Thomas R. Palfrey
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Thomas |
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R. |
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Palfrey |
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Affiliations
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California Institute of Technology
/ Division of Social Sciences
Research profile
author of:
- Minorities and Storable Votes (RePEc:ads:wpaper:0059)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey & Raymond Riezman - Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:9:p:2858-71)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey - Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why? (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:87:y:1997:i:5:p:829-46)
by Palfrey, Thomas R & Prisbrey, Jeffrey E - Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:2:p:181-86)
by S. Nageeb Ali & Jacob K. Goeree & Navin Kartik & Thomas R. Palfrey - Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:2:p:194-200)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:1:y:2009:i:1:p:151-81)
by Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas R. Palfrey - Games Played by Teams of Players (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:122-57)
by Jeongbin Kim & Thomas R. Palfrey & Jeffrey R. Zeidel - The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:4:p:268-308)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey - Cursed Sequential Equilibrium (RePEc:arx:papers:2301.11971)
by Meng-Jhang Fong & Po-Hsuan Lin & Thomas R. Palfrey - A Note on Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium (RePEc:arx:papers:2304.05515)
by Meng-Jhang Fong & Po-Hsuan Lin & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study (RePEc:aub:autbar:530.02)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey - Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information (RePEc:aub:autbar:573.03)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey - Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections (RePEc:bge:wpaper:236)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite - The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study (RePEc:bge:wpaper:59)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey - Electoral Competition Between Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information (RePEc:bge:wpaper:60)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey - Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (RePEc:bie:wpaper:468)
by Kuzmics, Christoph & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian W. - A Statistical Theory Of Equilibrium In Games (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:47:y:1996:i:2:p:186-209)
by Richard D. Mckelvey & Thomas R. Palfrey - Futures Markets and Informational Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:39:y:1984:i:4:p:955-81)
by Forsythe, Robert & Palfrey, Thomas R & Plott, Charles R - Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:5:y:2003:i:3:p:449-478)
by Didier Laussel & Thomas R. Palfrey - Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Public Investment (RePEc:cca:wpaper:142)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey - Minorities and Storable Votes (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1583)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey & Raymond Riezman - Storable Votes: Giving Voice to Minority Preferences without Sacrificing Efficiency (RePEc:ces:ifodic:v:5:y:2007:i:03:p:17-22)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey & Raymond Riezman - Ignorance and bias in collective decision:Theory and experiments (RePEc:cie:wpaper:1401)
by Alexander Elvitar & Andrei Gomberg & César Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Downsian Model of Electoral Participation: Formal Theory and Empirical Analysis of the Constituency Size Effect (RePEc:cla:levarc:101)
by Stephen Hansen & Thomas R Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001997)
by Syngjoo Choi & Douglas Gale & Shachar Kariv & Thomas Palfrey - Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why? (RePEc:cla:levarc:1380)
by Thomas R. Palfrey & Jeffrey Prisbrey - Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments (RePEc:cla:levarc:1544)
by Thomas R Palfrey & Jeffrey E Prisbrey - The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000103)
by John Ledyard & Thomas Palfrey - Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:510)
by R. McKelvey & T. Palfrey - An experimental study of the centipede game (RePEc:cla:levarc:521)
by Richard McKelvey & Thomas Palfrey - A Strategic Calculus of Voting (RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000039)
by Thomas R Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - Altruism, Reputation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments (RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000051)
by Thomas R Palfrey & Jeffrey E Prisbrey - The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000968)
by David K Levine & Thomas R Palfrey - Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000143)
by Alessandra Casella & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Thomas R. Palfrey - Self-Correcting Information Cascades (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000153)
by Jacob Goeree & Thomas Palfrey & Brian Rogers - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000914)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey - The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001463)
by Juan D Carrillo & Thomas R Palfrey - No Trade (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001839)
by Juan D Carrillo & Thomas R Palfrey - The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000188)
by David K. Levine & Thomas R. Palfrey - Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000193)
by Colin F. Camerer & Thomas R. Palfrey & Brian W. Rogers - Minorities and Storable Votes (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000199)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey & Raymond Riezman - Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000205)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey - Self-Correcting Information Cascades (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000211)
by Jacob K. Goeree & Thomas R. Palfrey & Brian W. Rogers & Richard D. McKelvey - The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000754)
by Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000760)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey - Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions (RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000089)
by Thomas Palfrey - Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1006)
by Erikson, Robert S. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1034)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-value Auctions (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1073)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Goeree, Jacob & Holt, Charles - Voluntary Implementation (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1077)
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1092)
by Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1102)
by Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R. - The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1138)
by Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1169)
by Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. - A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1171)
by Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1172)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Pevnitskaya, Svetlana - An Experimental Study of Storable Votes (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1173)
by Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R. - A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1186)
by Ledyard, John & Palfrey, Thomas - Social learning with private and common values (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1187)
by Goeree, Jacob & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian - Self-correcting Information Cascades (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1197)
by Goeree, Jacob & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian & McKelvey, Richard - Regular quantal response equilibrium (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1203)
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1219)
by Goeree, Jacob & Holt, Charles & Palfrey, Thomas - Political reputations and campaign promises (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1258)
by Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Postlewaite, Andrew - The compromise game: Two-sided adverse selection in the laboratory (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1259)
by Carrillo, Juan D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1260)
by Camerer, Colin F. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rogers, Brian W. - Minorities and storable votes (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1261)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Riezman, Raymond - Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1262)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The Swing Voter’s Curse in the laboratory (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1263)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R. - On eliciting beliefs in strategic games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1271)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Wang, Stephanie W. - The dynamics of distributive politics (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1273)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R. - No Trade (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1279)
by Carrillo, Juan D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees (formerly: Information aggregation and equilibrium selection in committees) (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1280)
by Ali, S. Nageeb & Goeree, Jacob K. & Kartik, Navin & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Network architecture, salience and coordination (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1291)
by Choi, Syngjoo & Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar & Palfrey, Thomas - A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1292)
by Grober, Jens & Palfrey, Thomas - Information aggregation & strategic abstention in large laboratory elections (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1296)
by Battaglimi, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas - An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods (RePEc:clt:sswopa:262)
by Ferejohn, John A. & Forsythe, Robert & Noll, Roger G. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Multiple-Object Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:clt:sswopa:290)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. - Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market (RePEc:clt:sswopa:299)
by Forsythe, Robert & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Plott, Charles R. - Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysi (RePEc:clt:sswopa:465)
by Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard. - Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information (RePEc:clt:sswopa:618)
by Ordeshook, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs (RePEc:clt:sswopa:619)
by Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - On Bayesian Implementable Allocations (RePEc:clt:sswopa:624)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay. - Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies (RePEc:clt:sswopa:649)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay. - Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem (RePEc:clt:sswopa:658)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay. - Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism (RePEc:clt:sswopa:659)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard. - Theories and Tests of (Blind Bidding) in Sealed Bid Auctions (RePEc:clt:sswopa:670)
by Forsythe, Robert & Isaac, R. Mark & Palfrey, Thomas R. - A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law (RePEc:clt:sswopa:688)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. - Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information (RePEc:clt:sswopa:692)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard. - Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication (RePEc:clt:sswopa:693)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay. - Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms (RePEc:clt:sswopa:717)
by Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Free Riding: New Evidence on Probability Bias and Learning (RePEc:clt:sswopa:730)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard. - Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (RePEc:clt:sswopa:731)
by Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game (RePEc:clt:sswopa:732)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas. - Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism (RePEc:clt:sswopa:754)
by Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay. - A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:757)
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design (RePEc:clt:sswopa:760)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. - Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study (RePEc:clt:sswopa:785)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard. - Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:800)
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information (RePEc:clt:sswopa:803)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information (RePEc:clt:sswopa:804)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why? (RePEc:clt:sswopa:833)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Pribrey, Jeffrey E. - The Spending Game: Money, Votes, and Incumbency in Congressional Elections (RePEc:clt:sswopa:851)
by Erikson, Robert S. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments (RePEc:clt:sswopa:864)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. - Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game (RePEc:clt:sswopa:876)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:877)
by Fey, Mark & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote (RePEc:clt:sswopa:879)
by Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:883)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design (RePEc:clt:sswopa:884)
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Implementation Theory (RePEc:clt:sswopa:912)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. - Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:947)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:955)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem (RePEc:clt:sswopa:956)
by Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Dynamic Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining (RePEc:clt:sswopa:985)
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Political Confederation (RePEc:clt:sswopa:990)
by Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2X2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria (RePEc:clt:sswopa:991)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & McKelvey, Richard D. - The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10788)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R & Nunnari, Salvatore - Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10908)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11357)
by Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13097)
by Nunnari, Salvatore & Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R - Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17951)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R - Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19102)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R - An Experimental Study of Storable Votes (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4081)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R & Gelman, Andrew - Minorities and Storable Votes (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5278)
by Casella, Alessandra & Riezman, Raymond & Palfrey, Thomas R - Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5291)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R & Morton, Rebecca - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5458)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R & Morton, Rebecca - The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6103)
by Carrillo, Juan & Palfrey, Thomas R - No Trade (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6554)
by Carrillo, Juan & Palfrey, Thomas R - Information Gatekeepers: Theory and Experimental Evidence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7457)
by Carrillo, Juan & Brocas, Isabelle & Palfrey, Thomas R - Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7992)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8848)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R & Turban, Sébastien - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:cso:wpaper:0019)
by Marci Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey - The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:101:y:2007:i:01:p:143-158_07)
by Levine, David K. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:101:y:2007:i:03:p:409-424_07)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas - Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:106:y:2012:i:02:p:407-429_00)
by Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:106:y:2012:i:04:p:908-909_00)
by Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:113:y:2019:i:01:p:209-225_00)
by Großer, Jens & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:62-78_22)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard - Political Confederation (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:01:p:69-83_21)
by Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:02:p:407-423_22)
by Guarnaschelli, Serena & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:03:p:595-609_22)
by Erikson, Robert S. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:98:y:2004:i:01:p:77-90_00)
by Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Reporting Guidelines for Experimental Research: A Report from the Experimental Research Section Standards Committee (RePEc:cup:jexpos:v:1:y:2014:i:01:p:81-98_00)
by Gerber, Alan & Arceneaux, Kevin & Boudreau, Cheryl & Dowling, Conor & Hillygus, Sunshine & Palfrey, Thomas & Biggers, Daniel R. & Hendry, David J. - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:ecl:prirpe:03-13-2006)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas - A Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study (RePEc:ecl:prirpe:09-19-2005a)
by Levine, David & Palfrey, Thomas - Minorities and Storable Votes (RePEc:ecl:prirpe:09-19-2005b)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Riezman, Raymond - Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:ecl:prirpe:09-19-2005c)
by Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas - External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery (RePEc:ecl:riceco:14-015)
by Merlo, Antonio & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:3:p:537-67)
by Forsythe, Robert & Palfrey, Thomas R & Plott, Charles R - Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:51:y:1983:i:2:p:463-83)
by Palfrey, Thomas R - Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:57:y:1989:i:1:p:115-34)
by Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay - Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:2:p:479-501)
by Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay - An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:4:p:803-36)
by McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R - Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:66:y:1998:i:6:p:1353-1388)
by Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey - A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:2:p:435-448)
by John O. Ledyard & Thomas R. Palfrey - Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets With Information Flows (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:5:p:1937-1976)
by Thomas R. Palfrey & Stephanie W. Wang - The effects of income mobility and tax persistence on income redistribution and inequality (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:123:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120300040)
by Agranov, Marina & Palfrey, Thomas R. - In or out?: Centralization by majority vote (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:40:y:1996:i:1:p:43-60)
by Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis (RePEc:eee:expchp:4-60)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Implementation theory (RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-61)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. - Introduction (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:1-5)
by Ledyard John O. & Palfrey Thomas R. - Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:6-38)
by McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R. - Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:2:p:255-283)
by Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R. - How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:234-259)
by Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Roy, Nilanjan - Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:125:y:2021:i:c:p:1-26)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:183-220)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard - Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:97-113)
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:51:y:2005:i:2:p:237-242)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. - An experimental study of storable votes (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:57:y:2006:i:1:p:123-154)
by Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:474-501)
by Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay - No trade (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:66-87)
by Carrillo, Juan D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Network architecture, salience and coordination (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:76-90)
by Choi, Syngjoo & Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar & Palfrey, Thomas - Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:322-348)
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:243-263)
by Camerer, Colin & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R. - The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 x 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:42:y:2000:i:4:p:523-548)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Weber, Roberto A. - Endogenous entry and self-selection in private value auctions: An experimental study (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:3-4:p:731-747)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Pevnitskaya, Svetlana - On eliciting beliefs in strategic games (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:71:y:2009:i:2:p:98-109)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Wang, Stephanie W. - Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:1:p:131-161)
by Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:104:y:2002:i:1:p:247-272)
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Corrigendum to "Voluntary implementation": J. Econ. Theor. 98 (2001) 1-25 (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:110:y:2003:i:1:p:204-205)
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:441-466)
by Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1440-1467)
by Rogers, Brian W. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Camerer, Colin F. - Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:25-67)
by Kuzmics, Christoph & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian W. - Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:220:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000772)
by Lin, Po-Hsuan & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Private information in large economies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:39:y:1986:i:1:p:34-58)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay - Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:55:y:1991:i:1:p:17-40)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay - Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:73:y:1997:i:2:p:425-437)
by McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Voluntary Implementation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:98:y:2001:i:1:p:1-25)
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Vote trading with and without party leaders (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:112:y:2014:i:c:p:115-128)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Turban, Sébastien - Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:130:y:2015:i:c:p:45-58)
by Agranov, Marina & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Static and dynamic underinvestment: An experimental investigation (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:143:y:2016:i:c:p:125-141)
by Agranov, Marina & Fréchette, Guillaume & Palfrey, Thomas & Vespa, Emanuel - Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:24:y:1984:i:2:p:171-193)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard - Welfare in the volunteer’s dilemma (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:245:y:2025:i:c:s0047272725000581)
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Private incentives in social dilemmas : The effects of incomplete information and altruism (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:35:y:1988:i:3:p:309-332)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard - Altuism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:61:y:1996:i:3:p:409-427)
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. - The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:83:y:2002:i:2:p:153-171)
by Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:89:y:2005:i:8:p:1361-1398)
by Gailmard, Sean & Palfrey, Thomas R. - An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:10-11:p:2091-2106)
by Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote (RePEc:fth:gremaq:94.335)
by Cremer, J. & Palfrey, T.R. - Political Confederation (RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.465)
by Cremer, J. & Palfrey, T.R. - Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results (RePEc:gms:wpaper:1065)
by Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey - An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods (RePEc:har:wpaper:0214)
by Sean Gailmard & Thomas R. Palfrey - Political Confederation (RePEc:ide:wpaper:1224)
by Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Federal Mandates by Popular Demand (RePEc:ide:wpaper:1226)
by Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote (RePEc:ide:wpaper:4558)
by Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities (RePEc:ide:wpaper:624)
by Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters (RePEc:ide:wpaper:665)
by Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:31:y:1990:i:1:p:17-47)
by Cramton, Peter C & Palfrey, Thomas R - Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:26:y:1980:i:9:p:935-946)
by Thomas R. Palfrey - Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:9-41)
by Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey - Erratum to: Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:18:y:2015:i:4:p:762-763)
by Richard McKelvey & Thomas Palfrey - Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:4:p:347-367)
by Jacob Goeree & Charles Holt & Thomas Palfrey - External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:176:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0523-7)
by Antonio Merlo & Thomas R. Palfrey - A strategic calculus of voting (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:1:p:7-53)
by Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - Comments on the papers by Austen-Smith and Shepsle (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:50:y:1986:i:1:p:211-219)
by Thomas Palfrey - The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:52:y:1987:i:1:p:15-33)
by Stephen Hansen & Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - Testing Game-Theoretic Models Of Free Riding: New Evidence Od Probability Bias And Learning (RePEc:mit:worpap:549)
by Palfrey, T.R. & Rosenthal, H. - Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_03)
by Alessandra Casella & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Thomas R. Palfrey - Minorities and Storable Votes (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11674)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey & Raymond Riezman - Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16315)
by Alessandra Casella & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Thomas R. Palfrey - Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17847)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey & Sébastien Turban - The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17926)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas Palfrey - Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19918)
by Marina Agranov & Thomas R. Palfrey - Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21645)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22406)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22759)
by Marina Agranov & Thomas R. Palfrey - Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30991)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey - Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32473)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey - Welfare in the Volunteer’s Dilemma (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32999)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey - Crisis Bargaining with Collective Decision Making (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33392)
by Jeongbin Kim & Thomas R. Palfrey & Jeffrey Zeidel - An Experimental Study of Storable Votes (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9982)
by Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman & Thomas R. Palfrey - Minorities and Storable Votes (RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00007048)
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Riezman, Raymond - The Dynamics of Distributive Politics (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1451)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey - Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1551)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Thomas Palfrey & Brian Rogers - Effects of Insider Trading Disclosures on Speculative Activity and Future Prices (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:27:y:1989:i:3:p:411-30)
by Jagannathan, Ravi & Palfrey, Thomas R - Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:129:y:2019:i:618:p:961-990.)
