Peter Postl
Names
| first: | Peter |
| last: | Postl |
Identifer
| RePEc Short-ID: | ppo295 |
Contact
| postal address: | Department of Economics University of Bath Bath BA2 7AY United Kingdom |
Affiliations
-
University of Birmingham
/ Department of Economics
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Research profile
author of:
- Dominant Strategy Implementable Compromises (RePEc:bir:birmec:06-05)
by Peter Postl - A Note on the Impossibility of Efficient N-Person Compromises (RePEc:bir:birmec:06-06)
by Peter Postl - Inefficient Procurement (RePEc:bir:birmec:06-07)
by Peter Postl - Strategy-Proof Compromises (RePEc:bir:birmec:10-12)
by Peter Postl - Efficiency versus Optimality in Procurement (RePEc:bir:birmec:11-03)
by Peter Postl - Strategy-Proof Compromises (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:11:y:2011:i:1:n:20)
by Postl Peter - A ‘divide and choose’ approach to compromising (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:2:p:204-209)
by Postl, Peter - Efficient compromising (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:2057-2076)
by Börgers, Tilman & Postl, Peter - Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:68:y:2014:i:c:p:31-52)
by Giles, Adam & Postl, Peter - Efficiency versus optimality in procurement (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:2:p:425-472)
by Peter Postl