Yoshitaka Okano

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Affiliations

• Kansai University / Faculty of Economics
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:08874r)
  by Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo
• Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0992)
  by Masaki Aoyagi & Naoko Nishimura & Yoshitaka Okano
• Minimax play by teams (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:168-180)
  by Okano, Yoshitaka
• The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:73-85)
  by Masuda, Takehito & Okano, Yoshitaka & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
• Detecting motives for cooperation in public goods experiments (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:19:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-015-9451-2)
  by Takafumi Yamakawa & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo
• Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09719-6)
  by Masaki Aoyagi & Naoko Nishimura & Yoshitaka Okano
• Reexamination of teams play in mixed-strategy game experiment (RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2014-12)
  by Yoshitaka Okano
• Detecting motives for cooperation in public goods experiments (RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2015-15)
  by Takafumi Yamakawa & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo
• Team vs. Individual, Hypothesis Testing vs. Model Selection, and the Minimax Model (RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2017-18)
  by Yoshitaka Okano
• Groups disguise lying better (RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2019-7)
  by Yoshitaka Okano & Eiji Goto
• Preemptive Striking in Individual and Group Conflict (RePEc:plo:pone00:0154859)
  by Nobuhiro Mifune & Yoichi Hizen & Yoshio Kamijo & Yoshitaka Okano
• Re-examination of team’s play in a mixed-strategy game experiment (RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:23:y:2016:i:8:p:601-604)
  by Yoshitaka Okano