financing of Entrepreneurial Firms (RePEc:mtl:montde:8914)
  by Poitevin, M.
• Information et Marche Financiers : une Revue de la Litterature (RePEc:mtl:montde:8930)
  by Poitevin, M.
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Competitive Contractual Markets (RePEc:mtl:montde:9009)
  by Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M.
• Competitive Screening in Financial Market When Borrowers Can Recontract (RePEc:mtl:montde:9035)
  by Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M.
• The Commitment Value of Contracts Under Dynamic Renegotiation (RePEc:mtl:montde:9202)
  by Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M.
• Le role du collateral dans le report des investissements en presence d'asymetries d'information (RePEc:mtl:montde:9205)
  by Beaudry, P. & Boyer, M. & Poitevin, M.
• Using Ex-ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts (RePEc:mtl:montde:9402)
  by Gauthier, C. & Poitevin, M.
• Disclosure of Information in regulatory Proceedings (RePEc:mtl:montde:9414)
  by Lewis, T. & Poitevin, M.
• Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts (RePEc:mtl:montde:9806)
  by GOBERT, Karine & POITEVIN, Michel
• Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable? (RePEc:mtl:montde:9808)
  by GOBERT, Karine & POITEVIN, Michel
• Should a Non-rival Public Good Always be Provided Centrally? (RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2015)
  by Nicolas GRAVEL & Michel POITEVIN
• The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations (RePEc:mtl:montec:14-2004)
  by GRAVEL, Nicolas & POITEVIN, Michel
• Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Devcentralization? (RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-13)
  by Poitevin, M.
• Organizational Design of R&D Activities (RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-12)
  by Ambec, S. & Poitevin, M.
• Managerial Compensation And The Agency Costs Of Debt Finance (RePEc:mtl:montec:8827)
  by Brander, J.A. & Poitevin, M.
• Moral Hazard And The Financing Of Entrepreneurial Firms (RePEc:mtl:montec:8914)
  by Poitevin, M.
• Information Et Marche Financiers : Une Revue De La Litterature (RePEc:mtl:montec:8930)
  by Poitevin, M.
• Signalling And Renegotiation In Competitive Contractual Markets (RePEc:mtl:montec:9009)
  by Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M.
• Competitive Screening In Financial Market When Borrowers Can Recontract (RePEc:mtl:montec:9035)
  by Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M.
• The Commitment Value of Contracts Under Dynamic Renegotiation (RePEc:mtl:montec:9202)
  by Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M.
• Le role du collateral dans le report des investissements en presence d'asymetries d'information (RePEc:mtl:montec:9205)
  by Beaudry, P. & Boyer, M. & Poitevin, M.
• Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory (RePEc:mtl:montec:9332)
  by Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M.
• Using Ex-ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts (RePEc:mtl:montec:9402)
  by Gauthier, C. & Poitevin, M.
• Disclosure of Information in regulatory Proceedings (RePEc:mtl:montec:9414)
  by Lewis, T. & Poitevin, M.
• Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1135)
  by Michel Poitevin
• Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:50-73)
  by Lewis, Tracy R & Poitevin, Michel
• Competitive Screening in Financial Markets when Borrowers can Recontract (RePEc:oup:restud:v:62:y:1995:i:3:p:401-423.)
  by Paul Beaudry & Michel Poitevin
• Éducation et frais de scolarité (RePEc:ris:actuec:0104)
  by CASTRO, Rui & Poitevin, Michel
• Commentaire sur le texte de Stylianos Perrakis (RePEc:ris:actuec:v:65:y:1989:i:4:p:547-554)
  by Boyer, Marcel & Poitevin, Michel
• Information et marchés financiers : une revue de littérature (RePEc:ris:actuec:v:65:y:1989:i:4:p:555-589)
  by Poitevin, Michel
• Le rôle du collatéral dans le report des investissements en présence d’asymétries d’information (RePEc:ris:actuec:v:69:y:1993:i:1:p:71-90)
  by Beaudry, Paul & Boyer, Marcel & Poitevin, Michel
• Contrats financiers avec asymétrie de l’information dans un cadre dynamique (RePEc:ris:actuec:v:69:y:1993:i:1:p:91-110)
  by Fouda, Henri & Poitevin, Michel
• Information asymétrique, contraintes de liquidité et investissement (RePEc:ris:actuec:v:71:y:1995:i:4:p:398-420)
  by Bascuñán, Mauricio & Garcia, René & Poitevin, Michel
• Financial Signalling and the "Deep-Pocket" Argument (RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:spring:p:26-40)
  by Michel Poitevin
• The Commitment Value of Contracts under Dynamic Renegotiation (RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:winter:p:501-517)
  by Paul Beaudry & Michel Poitevin
• Organizational Design of R&D activities (RePEc:sef:csefwp:60)
  by Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin
• Non-commitment and savings in dynamic risk-sharing contracts (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:357-372)
  by Karine Gobert & Michel Poitevin
• Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:20:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-015-0185-6)
  by Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin
• Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? (RePEc:wly:canjec:v:33:y:2000:i:4:p:878-906)
  by Michel Poitevin
• Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities? (RePEc:wly:canjec:v:50:y:2017:i:5:p:1573-1594)
  by Kim Nguyen & Michael Peters & Michel Poitevin