by Thomas R Palfrey & Kirill Pogorelskiy - The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:18:y:2020:i:4:p:1969-2012.)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R Palfrey - Spatial Equilibrium with Entry (RePEc:oup:restud:v:51:y:1984:i:1:p:139-156.)
by Thomas R. Palfrey - Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation and the Cournot Competitive Limit (RePEc:oup:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:1:p:69-83.)
by Thomas R. Palfrey - On Bayesian Implementable Allocations (RePEc:oup:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:2:p:193-208.)
by Thomas R. Palfrey & Sanjay Srivastava - Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms (RePEc:oup:restud:v:61:y:1994:i:2:p:327-355.)
by John O. Ledyard & Thomas R. Palfrey - Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study (RePEc:oup:restud:v:61:y:1994:i:3:p:545-565.)
by Thomas R. Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - Self-Correcting Information Cascades (RePEc:oup:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:3:p:733-762)
by Jacob K. Goeree & Thomas R. Palfrey & Brian W. Rogers & Richard D. McKelvey - The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (RePEc:oup:restud:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:61-89)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey - Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:90ier)
by Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey - Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:95geb)
by Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey - Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections (RePEc:pen:papers:05-021)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite - Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections (RePEc:pen:papers:05-027)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite - External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery (RePEc:pen:papers:13-012)
by Antonio Merlo & Thomas R.Palfrey - Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy (RePEc:pri:cepsud:111)
by Thomas R. Palfrey - Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:pri:cepsud:121)
by Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey - The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis (RePEc:pri:metric:wp021_2011_battaglini_nunnari_pafrey.pdf)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas Palfrey - The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:pri:metric:wp048_2012_battaglini_nunnari_palfrey_dyn_free_rider.pdf)
by Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. R. Palfrey - Introduction and Background (RePEc:pup:chapts:10743-1)
by Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey - Quantal Response Equilibrium:A Stochastic Theory of Games (RePEc:pup:pbooks:10743)
by Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey - Risk Advantages and Information Acquisition (RePEc:rje:bellje:v:13:y:1982:i:spring:p:219-224)
by Thomas R. Palfrey - Warranties, Performance, and the Resolution of Buyer-Seller Disputes (RePEc:rje:bellje:v:14:y:1983:i:spring:p:97-117)
by Thomas Palfrey & Thomas Romer - Repeated Insurance Contracts and Learning (RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:autumn:p:356-367)
by Thomas R. Palfrey & Chester S. Spatt - Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions (RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:summer:p:214-238)
by Robert Forsythe & R. Mark Isaac & Thomas R. Palfrey - The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory (RePEc:scp:wpaper:06-60)
by Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas R. Palfrey - Social learning with private and common values (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:245-264)
by Jacob Goeree & Thomas Palfrey & Brian Rogers - Learning in Experimental Games (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:4:y:1994:i:6:p:901-22)
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A & McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R - The dynamics of distributive politics (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:739-777)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey - Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:51:y:2012:i:3:p:649-676)
by Isabelle Brocas & Juan Carrillo & Thomas Palfrey - An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:269-87)
by Fey, Mark & McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R - Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:4:p:495-517)
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A & Palfrey, Thomas R - Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-27295-3_4)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey - Political Reputations and Campaign Promises (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:4:p:846-884)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite - Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/667988)
by Alessandra Casella & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Thomas R. Palfrey - Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/729580)
by Marco Battaglini & Thomas R. Palfrey - Federal Mandates by Popular Demand (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:108:y:2000:i:5:p:905-927)
by Jacques Cremer & Thomas R. Palfrey - Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:3:p:668-91)
by Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay - Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate (RePEc:upf:upfgen:502)
by Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey - Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions (RePEc:vir:virpap:345)
by Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey - Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem (RePEc:wly:amposc:v:58:y:2014:i:1:p:127-143)
by Jens Großer & Thomas R. Palfrey - Erratum for “Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem”, American Journal of Political Science, 58(1):127‐143 (RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:3:p:761-763)
by Jens Großer & Thomas R. Palfrey - Turnout and Power Sharing (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:124:y:2014:i:574:p:f131-f162)
by Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Thomas Palfrey - Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:87:y:2019:i:2:p:631-652)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey - Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9405003)
by John O. Ledyard & Thomas R. Palfrey - Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9711003)
by Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey - Minorities and Storable Votes (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390125_0015)
by Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey & Raymond Riezman - Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment (RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2011205)
by Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas