Ágnes Pintér
Names
first: |
Ágnes |
last: |
Pintér |
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Contact
Affiliations
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Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
/ Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
/ Departamento de Análisis Económico: Teoría Económica e Historia Económica
Research profile
author of:
- College admissions and the role of information : an experimental study (RePEc:cte:werepe:we080302)
by Pais, Joana & Pintér, Ágnes & Veszteg, Róbert F. - College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0707)
by Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter & Robert F. Veszteg - Minority vs. Majority: An Experimental Study of Standardized Bids (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0708)
by Agnes Pinter & Robert F. Veszteg - School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:303-328)
by Pais, Joana & Pintér, Ágnes - Does payoff equity facilitate coordination? A test of Schelling's conjecture (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:117:y:2015:i:c:p:209-222)
by López-Pérez, Raúl & Pintér, Ágnes & Kiss, Hubert J. - Some conditions (not) affecting selection neglect: Evidence from the lab (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:195:y:2022:i:c:p:140-157)
by López-Pérez, Raúl & Pintér, Ágnes & Sánchez-Mangas, Rocío - Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:36-50)
by Pintér, Ágnes & Veszteg, Róbert F. - Does risk sorting explain overpricing in experimental asset markets? (RePEc:eee:soceco:v:99:y:2022:i:c:s2214804322000568)
by Kiss, Hubert J. & Kóczy, László Á. & Pintér, Ágnes & Sziklai, Balázs R. - Does Payoff Equity Facilitate Coordination? A test of Schelling's Conjecture (RePEc:has:discpr:1346)
by Raul Lopez-Perez & Agnes Pinter & Hubert Janos Kiss - Would depositors like to show others that they do not withdraw? Theory and Experiment (RePEc:has:discpr:1553)
by Markus Kinateder & Hubert Janos Kiss & Agnes Pinter - Does risk sorting explain bubbles? (RePEc:has:discpr:1905)
by Hubert J. Kiss & Laszlo A. Koczy & Agnes Pinter & Balazs R. Sziklai - College Admissions And The Role Of Information: An Experimental Study (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:52:y:2011:i:3:p:713-737)
by Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg - Some Conditions (Not) Affecting Selection Neglect: Evidence From The Lab (RePEc:ipp:wpaper:2002)
by Raúl López-Pérez & Ágnes Pintér & Rocío Sánchez-Mangas - Decentralized Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment (RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp082012)
by Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter & Robert F. Veszteg - School Choice and Information An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms (RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp142006)
by Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér - Decentralized Matching Markets With(out) Frictions: A Laboratory Experiment (RePEc:ise:remwps:wp0032017)
by Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg - Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-019-09606-1)
by Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg - Would depositors pay to show that they do not withdraw? Theory and experiment (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09646-y)
by Markus Kinateder & Hubert János Kiss & Ágnes Pintér - School Choice and Information. An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms (RePEc:usi:labsit:018)
by Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter