Marina Núñez
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Marina |
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Núñez |
Identifer
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Affiliations
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Universitat de Barcelona
/ School of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- On the extreme points of the core and reduced games (RePEc:bar:bedcje:19966)
by Marina Nunez Oliva & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - The extreme core allocations of the assignment game (RePEc:bar:bedcje:200165)
by Marina Nunez Oliva & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - The assignment game: core bounds for mixe-pair coalitions (RePEc:bar:bedcje:200284)
by Marina Nunez Oliva & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - Single-valued solutions for the Bohm-Bawerk horse market game (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2003104)
by Marina Nunez Oliva & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2004114)
by Marina Nunez Oliva - Uniform-price assignment markets (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2005135)
by Marina Nunez Oliva & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - On the dimension of the core of the assignment game (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2006167)
by Marina Nunez Oliva & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - The maximun and the addition of assigment games (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2009221)
by Silvia Miquel & Marina Nunez - Assignment markets with the same core (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010239)
by F. Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz & Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels - Multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010243)
by Oriol Tejada & Marina Nunez - The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010246)
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels - A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2011260)
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels - An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2012286)
by Francesc Llerena (Universitat Rovira i Virgili - CREIP) & Marina Nunez (Universitat de Barcelona) & Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona) - Bargained stable allocations in assignment markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:153)
by Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - A Simple Procedure to Obtain the Extreme Core Allocations of an Assignment Market (RePEc:bge:wpaper:275)
by Josep M. Izquierdo & Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - A Canonical Representation for the Assignment Game: the Kernel and the Nucleolus (RePEc:bge:wpaper:279)
by Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market (RePEc:bge:wpaper:412)
by Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - One‐seller assignment markets with multi‐unit demands: Core and competitive equilibrium (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:15:y:2019:i:2:p:169-182)
by Francisco Robles & Marina Núñez - Assignment submarkets with a segment core (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c70010)
by Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels - A geometric characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00667)
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez - Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:212:y:2011:i:3:p:529-534)
by Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. & Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles - Stable cores in information graph games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:353-367)
by Núñez, Marina & Vidal-Puga, Juan - Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:469-484)
by Domènech, Gerard & Núñez, Marina - On the dimension of the core of the assignment game (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:290-302)
by Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles - A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:598-610)
by Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles - Assignment markets with the same core (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:553-563)
by Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier & Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles - Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:3:p:1282-1291)
by Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles - Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:195:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000946)
by van den Brink, René & Núñez, Marina & Robles, Francisco - Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:115:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824001241)
by Funaki, Yukihiko & Núñez, Marina - A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:87:y:2020:i:c:p:6-14)
by Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carlos & Robles, Francisco - A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:98:y:2019:i:c:p:10-14)
by Atay, Ata & Núñez, Marina - One-seller assignment markets with multiunit demands (RePEc:ewp:wpaper:316web)
by Francisco Robles & Marina Núñez - Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs (RePEc:ewp:wpaper:357web)
by Ata Atay & Marina Núñez - Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems (RePEc:ewp:wpaper:378web)
by René van den Brink & Marina Nuñez & Francisco Robles - Stable cores in information graph games (RePEc:ewp:wpaper:403web)
by Marina Núñez & Juan Vidal-Puga - Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market (RePEc:ewp:wpaper:419web)
by Gerard Domènech Gironell & Marina Núñez Oliva - Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games (RePEc:has:discpr:1425)
by Marina Núnez & Tamás Solymosi - Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games (RePEc:has:discpr:1806)
by Ata Atay & Marina Núnez - Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:254:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-017-2435-1)
by Marina Núñez & Tamás Solymosi - Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:279:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-019-03256-5)
by Ata Atay & Marina Núñez - On extreme points of the core and reduced games (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:84:y:1998:i:0:p:121-133:10.1023/a:1018980602195)
by Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - A Cooperative Bargaining Approach to the Assignment Market (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:17:y:2008:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-008-9111-4)
by Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:55-65)
by Marina Núñez - The Böhm–Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:3:p:421-430)
by Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:17-26)
by Josep Izquierdo & Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:1-15)
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:199-220)
by Oriol Tejada & Marina Núñez - Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:62:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01506-5)
by Marina Núñez & Francisco Robles - The maximum and the addition of assignment games (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:19:y:2011:i:1:p:189-212)
by S. Miquel & M. Núñez - Comments on: Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:24:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s11750-016-0418-z)
by Marina Núñez - Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:24:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11750-016-0409-0)
by Ata Atay & Francesc Llerena & Marina Núñez - Valuation Monotonicity, Fairness and Stability in Assignment Problems (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180071)
by Rene (J.R.) van den Brink & Marina Nunez & Francisco Robles - Axiomatization of the nucl eolus of assignment games (RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/228403)
by Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Nuñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) - Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core (RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/246962)
by Atay, Ata & Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)