Martin J. Osborne
Names
| first: |
Martin |
| middle: |
J. |
| last: |
Osborne |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Toronto
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Games with Procedurally Rational Players (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:4:p:834-47)
by Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel - Meetings with Costly Participation (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:4:p:927-943)
by Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner - Meetings with Costly Participation: Reply (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:1351-1354)
by Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner - Noncooperative Models of Bargaining (RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275482)
by Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel - Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take (RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:2:p:261-301)
by Martin J. Osborne - Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000037)
by Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein - Party formation in collective decision-making (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000050)
by Martin J Osborne & Rabee Tourky - Bargaining and Markets (RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000515)
by Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein - A Course in Game Theory (RePEc:cla:levrem:814577000000000225)
by Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein - Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem (RePEc:cvs:starer:82-06)
by Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn - Are Large Firms More Powerful Than Small Ones? (RePEc:cvs:starer:82-07)
by Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn - Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry (RePEc:cvs:starer:83-06)
by Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn - Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly (RePEc:cvs:starer:83-08)
by Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn - Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity (RePEc:cvs:starer:83-09)
by Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn - Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:628)
by Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik - Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:668)
by Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik - Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:4:p:911-22)
by Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn - Profit-sharing in a collusive industry (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:22:y:1983:i:1:p:59-74)
by Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn - Noncooperative models of bargaining (RePEc:eee:gamchp:1-07)
by Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel - Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:434-441)
by Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel - Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:133-151)
by Osborne Martin J. - Why do some goods bear higher taxes than others? (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:32:y:1984:i:2:p:301-316)
by Osborne, Martin J. - Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:38:y:1986:i:2:p:238-260)
by Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn - Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:1:p:22-36)
by Osborne, Martin J. - Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:40:y:2000:i:1:p:41-62)
by Osborne, Martin J. - Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining (RePEc:fth:michet:89-26)
by Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A. - Games with Procedurally Rational Players (RePEc:fth:teavfo:4-97)
by Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A - Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517283)
by M. Remzi Sanver & Martin Osborne & Sean Horan - A Note on “The Early History of the Theory of Strategic Games from Waldegrave to Borel” by Robert W. Dimand and Mary Ann Dimand (RePEc:hop:hopeec:v:28:y:1996:i:1:p:81-82)
by Martin J. Osborne & Paul S. Walker - The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:27:y:1986:i:1:p:223-37)
by Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn - Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:28:y:1987:i:2:p:413-28)
by Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn - Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition (RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1985-02)
by Martin J Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik - Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition (RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1992-02)
by Martin J. Osborne - A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates (RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1995-01)
by Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi - Games with Procedurally Rational Players (RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1997-02)
by Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein - Party Formation Incollective Decision-Making (RePEc:mlb:wpaper:844)
by Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky - Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives (RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-01)
by HORAN, Sean & OSBORNE, Martin J. & SANVER, M. Remzi - Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules and Majority Rule : A Generalization of May’s Theorem to Many Alternatives (RePEc:mtl:montec:03-2018)
by Sean HORAN & Martin J. OSBORNE & M. Remzi SANVER - A Course in Game Theory (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262650401)
by Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein - Information Aggregation with Costly Reporting (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:625:p:208-232.)
by Martin J Osborne & Jeffrey S Rosenthal & Colin Stewart - A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:111:y:1996:i:1:p:65-96.)
by Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski - Capitalist-Worker Conflict and Involuntary Unemployment (RePEc:oup:restud:v:51:y:1984:i:1:p:111-127.)
by Martin J. Osborne - Introduction to Game Theory: International Edition (RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780195322484)
by Osborne, Martin J. - Meetings with costly participation (RePEc:tor:tecipa:mturner-98-02)
by Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner - Party formation in single-issue politics (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-174)
by Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky - Strategic and extensive games (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-231)
by Martin J. Osborne - Cost benefit analysis vs. referenda (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-286)
by Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner - Party formation in single-issue politics [revised] (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-296)
by Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky - Information aggregation with costly reporting (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-565)
by Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Colin Stewart - Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-599)
by Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver - Comment on a passage in "Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective" by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-778)
by Martin J. Osborne - Sequential entry into electoral competition when the possibility of ties is limited (RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-786)
by Martin J. Osborne - Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:5:p:974-1005)
by Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky - Cost Benefit Analyses versus Referenda (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:118:y:2010:i:1:p:156-187)
by Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner - Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules And Majority Rule: A Generalization Of May'S Theorem To Many Alternatives (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:4:p:1489-1504)
by Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver