Hiroshi Osano
Names
| first: |
Hiroshi |
| last: |
Osano |
Identifer
Contact
| phone: |
0668718818 |
| postal address: |
1-1-10-705 Shinsenri-Nishimachi,Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0083, Japan |
Affiliations
-
Konan University
/ Faculty of Economics (weight: 50%)
-
Kyoto University
/ Institute of Economic Research (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Breach Of Contracts And Renegotiation In Corporate Takeovers (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:47:y:1996:i:4:p:346-367)
by HIROSHI Osano - Default and Renegotiation in Financial Distress in the Multiple Bank Model: An Analysis of the Main Bank System (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:49:y:1998:i:2:p:138-157)
by Hiroshi Osano - Wealth Dynamics and the Endogenous Design of Firm Organization (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:54:y:2003:i:3:p:300-323)
by Hiroshi Osano - Optimal Contracts For Central Bankers And Public Debt Policy (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:55:y:2004:i:4:p:372-400)
by Hiroshi Fujiki & Hiroshi Osano & Hirofumi Uchida - An Optimal Scheme For Injecting Public Funds Under The Moral Hazard Incentive For Banks (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:56:y:2005:i:2:p:223-247)
by Hiroshi Osano - Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:68:y:2017:i:4:p:521-554)
by Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano - Implicit Contracts in the Japanese Bank Loan Market (RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:20:y:1985:i:02:p:211-229_01)
by Osano, Hiroshi & Tsutsui, Yoshiro - Stock options and employees' firm-specific human capital under the threat of divestitures and acquisitions (RePEc:eee:corfin:v:10:y:2004:i:4:p:615-638)
by Osano, Hiroshi - Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts (RePEc:eee:corfin:v:29:y:2014:i:c:p:607-627)
by Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi - Information production in start-up firms: SPACs vs. Traditional IPOs (RePEc:eee:corfin:v:85:y:2024:i:c:s0929119924000051)
by Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi - Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:111:y:2020:i:c:s0165188919301915)
by Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi - Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:33:y:2009:i:12:p:1962-1980)
by Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi - Credit default swaps and market information (RePEc:eee:finmar:v:48:y:2020:i:c:s138641811830257x)
by Osano, Hiroshi - Credit rationing and implicit contract theory : An empirical study (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:4:y:1986:i:4:p:419-438)
by Osano, Hiroshi & Tsutsui, Yoshiro - Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm (RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:20:y:1996:i:6:p:1047-1068)
by Osano, Hiroshi - Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy (RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:26:y:2002:i:1:p:25-49)
by Osano, Hiroshi - Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:37:y:1998:i:2:p:207-230)
by Osano, Hiroshi - Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:1:p:175-192)
by Osano, Hiroshi - Renegotiation-Proof Lotteries Equilibrium in an Economy with Private Information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:65:y:1995:i:2:p:435-467)
by Osano H. - Nonrecourse financing and securitization (RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:21:y:2012:i:4:p:659-693)
by Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi - An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts (RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:403-436)
by Osano, Hiroshi - Implicit contracts in the Japanese labor market (RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:2:y:1988:i:2:p:181-198)
by Osano, Hiroshi & Inoue, Touru - The new main bank system (RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:25:y:2011:i:3:p:336-354)
by Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi - Double moral hazard and renegotiation (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:59:y:2005:i:4:p:345-364)
by Osano, Hiroshi & Kobayashi, Mami - 日本における銀行モニタリングのガバナンス機能, Bank Monitoring and Corporate Governance in Japan (RePEc:hit:hitcei:2003-5)
by 内田, 浩史 & Uchida, Hirofumi & ウチダ, ヒロフミ & 小佐野, 広 & Osano, Hiroshi & オサノ, ヒロシ - Testing between Competing Models of Real Business Cycles (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:32:y:1991:i:3:p:669-88)
by Osano, Hiroshi & Inoue, Tohru - Sustainable Investing Under Delegated Investment Management (RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2023-01)
by Meg Adachi-Sato & Hiroshi Osano - Information Investment Regulation and Portfolio Delegation (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1032)
by Akihiko Ikeda & Hiroshi Osano - Lender Liability and Cleanup Procudure: A Comparison (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:561)
by Mami Kobayashi & Hiroshi Osano - Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:563)
by Hiroshi Osano & Mami Kobayashi - Prudential Regulation and Capital Injection under Moral Hazard in Banks and Entrepreneurs (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:576)
by Hiroshi Osano - Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:768)
by Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano - Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:863)
by Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori - A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:921)
by Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori - Debt Maturity, Default, and Investment under Rollover Risk and Solvency Concern (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:979)
by Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori - Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201012)166:4_614:itswma_2.0.tx_2-6)
by Nobuo Akai & Keizo Mizuno & Hiroshi Osano - Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201106)167:2_202:poasaw_2.0.tx_2-z)
by Hiroshi Osano - Testing Between Competing Models of Business Cycles: The Efficient Long-Term Contract Hypothesis Versus the Intertemporal Substitution Hypothesis (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:768)
by H. Osano & T. Inoue - Involuntary Unemployment and the Threat to Shirking Workers (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:795)
by Hiroshi Osano - Real Business Cycles in a Dynamic Labor Contract Equilibrium (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:809)
by Hiroshi Osano - Coordination Failure and Long Run Growth (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:831)
by Hiroshi Osano - Stock Options and Employees' Firm-Specific Human Capital under the Threat of Divesture and Aquisition (RePEc:osu:osuewp:01-10)
by Hiroshi Osano - Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium (RePEc:oup:revfin:v:2:y:1999:i:3:p:273-302.)
by Hiroshi Osano - Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:26:y:2013:i:10:p:2620-2647)
by Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano - Banking, Capital Markets and Corporate Governance (RePEc:pal:palbok:978-0-230-28814-0)
by None - Introduction (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-28814-0_1)
by Hiroshi Osano & Toshiaki Tachibanaki - Injection of Public Funds into Banks under Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-28814-0_4)
by Hiroshi Osano - Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options (RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:68:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1111_jere.12144)
by Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano - Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:161-177)
by Hiroshi Osano