Mandar Oak
Names
| first: |
Mandar |
| middle: |
Prafullachandra |
| last: |
Oak |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Adelaide
/ School of Economics and Public Policy
Research profile
author of:
- Commitment and Conquest: The Case of British Rule in India
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2009)
by Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2009-24) - Conflict and Leadership: When is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2011)
by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2011-24) - Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2013)
by Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2013-02) - Networks and Favor Exchange Norms under Stochastic Costs
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2013)
by Seungmoon Choi & Virginie Masson & Angus Moore & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2013-04) - Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type is Endogenous
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2013)
by Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2013-06) - Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2015)
by Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2015-06) - Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2015)
by Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2015-19) - Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2016)
by Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2016-02) - Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2016)
by Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2016-05) - Subpoena Power and Information Transmission
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2017)
by Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2017-05) - Political Favoritism by Powerful Politicians: Evidence from Chief Ministers in India
School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy (2020)
by Umair Khalil & Mandar Oak & Sundar Ponnusamy
(ReDIF-paper, adl:wpaper:2020-09) - Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy
Coalition Theory Network Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (2006)
by Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar
(ReDIF-paper, ags:feemct:12173) - Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham (2010)
by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, bir:birmec:10-04) - The Signalling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science (2005)
by Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-article, bla:econom:v:72:y:2005:i:288:p:597-613) - On The Role Of The Primary System In Candidate Selection
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell (2006)
by Mandar P. Oak
(ReDIF-article, bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:169-190) - Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type Is Endogenous
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory (2015)
by Amrita Dillon & MANDAR OAK
(ReDIF-article, bla:jpbect:v:17:y:2015:i:4:p:580-604) - A model of informal favor exchange on networks
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory (2018)
by V. Masson & S. Choi & A. Moore & M. Oak
(ReDIF-article, bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:5:p:639-656) - A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory (2007)
by Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-article, bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:3:p:425-449) - The Signaling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2003)
by Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, ces:ceswps:_913) - Local Currency as a Development Strategy
Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002, Royal Economic Society (2002)
by Jayaraman, Rajshri & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, ecj:ac2002:106) - Party Formation And Coalitional Bargaining In A Model Of Proportional Representation
Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004, Royal Economic Society (2004)
by Mandar Oak & Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
(ReDIF-paper, ecj:ac2004:37) - Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India
Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier (2012)
by Oak, Mandar & Swamy, Anand V.
(ReDIF-article, eee:exehis:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:352-366) - Approval voting with endogenous candidates
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2006)
by Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P.
(ReDIF-article, eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:47-76) - Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier (2008)
by Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar P.
(ReDIF-article, eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:3:p:554-561) - Political favoritism by powerful politicians: Evidence from chief ministers in India
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier (2021)
by Khalil, Umair & Oak, Mandar & Ponnusamy, Sundar
(ReDIF-article, eee:poleco:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0176268020300975) - A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?
Working Papers, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University (2005)
by Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, fal:wpaper:05005) - Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2004)
by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, fem:femwpa:2004.98) - Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2006)
by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-paper, fem:femwpa:2006.83) - Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2017)
by Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-article, mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201712)173:4_565:ppasci_2.0.tx_2-5) - Informational Lobbying and Pareto-Improving Agenda Constraint
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press (2019)
by Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-article, oup:jleorg:v:35:y:2019:i:3:p:579-618.) - Candidatures endogènes dans les élections pluralitaires : quelques explications du nombre de candidats et de leur polarisation
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique (2017)
by Bol, Damien & Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar
(ReDIF-article, ris:actuec:0166) - Subpoena power and informational lobbying
Journal of Theoretical Politics, (2020)
by Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-article, sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:2:p:188-234) - Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare (2007)
by Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-article, spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:2:p:229-245) - Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare (2016)
by Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-article, spr:sochwe:v:46:y:2016:i:1:p:1-38) - Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy
Studies in Political Economy, Springer (2016)
by Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak
(ReDIF-chapter, spr:stpocp:978-3-319-40118-8_2) - Only Twice as Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders
Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press (2010)
by Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy
(ReDIF-article, ucp:ecdecc:v:58:y:2010:i:4:p:775-803) - Only Twice As Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders
Center for Development Economics, Department of Economics, Williams College (2007)
by Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy
(ReDIF-paper, wil:wilcde:2007-03) - Commitment and Conquest: The Case of British Rule in India
Center for Development Economics, Department of Economics, Williams College (2010)
by Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy
(ReDIF-paper, wil:wilcde:2010-05) - Only Twice As Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders
Department of Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, Williams College (2007)
by Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy
(ReDIF-paper, wil:wileco:2007-06) - Commitment and Conquest: The Case of British Rule in India
Department of Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, Williams College (2010)
by Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy
(ReDIF-paper, wil:wileco:2010-08)