Hans J.M. Peters

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Contact

Affiliations

• Maastricht University / School of Business and Economics (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Maastricht University / School of Business and Economics / Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes (RePEc:ags:uwarer:269616)
  by Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava
• Individual disagreement point concavity and the bargaining problem (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:6-15)
  by Walter Bossert & Hans Peters
• On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Two-Person, Two-State Finance Economies (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2008:i:1:n:47)
  by Berden Caroline & Peters Hans
• Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:1:p:153-69)
  by Peters, Hans J M
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:6:p:1787-1801)
  by Peters, Hans & Wakker, Peter
• Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:14-16)
  by Öztürk, Murat & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• Locating a public good on a sphere (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:139:y:2016:i:c:p:46-48)
  by Chatterjee, Swarnendu & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• A note on additive utility and bargaining (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:17:y:1985:i:3:p:219-222)
  by Peters, Hans
• Information aggregation with a continuum of types (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:46-49)
  by Bozbay, Irem & Peters, Hans
• A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:218:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002567)
  by Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• Convex functions on non-convex domains (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:22:y:1986:i:2-3:p:251-255)
  by Peters, H. J. M. & Wakker, P. P.
• A note on partial vertical integration (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:30:y:1989:i:3:p:249-252)
  by Hendrikse, George & Peters, Hans
• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:55:y:1997:i:3:p:339-346)
  by Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:306:y:2023:i:1:p:448-456)
  by Kong, Qianqian & Peters, Hans
• Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:103:y:2017:i:c:p:254-261)
  by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
• Effectivity and power (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:363-378)
  by Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans
• Claim games for estate division problems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:116:y:2019:i:c:p:105-115)
  by Peters, Hans & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries
• Strategic transfers between cooperative games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:77-84)
  by Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Robles, Laura & Vermeulen, Dries
• Characterization of Consistent Assessments in Extensive Form Games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:238-252)
  by Perea y Monsuwe, Andres & Jansen, Mathijs & Peters, Hans
• Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:1:p:1-10)
  by Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans
• Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:252-260)
  by Peters, Hans
• Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:1:p:103-116)
  by Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:52:y:2005:i:1:p:20-33)
  by Calvo, Emilio & Peters, Hans
• Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:503-515)
  by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
• Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:39-51)
  by Atlamaz, Murat & Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries
• Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:407-417)
  by Bozbay, Irem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans
• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:571-590)
  by Bozbay, İrem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans
• A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:135-152)
  by Pálvölgyi, Dénes & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries
• Unlearning by Not Doing: Repeated Games with Vanishing Actions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:1-7)
  by Joosten Reinoud & Peters Hans & Thuijsman Frank
• Indirect control and power in mutual control structures (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:92:y:2015:i:c:p:150-165)
  by Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans
• Dynamic Cournot duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:2:p:174-192)
  by van den Berg, Anita & Bos, Iwan & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans
• When to fire bad managers: the role of collusion between management and board of directors (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:42:y:2000:i:4:p:427-444)
  by Beetsma, Roel & Peters, Hans & Rebers, Eugene
• Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:105:y:2002:i:2:p:408-434)
  by Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:106:y:2002:i:2:p:392-416)
  by Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava
• The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:110:y:2003:i:1:p:154-175)
  by Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:135:y:2007:i:1:p:533-544)
  by Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• WARP Does Not Imply SARP for More Than Two Commodities (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:62:y:1994:i:1:p:152-160)
  by Peters Hans & Wakker Peter
• Cycle-preserving extension of demand functions to new commodities (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:281-290)
  by Peters, Hans & Wakker, Peter
• Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:27:y:1997:i:4:p:425-449)
  by Perea y Monsuwe, Andres & Jansen, Mathijs & Peters, Hans
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:4:p:465-482)
  by Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans
• Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:43:y:2007:i:6:p:675-691)
  by Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• A preference foundation for constant loss aversion (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:1:p:21-25)
  by Peters, Hans
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:52:y:2014:i:c:p:123-127)
  by Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Storcken, Ton
• Single-basined choice (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:52:y:2014:i:c:p:162-168)
  by Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans
• Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:67:y:2016:i:c:p:162-170)
  by Driesen, Bram & Lombardi, Michele & Peters, Hans
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:69:y:2017:i:c:p:84-90)
  by Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Storcken, Ton
• Choice on the simplex domain (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:84:y:2019:i:c:p:63-72)
  by Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans
• The lexicographic equal-loss solution (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:22:y:1991:i:2:p:151-161)
  by Chun, Youngsub & Peters, Hans
• A reduced game property for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitarian bargaining solutions (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:27:y:1994:i:1:p:11-18)
  by Peters, Hans & Tijs, Stef & Zarzuelo, Jose
• Consistent restricted Shapley values (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:33:y:1997:i:1:p:75-91)
  by Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans
• Orderings, excess functions, and the nucleolus (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:2:p:175-182)
  by Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans
• Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:4:y:1983:i:3:p:295-300)
  by de Koster, R. & Peters, H. J. M. & Tijs, S. H. & Wakker, P.
• Multi-attribute decision-making in individual and social choice (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:40:y:2000:i:3:p:327-339)
  by Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:267-287)
  by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:1:p:12-23)
  by Bossert, Walter & Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans
• Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:53:y:2007:i:3:p:239-254)
  by Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:61:y:2011:i:1:p:58-64)
  by Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans
• Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:2:p:103-118)
  by Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans
• Single-plateaued choice (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:2:p:134-139)
  by Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans
• Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:150-159)
  by Lahiri, Abhinaba & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:99:y:2019:i:c:p:36-42)
  by Kasper, Laura & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries
• Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:1:p:43-50)
  by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
• Core Implementation in Modified Strong and Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9228)
  by Borm, P. & Otten, G.J. & Peters, H.
• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth (RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00978030)
  by Irem Bozbay & Franz Dietrich & Hans Peters
• Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00977992)
  by Irem Bozbay & Franz Dietrich & Hans Peters
• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00978030)
  by Irem Bozbay & Franz Dietrich & Hans Peters
• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00978030)
  by Irem Bozbay & Franz Dietrich & Hans Peters
• On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games (RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2012_004)
  by Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans & Sudhölter, Peter
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp308)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp323)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
• Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp404)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp671)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp693)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp717)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• The Zero-Condition: A Simplifying Assumption in QALY Measurement and Multiattribute Utility (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:44:y:1998:i:6:p:839-849)
  by John M. Miyamoto & Peter P. Wakker & Han Bleichrodt & Hans J. M. Peters
• Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:16:y:1991:i:3:p:447-461 (article)
• Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:46:y:2021:i:2:p:811-833)
  by Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan
• A Criterion for Comparing Strength of Preference with an Application to Bargaining (RePEc:inm:oropre:v:40:y:1992:i:5:p:1018-1022)
  by Hans Peters
• Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences (RePEc:isu:genres:5108)
  by Volij, Oscar & Otten, Gert-Jan & Peters, Hans
• Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:126:y:2006:i:1:p:27-43)
  by Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
• The market for foster care: an empirical study of the impact of foster care subsidies (RePEc:kap:reveho:v:5:y:2007:i:4:p:329-351)
  by Joseph Doyle & H. Peters
• On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games (RePEc:kap:theord:v:60:y:2006:i:4:p:359-370)
  by Caroline Berden & Hans Peters
• On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games (RePEc:kap:theord:v:68:y:2010:i:4:p:367-391)
  by Bram Driesen & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters
• Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice (RePEc:kap:theord:v:90:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-020-09774-0)
  by Hans Peters & Panos Protopapas
• Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution (RePEc:kap:theord:v:92:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09837-w)
  by Hans Peters
• A New Index for the Evaluation of Health States and Health Programs (RePEc:man:sespap:0210)
  by H Zank & M Joore & H Peters & L Anteunis & G Boas
• Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games (RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-14)
  by BOSSERT, Walter & DERKS, Jean & PETERS, Hans
• Single-Peaked Choice (RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-14)
  by BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans
• Single-plateaued choice (RePEc:mtl:montde:2012-04)
  by BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans
• Single-basined choice (RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-03)
  by BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans
• Single-Basined Choice (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2013)
  by Walter Bossert & Hans Peters
• Single-Plateaued Choice (RePEc:mtl:montec:05-2012)
  by Walter Bossert & Hans Peters
• Single-Peaked Choice (RePEc:mtl:montec:11-2006)
  by BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans
• Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games (RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-14)
  by Bossert, W. & Derks, J. & Peters, H.
