Felix Munoz-Garcia

Names

Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• Washington State University / School of Economic Sciences
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Environmental Regulation: Supported by Polluting Firms but Opposed by Green Firms? (RePEc:ags:aaea13:150202)
  by Akhundjanov, Sherzod & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Regulation, Free-Riding Incentives, and Investment in R&D with Spillovers (RePEc:ags:aaea17:258016)
  by Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Strandholm, John & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Information transmission during the trial: The role of punitive damages and legal costs (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:2:p:136-155)
  by Ana Espínola‐Arredondo & Felix Munoz‐Garcia & Pitchayaporn Tantihkarnchana
• Can mandatory certification promote greenwashing? A signaling approach (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:6:p:1801-1851)
  by Dolores Garrido & Ana Espínola‐Arredondo & Felix Munoz‐Garcia
• The Signaling Role of Subsidies (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:15:y:2015:i:1:p:22:n:6)
  by Muñoz-Garcia Félix & Espinola-Arredondo Ana
• Can Polluting Firms Favor Regulation? (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:16:y:2016:i:4:p:23:n:5)
  by Muñoz-García Félix & Akhundjanov Sherzod B.
• Endogenous Equity Shares in Cournot Competition: Welfare Analysis and Policy (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:20:y:2020:i:1:p:21:n:1)
  by Kanjilal Kiriti & Muñoz-García Félix
• The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Interpretation and Step-by-Step Examples (RePEc:bpj:jioedu:v:5:y:2011:i:1:n:7)
  by Munoz-Garcia Felix & Espinola-Arredondo Ana
• A systematic procedure for finding Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games (RePEc:bpj:jioedu:v:6:y:2012:i:1:p:1-18:n:8)
  by Munoz-Garcia Felix
• The Entry-Deterring Effects of Inflexible Regulation (RePEc:cje:issued:v:47:y:2014:i:1:p:298-324)
  by Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-Garcia & Jude Bayham
• Why do firms oppose entry-deterring policies? Environmental regulation and entry deterrence (RePEc:cup:endeec:v:20:y:2015:i:02:p:141-160_00)
  by Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix
• International coordination of environmental policies: is it always worth the effort? (RePEc:cup:endeec:v:24:y:2019:i:03:p:294-316_00)
  by Bayham, Jude & Muñoz-García, Félix & Espínola-Arredondo, Ana
• Regulators and environmental groups: better together or apart? (RePEc:cup:endeec:v:27:y:2022:i:1:p:40-66_3)
  by Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Stathopoulou, Eleni & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Nonprofit Product Differentiation (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00423)
  by Robert Rosenman & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Can more perishable products be welfare-improving? (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-23-00079)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Anticipatory effects of taxation in the commons: When do taxes work, and when do they fail? (RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:166:y:2019:i:c:10)
  by Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix & Duah, Isaac
• Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: A "desensitizer" from uncertainty (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:38-41)
  by Muñoz-García, Félix & Orozco-Alemán, Sandra
• Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:3:p:463-467)
  by Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix
• Does the presence of a public firm facilitate merger approvals? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:219:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003160)
  by Kanjilal, Kiriti & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Being green first: Simultaneous vs. sequential abatement decisions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001489)
  by Strandholm, John C. & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Corrigendum to “Being green first: Simultaneous vs. sequential abatement decisions” [Economics Letters 227 (2023) 111123] (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:238:y:2024:i:c:s0165176523004081)
  by Strandholm, John C. & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• When should a firm expand its business? (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:6:p:729-745)
  by Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Gal-Or, Esther & Muñoz-García, Félix
• Environmental regulation under sequential competition (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:221:y:2024:i:c:p:52-72)
  by Choi, Pak-Sing & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Can incomplete information lead to under-exploitation in the commons? (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:62:y:2011:i:3:p:402-413)
  by Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix
• When does environmental regulation facilitate entry-deterring practices (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:65:y:2013:i:1:p:133-152)
  by Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix
• Conservation procurement auctions with bidirectional externalities (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:92:y:2018:i:c:p:559-579)
  by Choi, Pak-Sing & Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix
• Regulation, free-riding incentives, and investment in R&D with spillovers (RePEc:eee:resene:v:53:y:2018:i:c:p:133-146)
  by Strandholm, John C. & Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Pollution abatement with disruptive R&D investment (RePEc:eee:resene:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0928765521000439)
  by Strandholm, John C. & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Environmental policy helping antitrust decisions: Socially excessive and insufficient merger approvals (RePEc:eee:resene:v:67:y:2022:i:c:s092876552100052x)
  by Choi, Pak-Sing & Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix
• When should the regulator be left alone in the commons? How fishing cooperatives can help ameliorate inefficiencies (RePEc:eee:resene:v:77:y:2024:i:c:s0928765524000101)
  by Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• “Last-chance” sales: what makes them credible? (RePEc:ere:journl:v:xxviii:y:2009:i:1:p:61-80)
  by Félix Muñoz-García & Heriberto González Lozano
• The Entry-Deterring Effects of Environmental Policy (RePEc:fem:femre3:2013.01-01)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Firm Preferences for Environmental Regulation (RePEc:fem:femre3:2014.11-04)
  by Félix Muñoz-García & Sherzod B. Akhundjanov
• Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:56-77:d:16780)
  by John Duffy & Félix Muñoz-García
• Can Poorly Informed Regulators Hinder Competition? (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:61:y:2015:i:3:p:433-461)
  by Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García
• Transboundary Natural Resources, Externalities, and Firm Preferences for Regulation (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:73:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-018-0265-5)
  by Sherzod B. Akhundjanov & Felix Muñoz-García
• Uncovering Entry Deterrence in the Presence of Learning-by-Doing (RePEc:kap:jincot:v:13:y:2013:i:3:p:319-338)
  by Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García
• Capacity Constrained Firms and Expansion Subsidies: Should Governments Avoid Generous Subsidies? (RePEc:kap:jincot:v:13:y:2013:i:4:p:563-597)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Gulnara Zaynutdinova
• Can Banning Spatial Price Discrimination Improve Social Welfare? (RePEc:kap:jincot:v:18:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10842-017-0263-2)
  by Ziying Yang & Félix Muñoz-García
• Strategic Emission Fees: Using Green Technology to Deter Entry (RePEc:kap:jincot:v:19:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10842-019-00292-6)
  by Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia & Boying Liu
• Organic Mergers and Acquisitions (RePEc:kap:jincot:v:20:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10842-019-00300-9)
  by Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia & Ae Rin Jung
• Green Alliances: Are They Beneficial when Regulated Firms are Asymmetric? (RePEc:kap:jincot:v:22:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10842-022-00384-w)
  by John C. Strandholm & Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Campaign contributions and policy convergence: asymmetric agents and donations constraints (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:184:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00732-1)
  by Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• When do firms support environmental agreements? (RePEc:kap:regeco:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:380-401)
  by Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García
• Profit-enhancing environmental policy: uninformed regulation in an entry-deterrence model (RePEc:kap:regeco:v:50:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-016-9298-2)
  by Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García
• Measuring regulatory errors from environmental policy uncertainty (RePEc:kap:regeco:v:64:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11149-023-09464-z)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia & Dolores Garrido
• Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences (RePEc:kap:theord:v:78:y:2015:i:1:p:45-75)
  by John Duffy & Félix Muñoz-García
• Don't Forget to Protect Abundant Resources (RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000032)
  by Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Firm Preferences for Environmental Policy: Industry Uniform or Firm Specific? (RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000066)
  by Akhundjanov, Sherzod B. & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Common Pool Resources with Endogenous Equity Shares (RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000102)
  by Kiriti Kanjilal & Félix Muñoz-García
• Competition for status acquisition in public good games (RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:63:y:2011:i:3:p:549-567)
  by Félix Muñoz-García
• Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games (RePEc:pit:wpaper:383)
  by John Duffy & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Cooperation and Signaling with Uncertain Social Preferences (RePEc:pit:wpaper:491)
  by John Duffy & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Common Pool Resources with Endogenous Equity Shares (RePEc:ris:wsuwpa:2018_004)
  by Kanjilal, Kiriti & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Can Mandatory Certification Promote Greenwashing? A Signaling Approach (RePEc:ris:wsuwpa:2018_005)
  by Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Garrido, Dolores & Munoz, Felix
• Abolishing Environmental Regulation: Strategic E§ects and Welfare Implications (RePEc:ris:wsuwpa:2018_007)
  by Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Pollution Abatement with Disruptive R&D Investment (RePEc:ris:wsuwpa:2018_008)
  by Strandholm, John & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Regulators and Environmental Groups: Substitutes or Complements? (RePEc:ris:wsuwpa:2019_001)
  by Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Stathopoulou, Eleni & Munoz, Felix
• Mergers as an environmental ally: Socially excessive and insufficient merger approvals (RePEc:ris:wsuwpa:2020_001)
  by Choi, Pak-Sing & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz, Felix
• Don't Leave the Regulator Alone in the Commons: How Fishing Cooperatives Can Help Ameliorate Inefficiencies (RePEc:ris:wsuwpa:2022_001)
  by Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix
• Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:1:p:111-134)
  by Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García
• Explaining Hypothetical Bias Variations Using Income Elasticity of Demand (RePEc:spr:homoec:v:35:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s41412-018-0076-5)
  by Félix Muñoz-García & Tongzhe Li
• Game Theory (RePEc:spr:sprbok:978-3-031-37574-3)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Introduction to Games and Their Representation (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_1)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_10)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Equilibrium Refinements (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_11)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Signaling Games with Continuous Messages (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_12)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Cheap Talk Games (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_13)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Equilibrium Dominance (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_2)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_3)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Nash Equilibria in Games with Continuous Action Spaces (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_4)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_5)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_6)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Repeated Games (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_7)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_8)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Auction Theory (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_9)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Strategy and Game Theory (RePEc:spr:sptbec:978-3-030-11902-7)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Industrial Organization (RePEc:spr:sptbec:978-3-030-57284-6)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Auction Theory (RePEc:spr:sptbec:978-3-030-69575-0)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Industrial Organization (RePEc:spr:sptbec:978-3-031-38635-0)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Strategy and Game Theory (RePEc:spr:sptbec:978-3-319-32963-5)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Dominance Solvable Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_1)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Cheap Talk Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_10)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• More Advanced Signaling Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_11)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Correction to: Strategy and Game Theory (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_12)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_2)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Mixed Strategies, Strictly Competitive Games, and Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_3)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Sequential-Move Games with Complete Information (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_4)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Applications to Industrial Organization (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_5)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_6)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Simultaneous-Move Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_7)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Auctions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_8)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_9)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Monopoly (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_1)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Networks and Switching Costs (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_10)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Simultaneous Quantity Competition (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_2)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Simultaneous Price Competition (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_3)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Sequential Competition (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_4)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_5)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• R&D Incentives (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_6)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Mergers and Collusion (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_7)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Bundling Incentives (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_8)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Incomplete Information, Signaling, and Competition (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-57284-6_9)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Second-Price Auctions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_1)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Procurement Auctions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_10)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• First-Price Auctions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_2)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• First-Price Auctions: Extensions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_3)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_4)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_5)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• The Revenue Equivalence Principle (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_6)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Common-Value Auctions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_7)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Multi-Unit Auctions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_8)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Mechanism Design (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_9)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Monopoly (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_1)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Incomplete Information, Signaling, and Competition (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_10)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Networks and Switching Costs (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_11)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Simultaneous Quantity Competition (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_2)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Simultaneous Price Competition (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_3)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Sequential Competition (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_4)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_5)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• R&D Incentives (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_6)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Mergers (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_7)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Collusion (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_8)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Bundling Incentives (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-38635-0_9)
  by Pak-Sing Choi & Eric Dunaway & Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Dominance Solvable Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_1)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• More Advanced Signaling Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_10)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Erratum to: Strategy and Game Theory (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_11)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Erratum to: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_12)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_2)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Mixed Strategies, Strictly Competitive Games, and Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_3)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Sequential-Move Games with Complete Information (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_4)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Applications to Industrial Organization (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_5)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_6)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Simultaneous-Move Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_7)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Auctions (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_8)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games (RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_9)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
• The Entry‐Deterring Effects of Inflexible Regulation (RePEc:wly:canjec:v:47:y:2014:i:1:p:298-324)
  by Ana Espínola‐Arredondo & Félix Muñoz‐Garcia & Jude Bayham
• The WSPC Reference on Natural Resources and Environmental Policy in the Era of Global Change:In 4 Volumes (RePEc:wsi:wsbook:9747)
  by None
• The Informative Role of Subsidies (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-10)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Environmental Protection Agencies: Measuring the Welfare Benefits from Regulation under Different Information Contexts (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-11)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• An Excessive Development of Green Products (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-13)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Can Poorly Informed Regulators Hinder Competition? (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-15)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• When Should a Firm Expand Its Business? The Signaling Implications of Business Expansion (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-4)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Esther Gal-Or & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-5)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Entry Deterrence in the Presence of Learning-by-Doing (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-6)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Keeping Negotiations in the Dark: Environmental Agreements under Incomplete Information (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-7)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Promoting Lies through Regulation: Deterrence Impacts of Flexible versus Inflexible Policy (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-8)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia & Jude Bayham
• Commitment in Environmental Policy as an Entry-Deterrence Tool (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-10)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• When does Disinformation Promote Successful Treaties (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-11)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Entry Deterrence in the Commons with Multiple Incumbents (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-12)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Environmental Regulation: Supported by Polluting Firms, but Opposed by Green Firms (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-13)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Sherzod Akhundjanov
• Asymmetric Information may Protect the Commons: The Welfare Benefits of Uniformed Regulators (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-14)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Firm Preferences for Environmental Policy: Industry Uniform or Firm Specific? (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-15)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Sherzod B. Akhundjanov
• Competition for status acquisition in public good games (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-2)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-3)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-4)
  by John Duffy & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• A Tale of Two Externalities: Environmental Policy and Market Structure (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-5)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Can Incomplete Information Lead to Under-exploitation in the Commons (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-6)
  by Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Signaling Concerns about Fairness: Cooperation under Uncertain Social Preferences (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-8)
  by John Duffy & Felix Munoz-Garcia
• Unobserved Capacity Constraints and Entry Deterrence (RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-9)
  by Felix Munoz-Garcia & Gulnara Zaynutdinova