Ichiro Obara
Names
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Ichiro |
| last: |
Obara |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA)
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games (RePEc:arx:papers:2308.09211)
by Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara - Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication (RePEc:arx:papers:2311.12242)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Weighted Garbling (RePEc:arx:papers:2410.21694)
by Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara - Firm reputation and horizontal integration (RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:340-363)
by Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara - Collusion and heterogeneity of firms (RePEc:bla:randje:v:48:y:2017:i:1:p:230-249)
by Ichiro Obara & Federico Zincenko - The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:8)
by Obara Ichiro - Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002038)
by Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara - Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002236)
by Ichiro Obara & David Rahman - Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000055)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001206)
by Ichiro Obara - Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000280)
by Ichiro Obara & David Rahman - Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000285)
by Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara - Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000342)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000934)
by David Rahman & Ichiro Obara - Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000261)
by Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Folk Theorem with Communication (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000351)
by Ichiro Obara - The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000137)
by Ichiro Obara - The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cla:penntw:83719e84b6825736ffcfdfacb90facc5)
by George J. Mailath & Ichiro Obara & Tadashi Sekiguchi - The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case (RePEc:cla:penntw:ba7f35f1c50de4503e241d1279556bab)
by Ichiro Obara - Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring (RePEc:cla:penntw:d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b11423f1641)
by V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara - Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) (RePEc:cla:uclaol:275)
by Ichiro Obara - Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) (RePEc:cla:uclaol:281)
by Ichiro Obara - Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) (RePEc:cla:uclaol:318)
by Ichiro Obara - Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) (RePEc:cla:uclaol:365)
by Ichiro Obara - Folk Theorem with Communication (RePEc:cla:uclaol:366)
by Ichiro Obara - The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (RePEc:cla:uclaol:374)
by Ichiro Obara - Endogenous Monitoring (RePEc:cla:uclaol:398)
by Ichiro Obara - Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) (RePEc:cla:uclaol:399)
by Ichiro Obara - Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) (RePEc:cla:uclaol:418)
by Ichiro Obara - Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (RePEc:cla:uclawp:826)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:74:y:2006:i:2:p:499-519)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - Mediated Partnerships (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:1:p:285-308)
by David Rahman & Ichiro Obara - Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1330)
by V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara - Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1449)
by Ichiro Obara - The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:40:y:2002:i:1:p:99-122)
by Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:40-69)
by Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro - Folk theorem with communication (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:120-134)
by Obara, Ichiro - Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:153:y:2014:i:c:p:191-212)
by McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew - Repeated games with general discounting (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:172:y:2017:i:c:p:348-375)
by Obara, Ichiro & Park, Jaeok - Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (RePEc:min:wpaper:2008-3)
by David Rahman & Ichiro Obara - Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (RePEc:pen:papers:05-024)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:11-029)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication (RePEc:pen:papers:23-018)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Endogeous Monitoring (RePEc:red:sed004:752)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games (RePEc:red:sed007:253)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - Mechanism design with information acquisition (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:63:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0964-5)
by Sushil Bikhchandani & Ichiro Obara - Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:4:p:475-493)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess (RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf246)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf255)
by Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara - The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case (RePEc:wop:pennca:99-13)
by Ichiro Obara - Repeated Games with General Discounting (RePEc:yon:wpaper:2015rwp-84)
by Ichiro Obara & Jaeok Park