• Multi-Attribute Decision-Making in Individual and Social, Choice (RePEc:not:notecp:98/7)
  by Walter Bossert & Hans Peters
• Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty (RePEc:not:notecp:98/8)
  by Walter Bossert & Hans Peters
• Dynamic Cooperative Games (RePEc:nya:albaec:00-06)
  by Laurence Kranich & Andres Perea & Hans Peters
• Preface (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:137:y:2005:i:1:p:17-19:10.1007/s10479-005-2241-z)
  by Jesús Bilbao & Jacqueline Morgan & Hans Peters
• The Egalitarian Solution for Multichoice Games (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:137:y:2005:i:1:p:399-409:10.1007/s10479-005-2270-7)
  by Hans Peters & Horst Zank
• Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules using bargaining axioms (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:318:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-020-03828-w)
  by Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters
• Two-bound core games and the nucleolus (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:336:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10479-022-04949-0)
  by Doudou Gong & Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:2:p:305-333)
  by Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
• The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:1:p:147-162)
  by Arkadi Predtetchinski & P. Herings & Hans Peters
• Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:30:y:2007:i:2:p:373-384)
  by Tim Schulteis & Andres Perea & Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen
• Single-peaked choice (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:41:y:2009:i:2:p:213-230)
  by Walter Bossert & Hans Peters
• On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:56:y:2014:i:1:p:83-108)
  by Murat Öztürk & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
• Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (*) (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:2:p:291-306)
  by Hans Peters & Gert-Jan Otten & Oscar Volij
• Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:78:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-023-01550-9)
  by Doudou Gong & Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters
• Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-Proofness in Location Problems (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:221-35)
  by Peters, Hans & van der Stel, Hans & Storcken, Ton
• A Shapley Value for Games with Restricted Coalitions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1993:i:4:p:351-60)
  by Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans
• The selectope for cooperative games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38)
  by Jean Derks & Hans Haller & Hans Peters
• Dynamics and axiomatics of the equal area bargaining solution (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:81-92)
  by Emilio Calvo & Hans Peters
• Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:145-158)
  by Geoffroy de Clippel & Hans Peters & Horst Zank
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:3:p:381-396)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
• Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:4:p:457-473)
  by Andres Perea & Hans Peters & Tim Schulteis & Dries Vermeulen
• Preface to the special issue on the occasion of the first Spain Italy Netherlands meeting on Game theory (SING 1) (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:147-147)
  by Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen
• WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:851-884)
  by Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen
• Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:915-930)
  by Hans Peters & Peter Sudhölter
• On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:37-63)
  by Jean Derks & Hans Peters & Peter Sudhölter
• An axiomatic characterization of the Owen–Shapley spatial power index (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0544-8)
  by Hans Peters & José M. Zarzuelo
• Hotelling’s location model with negative network externalities (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0615-0)
  by Hans Peters & Marc Schröder & Dries Vermeulen
• Linearity of the core correspondence (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0604-8)
  by Dénes Pálvölgyi & Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen
• An issue based power index (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00737-x)
  by Qianqian Kong & Hans Peters
• Professor Stef Tijs (1937–2023) (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:52:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-023-00876-x)
  by Peter Borm & Hans Peters
• One-bound core games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:53:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-024-00889-0)
  by Doudou Gong & Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters
• Limit Consistent Solutions in Noncooperative Games (RePEc:spr:joptap:v:98:y:1998:i:1:d:10.1023_a:1022688931144)
  by A. Perea y Monsuwé & H. Peters
• Reduced two-bound core games (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:96:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s00186-022-00800-1)
  by Doudou Gong & Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters
• Sequential claim games (RePEc:spr:orspec:v:45:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00291-023-00711-5)
  by Qianqian Kong & Hans Peters
• Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences (RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:485-496)
  by Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken
• Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401)
  by T. Storcken & H. Peters & H. v. d. Stel & W. Peremans
• Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:297-311)
  by Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
• Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:489-502)
  by Hans Peters & Walter Bossert
• Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:477-492)
  by B Pezaleleleg & Hans Peters
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:493-493)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:163-179)
  by Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:2:p:247-269)
  by Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:4:p:701-702)
  by Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen
• Generalized stochastic dominance and bad outcome aversion (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:2:p:285-290)
  by Hans Peters & Tim Schulteis & Dries Vermeulen
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:399-429)
  by Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken
• On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:2:p:287-307)
  by Hans Peters & Marc Schröder & Dries Vermeulen
• Professor Bezalel Peleg (1936–2019) (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:53:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01203-8)
  by Hans Peters & Peter Sudhölter
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:59:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01420-8)
  by Saptarshi Mukherjee & Hans Peters
• On the safety of group manipulation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:61:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-023-01469-z)
  by Hans Peters & Yuliya Veselova
• Group strategy-proof rules in multidimensional binary domains (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:63:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01523-4)
  by Aditya Aradhye & Hans Peters
• Game Theory (RePEc:spr:sptbec:978-3-662-46950-7)
  by Hans Peters
• Introduction (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_1)
  by Hans Peters
• Cooperative Game Models (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_10)
  by Hans Peters
• Social Choice (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_11)
  by Hans Peters
• Matrix Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_12)
  by Hans Peters
• Finite Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_13)
  by Hans Peters
• Extensive Form Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_14)
  by Hans Peters
• Evolutionary Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_15)
  by Hans Peters
• TU-Games: Domination, Stable Sets, and the Core (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_16)
  by Hans Peters
• The Shapley Value (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_17)
  by Hans Peters
• Core, Shapley Value, and Weber Set (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_18)
  by Hans Peters
• The Nucleolus (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_19)
  by Hans Peters
• Finite Two-Person Zero-Sum Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_2)
  by Hans Peters
• Special Transferable Utility Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_20)
  by Hans Peters
• Bargaining Problems (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_21)
  by Hans Peters
• Tools (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_22)
  by Hans Peters
• Review Problems for Part I (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_23)
  by Hans Peters
• Hints, Answers and Solutions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_24)
  by Hans Peters
• Finite Two-Person Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_3)
  by Hans Peters
• Finite Extensive Form Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_4)
  by Hans Peters
• Finite Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_5)
  by Hans Peters
• Noncooperative Games: Extensions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_6)
  by Hans Peters
• Repeated Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_7)
  by Hans Peters
• An Introduction to Evolutionary Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_8)
  by Hans Peters
• Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_9)
  by Hans Peters
• Introduction to Part I (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_1)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_10)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_11)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_2)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Nash consistent representations (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_3)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Acceptable representations (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_4)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Strongly consistent representations (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_5)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Nash consistent representation through lottery models (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_6)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• On the continuity of representations of constitutions (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_7)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Introduction to Part II (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_8)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Feasible elimination procedures (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_9)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Strategic Social Choice (RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-642-13875-1)
  by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-642-02865-6_15
• Theory and Decision Library C (RePEc:spr:thdlic)
  from Springer as editor
• Comments on: Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:24:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s11750-016-0419-y)
  by Hans Peters
• Characterizing NTU-Bankruptcy Rules using Bargaining Axioms (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:19230a8e-2d4d-4d10-b795-99c334d8862d)
  by Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:694d8dc4-f037-40a7-a38d-fc2bab7d939b)
  by Otten, G.J.M. & Peters, H. & Volij, O.C.
• Core implementation in modified strong and coalition proof Nash equilibria (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a3680e90-b5f5-45c4-bd21-66b298e6957e)
  by Borm, P.E.M. & Otten, G.J.M. & Peters, H.J.M.
• When to fire bad managers : The role of collusion between management and board of directors (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d45d16bf-dbd7-4c02-8dac-c1e3f5df8340)
  by Rebers, E. & Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Peters, H.
• Characterizing NTU-Bankruptcy Rules using Bargaining Axioms (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:19230a8e-2d4d-4d10-b795-99c334d8862d)
  by Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• Probabilistic bargaining solutions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:42499a54-3826-45c3-9e17-c9483a9363ec)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Tijs, S.H.
• Professor Stef Tijs (1937-2023) OBITUARY (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:4bcb478a-7e95-432c-aa64-d39b7acb76dc)
  by Borm, Peter & Peters, Hans
• Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa bargaining solutions by disagreement point axioms (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:4bd5eb9e-328a-45a0-aa0a-edbd38168d88)
  by van Damme, E.E.C. & Peters, H.
• Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:52f5a6d5-dcac-4fec-9b8e-942e8ae9e54e)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Tijs, S.H.
• Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:694d8dc4-f037-40a7-a38d-fc2bab7d939b)
  by Otten, G.J.M. & Peters, H. & Volij, O.C.
• A reduced game property for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitarian bargaining solutions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:757cbb5b-f7ba-42ec-91e9-1ecce7a26ec6)
  by Peters, H. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J.
• Risk properties of n-person bargaining solutions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:82a3c9c3-6cd8-4178-ab8d-5df7f6330475)
  by Peters, H. & Tijs, S.H.
• Individually monotonic bargaining solutions of n-person bargaining games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:94ffcb19-a0bc-4364-a42e-70fc951c4c18)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Tijs, S.H.
• Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:9715c0e3-8f88-482e-9a95-fe609383752e)
  by Tijs, S.H. & Peters, H.
• Core implementation in modified strong and coalition proof Nash equilibria (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a3680e90-b5f5-45c4-bd21-66b298e6957e)
  by Borm, P.E.M. & Otten, G.J.M. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ca1db065-9070-4741-9bbe-0489be301d7e)
  by de Koster, R. & Peters, H. & Tijs, S.H. & Wakker, P.
• Risk sensitivity of bargaining solutions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d028d073-964b-49f1-9aac-d0331d4f87bc)
  by Peters, H. & Tijs, S.H.
• When to fire bad managers : The role of collusion between management and board of directors (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d45d16bf-dbd7-4c02-8dac-c1e3f5df8340)
  by Rebers, E. & Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Peters, H.
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives and revealed group preferences (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d5b29b32-d795-4423-8c3e-045dc477103d)
  by Peters, H. & Wakker, P.P.
• Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa bargaining solutions by disagreement point axions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e3289955-fbd0-4e43-a679-f7a6f9018a8d)
  by Peters, H. & van Damme, E.E.C.
• Single-basined choice (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013030)
  by Bossert, W. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013040)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Roy, S. & Sen, A. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Indirect control and power in mutual control structures (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013048)
  by Karos, D. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013049)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Schröder, M.J.W. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• Claim games for estate division problems (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013055)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Schröder, M.J.W. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• The economic order decision with continuous dynamic pricing and batch supply (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2014001)
  by van den Berg, A.H.J. & Herings, P.J.J. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2014033)
  by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015007)
  by Lahiri, A. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015015)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Zarzuelo, J.M.
• Locating a public good on a sphere (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015028)
  by Chatterjee, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015031)
  by Driesen, B.W.I. & Lombardi, M. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Waiting in the queue on Hotelling’s Main Street (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015040)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Schröder, M.J.W. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• Feasible elimination procedures in social choice : an axiomatic characterization (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016001)
  by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M.
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016012)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Roy, S. & Sadhukhan, S. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Power on digraphs (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016019)
  by Peters, Hans & Timmer, Judith & van den Brink, Rene
• Effectivity and Power (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016034)
  by Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans
• Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017017)
  by Kasper, Laura & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries
• Choice on the simplex domain (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017030)
  by Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans
• Information aggregation with continuum of types (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017032)
  by Bozbay, Irem & Peters, Hans
• Random social choice functions for single-peaked domains on trees (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018004)
  by Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong Equilibrium (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018005)
  by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
• Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules using bargaining axioms (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018006)
  by Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• Two-bound core games and the nucleolus (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2021020)
  by Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• Reduced two-bound core games (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2022001)
  by Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2022006)
  by Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2022007)
  by Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• One-bound core games (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2023003)
  by Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans
• Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments (RePEc:unm:umamet:1995001)
  by Klaus, B.E. & Storcken, A.J.A. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good (RePEc:unm:umamet:1995012)
  by Klaus, B.E. & Storcken, A.J.A. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Optimal international tax coordination and economic integration: a game-theoretic framework (RePEc:unm:umamet:2000005)
  by Owen, R. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems (RePEc:unm:umamet:2000029)
  by Ehlers, L.H. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Relationship marketing effectiveness in retailing: a contingency approach (RePEc:unm:umamet:2000036)
  by Odekerken-Schroder, G.J. & de Wulf, K. & Reynolds, K.E.
• The impact of attitude strength on the use of customer satisfaction information: an empirical investigation (RePEc:unm:umamet:2000037)
  by van Birgelen, M.J.H. & de Ruyter, J.C. & Wetzels, M.G.M.
• Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2001008)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Bossert, W. & Derks, J.
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies (RePEc:unm:umamet:2001013)
  by Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P.J.J. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Core concepts for dynamic TU games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2001024)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A.
• The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy (RePEc:unm:umamet:2002003)
  by Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P.J.J. & Peters, H.J.M.
• A class of methods for evaluating multiattribute utilities (RePEc:unm:umamet:2002004)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Zank, H.
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (RePEc:unm:umamet:2002024)
  by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M.
• The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems (RePEc:unm:umamet:2002064)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Koebberling, V.
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (RePEc:unm:umamet:2003025)
  by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets (RePEc:unm:umamet:2003029)
  by Maus, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Sequentially complete markets remain incomplete (RePEc:unm:umamet:2003044)
  by Drèze, J. & Herings, P.J.J.
• Bridging the gap between Ox and Gauss using OxGauss (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004005)
  by Laurent, S. & Urbain, J.R.Y.J.
• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and non-dictatorship (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004006)
  by Maus, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and surjectivity (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004007)
  by Maus, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004008)
  by Schulteis, T.J.W. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004026)
  by Maus, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• An assessment of measurement invariance between online and mail surveys (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005004)
  by Deutskens, Elisabeth & de Ruyter, J.C. & Wetzels, M.G.M.
• Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005005)
  by Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M. & Schulteis, T.J.W. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• The agents-are-substitutes property in continuous generalized assignment problems (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005009)
  by Lok, R.B. & Romero Morales, D. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005012)
  by Maus, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005029)
  by Klaus, B.E. & Haake, C.J.
• On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005030)
  by Berden, C. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005031)
  by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M.
• On the effect of risk aversion in two-person, two-state finance economies (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006011)
  by Berden, C. & Peters, H.J.M.
• WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006021)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• Single-peaked choice (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006037)
  by Bossert, W. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Generalized stochastic dominance and bad outcome aversion (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007031)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Schulteis, T.J.W. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• On loss aversion in bimatrix games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007033)
  by Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Noncooperative collusion and price wars with individual demand fluctuations (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008017)
  by Pot, E.A. & Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Peters, H.J.M. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• Non-Cooperative Solutions for Claims Problems (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008038)
  by Atlamaz, M. & Berden, C. & Peters, H.J.M. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• Manipulation under k-approval scoring rules (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008056)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Roy, S. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion (RePEc:unm:umamet:2009001)
  by Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Dynamic duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints (RePEc:unm:umamet:2009018)
  by van den Berg, A.H.J. & Herings, P.J.J. & Peters, H.J.M.
• The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with loss aversion (RePEc:unm:umamet:2009030)
  by Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M.
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules (RePEc:unm:umamet:2009060)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Roy, S. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (RePEc:unm:umamet:2010008)
  by Bozbay, I. & Dietrich, F.K. & Peters, H.J.M.
• Intentional price wars on the equilibrium path (RePEc:unm:umamet:2010028)
  by Pot, E.A. & Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Peters, H.J.M. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• A strategic approach to estate division problems with non-homogenous preferences (RePEc:unm:umamet:2010036)
  by Palvolgyi, D.G. & Peters, H.J.M. & Vermeulen, A.J.
• A preference foundation for constant loss aversion (RePEc:unm:umamet:2010062)
  by Peters, H.J.M.
• Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences (RePEc:unm:umamet:2010064)
  by Peters, H.J.M. & Roy, S. & Storcken, A.J.A.
• Judgement Aggregation in Search for the Truth (RePEc:unm:umamet:2011040)
  by Bozbay, I. & Dietrich, F.K. & Peters, H.J.M.
• On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2012003)
  by Derks, J. & Peters, H.J.M. & Sudhölter, P.
• Single-plateaued choice (RePEc:unm:umamet:2012026)
  by Bossert, W. & Peters, H.J.M.
• "Employability-miles" and worker employability awareness (RePEc:unm:umamet:2012042)
  by Gerards, R. & de Grip, A. & Witlox, M.A.
• The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0205004)
  by Arkadi Predtetchinski & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Hans Peters
• Core Concepts For Dynamic Tu Games (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:n:s0219198905000417)
  by Laurence Kranich & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters
• Power on digraphs (RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2016:p:107-125:id:1224)
  by Hans Peters & Judith Timmer & Rene van den Brink