Stephen Morris
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
/ Economics Department
Research profile
author of:
- Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:3:p:319-24)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - The Limits of Price Discrimination (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:3:p:921-57)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:5:p:586-91)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Revenue Guarantee Equivalence (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:5:p:1911-29)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:8:p:2823-54)
by Stephen Morris & Muhamet Yildiz - Counterfactuals with Latent Information (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:1:p:343-68)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:3:p:587-97)
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song - Policy Persistence (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:5:p:1327-1336)
by Stephen Morris & Stephen Coate - Social Value of Public Information (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:5:p:1521-1534)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con: Reply (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:453-455)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin & Hui Tong - Inertia of Forward-Looking Expectations (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:152-157)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:125-130)
by Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann - Contagious Adverse Selection (RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:4:y:2012:i:1:p:1-21)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions (RePEc:aea:aerins:v:4:y:2022:i:3:p:371-88)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter - Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices (RePEc:aea:apandp:v:108:y:2018:p:572-77)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Information Design: A Unified Perspective (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:57:y:2019:i:1:p:44-95)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Expectations, Networks, and Conventions (RePEc:arx:papers:2009.13802)
by Benjamin Golub & Stephen Morris - Screening with Persuasion (RePEc:arx:papers:2212.03360)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing (RePEc:arx:papers:2301.13827)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Search, Information, and Prices (RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-23)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices (RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:36:y:2005:i:2005-2:p:1-66)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Financial Regulation in a System Context (RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:39:y:2008:i:2008-02:p:229-274)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Communication and monetary policy (RePEc:bis:biswps:123)
by Jeffery D. Amato & Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris - Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers (RePEc:bis:biswps:608)
by Stephen Morris & Ilhyock Shim & Hyun Song Shin - Central bank forward guidance and the signal value of market prices (RePEc:bis:biswps:692)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty Of Payoffs (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:63:y:2012:i:1:p:57-67)
by Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux - Information, market power, and price volatility (RePEc:bla:randje:v:52:y:2021:i:1:p:125-150)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2002:i:1:n:5)
by Morris Stephen E - Observational Implications of Non-Exponential Discounting (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_712_0313)
by Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach (RePEc:chb:bcchsb:v24c05pp131-150)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Global Games: Theory and Applications (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001080)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun S Shin - Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002286)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levarc:2107)
by George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - p-dominance and Belief Potential (RePEc:cla:levarc:505)
by S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin - Catalytic Finance (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000320)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000325)
by Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui - Communication and Monetary Policy (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000330)
by Jeffery Amato & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000257)
by George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000017)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Rationalizable Implementation (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000022)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux - Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000273)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000054)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000187)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000265)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000275)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000331)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000427)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000601)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000666)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000725)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000730)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - The Limits of Price Discrimination (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000776)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris - Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from? (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000892)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000898)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms (RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000109)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Virtual Implementation (RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000155)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000178)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris - Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000028)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000340)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000790)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001105)
by George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Ex Post Implementation (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001110)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001115)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris - Interim Correlated Rationalizability (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001188)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001194)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Endogenous Public Signals and Coordination (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001309)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001513)
by V Bhaskar & George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Belief Free Incomplete Information Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001569)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001574)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Common Belief Foundations of Global Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001638)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000170)
by V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Optimal Communication (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000236)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Purification (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000470)
by Stephen Morris - Dynamic Auctions: Uniqueness and Robustness to Private Information (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000771)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Ascending Auction: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000845)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Coordinating Expectations in Monetary Policy (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000956)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000001000)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Mechanism Design (RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000035)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Interim Rationalizability (RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000526)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Ex Post Implementation (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000018)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Topologies on Types (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000061)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000116)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001031)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris - Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001085)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Information and Market Power (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001101)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000149)
by Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann - Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets (RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000553)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000257)
by George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Robust Mechanism Design (RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000593)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching (RePEc:cla:penntw:1879bf5487d743edef7f32bb2949354e)
by Stephen Morris - The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs (RePEc:cla:penntw:269cceedcbd401a5e46548b88874373f)
by Jayasri Dutta & Stephen Morris - Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (RePEc:cla:penntw:5d82f80bcea2483b6387c5b68db8a6c2)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited (RePEc:cla:penntw:6be11f49fbded40b2a623aebfa5361c6)
by Stephen Morris - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:penntw:6bf0f633ff55148107994e0926f677bd)
by George Mailath & Stephen Morris - Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory (RePEc:cla:penntw:72042421d029130510780dde2e13dcf9)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Policy Persistence (RePEc:cla:penntw:8a66677895e9fcb3f6d813c0c6f99b54)
by Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris - Justifying Rational Expectations (RePEc:cla:penntw:9c26245814018c6e9fadb3767c054fb0)
by Stephen Morris - Contagion (RePEc:cla:penntw:ab67d13cfae3b5b56b7b9df3bc7e7758)
by Stephen Morris - Co-operation and Timing (RePEc:cla:penntw:b8d506ba7aa15345b602bb4ebcc6d293)
by Stephen Morris - Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning (RePEc:cla:penntw:d12f7936881423171f6589501c00cc2d)
by Stephen Morris - The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:penntw:ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60d7ff5c6)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Alternative Notions of Knowledge (RePEc:cor:louvco:1994002)
by MORRIS , Stephen - The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs (RePEc:cor:louvco:1995076)
by DUTTA, Jayasri & MORRIS, Stephen - The revelation of information and self-fulfilling beliefs (RePEc:cor:louvrp:1264)
by Dutta, J. & Morris, S. - Information and Market Power (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10791)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor - First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10792)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Brooks, Benjamin A - First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11782)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen - Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11783)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen - Information Design: A Unified Perspective (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11867)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen - Revenue Guarantee Equivalence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12964)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen - Information and Market Power (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13295)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen - Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13332)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen - Search, Information and Prices (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14521)
by Morris, Stephen & Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A - Information, Market Power and Price Volatility (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15104)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor - Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16402)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen - Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16495)
by Morris, Stephen & Yang, Ming - Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16507)
by Morris, Stephen & Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Sorokin, Constantine & Winter, Eyal - Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16858)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen & Sorokin, Constantine & Winter, Eyal - Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1687)
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song - Screening with Persuasion (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17502)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen - The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17897)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen - Screening with Persuasion (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17898)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen - A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2025)
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song - Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2610)
by Shin, Hyun Song & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Dasgupta, Amil & Morris, Stephen - The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory (RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:11:y:1995:i:02:p:227-253_00)
by Morris, Stephen - Finance Applications of Game Theory (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1195)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris - Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1203)
by Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris - A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1204)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Rationalizable Trade (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1211)
by Stephen Morris & Skiadas Costis - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1236)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1241)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1241r)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Political Correctness (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1242)
by Stephen Morris - Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modelling (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1260)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Faulty Communication (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1271)
by Morris, Stephen - Faulty Communication (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1271r)
by Stephen Morris - Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1273)
by Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Shin, Hyun - Global Games: Theory and Applications (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1275)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Global Games: Theory and Applications (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1275r)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - The CNBC Effect: Welfare Effects of Public Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1312)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1336)
by David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner - Best Response Equivalence (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1377)
by Morris, Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui - Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1394)
by Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui - Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work? (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1400)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on Electronic Mail Game (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1401)
by Stephen Morris - Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1402)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Communication and Monetary Policy (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1405)
by Jeffrey D. Amado & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1406)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Robust Mechanism Design (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Mechanism Design (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1423)
by Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris - Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1433)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris - Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1433r)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris - Liquidity Black Holes (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1434)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1451)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479r)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Ex Post Implementation (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1502)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1519)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1561)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms" (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1561r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1561r2)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Stephen Morris - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1571)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - An Ascending Auction for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1600)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1609)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1609r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Virtual Implementation (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1609r2)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1628)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Belief Free Incomplete Information Games (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1629)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1666)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1666r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Rationalizable Implementation (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1697)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Rationalizable Implementation (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1697r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux - Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1772)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1772r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1772r3)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1772rr)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1818)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1821)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1821r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1821r2)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1821r3)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1822)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1822r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1846)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - The Limits of Price Discrimination (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1896)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - The Limits of Price Discrimination (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1896r2)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - The Limits of Price Discrimination (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1896r3)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909rr)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909rrr)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1926)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come From" (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1928)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Information and Volatility (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1928r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Information and Volatility (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1928rr)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1973)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1973r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Information and Market Power (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2017)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Information and Market Power (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2017r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2018)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2018r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2018r2)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2018r3)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2027)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2064)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2064r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2065)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2066)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Information Design: A Unified Perspective (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Information Design: A Unified Perspective (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Information Design: A Unified Perspective (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075r2)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Information Design: A Unified Perspective (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075r3)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2088)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2132)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Revenue Guarantee Equivalence (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2133)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2147)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2147r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Counterfactuals with Latent Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2162)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Counterfactuals with Latent Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2162r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Counterfactuals with Latent Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2162r2)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Counterfactuals with Latent Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2162r3)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Counterfactuals with Latent Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2162r4)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Information, Market Power and Price Volatility (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2200)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Search, Information, and Prices (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2224)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Search, Information, and Prices (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2224r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Search, Information, and Prices (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2224r2)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Competition and Public Information: A Note (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2234)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2291)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2300)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter - Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2318)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Screening with Persuasion (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2338)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Screening with Persuasion (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2338r)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Screening with Persuasion (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2338r2)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2353)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2368)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - On the Alignment of Consumer Surplus and Total Surplus Under Competitive Price Discrimination (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2373)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2375)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2375r1)
by Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris - Econometrica (RePEc:ecm:emetrp)
from Econometric Society as editor - Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:62:y:1994:i:6:p:1327-47)
by Morris, Stephen - Dominance and Belief Potential (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:1:p:145-57)
by Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song - The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:6:p:1283-1310)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Robust Mechanism Design (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:73:y:2005:i:6:p:1771-1813)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Report of the Editors 2009–2010 (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:79:y:2011:i:1:p:327-330)
by Stephen Morris & Daron Acemoglu & Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jean‐Marc Robin & Larry Samuelson & James H. Stock & Harald Uhlig - Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:81:y:2013:i:4:p:1251-1308)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:174)
by Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang - Liquidity Black Holes (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:620)
by Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris - Liquidity Black Holes (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:644)
by Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0661)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1490)
by David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner - Inflation dynamics and the parallel market for foreign exchange (RePEc:eee:deveco:v:46:y:1995:i:2:p:295-316)
by Morris, Stephen - Coordination risk and the price of debt (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:133-153)
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song - Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:744-759)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen - Commonp-Belief: The General Case (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:73-82)
by Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen - Rationalizable Trade (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:2:p:311-323)
by Morris, Stephen & Skiadas, Costis - Best response equivalence (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:2:p:260-287)
by Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi - Ex post implementation (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:2:p:527-566)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen - Editorial: A special issue dedicated to John Nash (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:1-1)
by Dixit, Avinash & Kalai, Ehud & Morris, Stephen - Robust implementation in general mechanisms (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:261-281)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen - Catalytic finance: When does it work? (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:70:y:2006:i:1:p:161-177)
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:189-228)
by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen - Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:105:y:2002:i:2:p:450-468)
by Baliga, Sandeep & Morris, Stephen - Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:108:y:2003:i:1:p:1-44)
by Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady - Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:124:y:2005:i:1:p:45-78)
by Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi - Multidimensional private value auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:126:y:2006:i:1:p:1-30)
by Fang, Hanming & Morris, Stephen - Rationalizable implementation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:3:p:1253-1274)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Tercieux, Olivier - The robustness of robust implementation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:2093-2104)
by Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Morris, Stephen - Information and volatility (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:158:y:2015:i:pb:p:427-465)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen - Common belief foundations of global games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:826-848)
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song & Yildiz, Muhamet - Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:168:y:2017:i:c:p:329-371)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Takahashi, Satoru - Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:61:y:1993:i:2:p:206-229)
by Allen F. & Morris S. & Postlewaite A. - The Logic of Belief and Belief Change: A Decision Theoretic Approach (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:69:y:1996:i:1:p:1-23)
by Morris, Stephen - The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:73:y:1997:i:1:p:231-244)
by Dutta, Jayasri & Morris, Stephen - Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:82:y:1998:i:1:p:267-276)
by Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen - Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks (RePEc:eee:moneco:v:54:y:2007:i:8:p:2205-2230)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Morris, Stephen - Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers (RePEc:eee:moneco:v:89:y:2017:i:c:p:71-87)
by Morris, Stephen & Shim, Ilhyock & Shin, Hyun Song - Fiscal stabilization and exchange rate instability : A theoretical approach and some policy conclusions using Mexican data (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:42:y:1990:i:3:p:329-356)
by Feltenstein, Andrew & Morris, Stephen - Coordination, timing and common knowledge (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:68:y:2014:i:4:p:306-314)
by Morris, Stephen - Laws and authority (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:1:p:32-42)
by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew - Does one Soros make a difference? A theory of currency crises with large and small traders (RePEc:ehl:lserod:25045)
by Corsetti, Giancarlo & Dasgupta, Amil & Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song - Coordination risk and the price of debt (RePEc:ehl:lserod:25046)
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song - Unknown item RePEc:ehl:lserod:4804 (paper)
- Coordinating Expectations in Monetary Policy (RePEc:elg:eechap:13295_5)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (RePEc:esx:essedp:8873)
by Bhaskar, V & Mailath, George & Morris, Stephen - Informational events that trigger currency attacks (RePEc:fip:fedpwp:95-24)
by Stephen D. Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Speculative investor behavior and learning (RePEc:fip:fedpwp:96-5)
by Stephen D. Morris - Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders (RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp372)
by Hyun Song Shin & Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris - Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt (RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp373)
by Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris - Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (RePEc:fth:aunaec:349)
by Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S. - Price Bubbles and Learning (RePEc:fth:cambri:191)
by Morris, S. - Trade and Almost Common Knowledge (RePEc:fth:cambri:194)
by Morris, S. - Interim Rationalizability (RePEc:fth:harver:2064)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Topologies on Types (RePEc:fth:harver:2093)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information (Reprint 042) (RePEc:fth:pennfi:16-92)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited (RePEc:fth:yalegr:987r)
by Morris, S. - Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoff (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00813054)
by Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux - Rationalizable Implementation (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00654687)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux - Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoff (RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-00813054)
by Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux - Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoff (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00813054)
by Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux - Rationalizable Implementation (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00654687)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux - Topologies on Types (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3160489)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen - Interim Correlated Rationalizability (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196333)
by Morris, Stephen & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew - Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (RePEc:isu:genres:11920)
by Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady - Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (RePEc:isu:genstf:200301010800001098)
by Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady - Liquidity Black Holes (RePEc:kap:eurfin:v:8:y:2004:i:1:p:1-18)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Risk, uncertainty and hidden information (RePEc:kap:theord:v:42:y:1997:i:3:p:235-269)
by Stephen Morris - Notes on Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1007)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling (RePEc:nbr:nberch:11056)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design (RePEc:now:fntmic:0700000057)
by Bergemann & Morris - Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:nuf:econwp:126)
by Morris, S & Song Shin, H - A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks (RePEc:nuf:econwp:149)
by Morris, S. & Shin, H.S. - Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1193)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1197)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1209)
by Stephen Morris - Coordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1301)
by Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris - Inspiring Regime Change (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:21:y:2023:i:6:p:2635-2681.)
by Stephen Morris & Mehdi Shadmehr - Risk Management with Interdependent Choice (RePEc:oup:oxford:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:52-62)
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song - Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game (RePEc:oup:oxford:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:433-445)
by Stephen Morris - Communication and Monetary Policy (RePEc:oup:oxford:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:495-503)
by Jeffery D. Amato & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:111:y:1996:i:4:p:1111-1133.)
by Stephen Morris - Contagion (RePEc:oup:restud:v:67:y:2000:i:1:p:57-78.)
by Stephen Morris - Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders (RePEc:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:1:p:87-113)
by Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms (RePEc:oup:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:4:p:1175-1204)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super- (RePEc:oup:restud:v:80:y:2013:i:3:p:925-948)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice
[Dynamic Global Games of Regime change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks] (RePEc:oup:restud:v:89:y:2022:i:5:p:2687-2722.)
by Stephen Morris & Ming Yang - Liquidity Black Holes (RePEc:oup:revfin:v:8:y:2004:i:1:p:1-18.)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:19:y:2006:i:3:p:719-752)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (RePEc:pen:papers:04-004)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:pen:papers:04-033)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:pen:papers:05-014)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:07-024)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games (RePEc:pen:papers:09-029)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory (RePEc:pen:papers:12-003)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games (RePEc:pen:papers:12-043)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Laws and Authority (RePEc:pen:papers:16-018)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:pri:metric:023_2011)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:pri:metric:023-2011)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:pri:metric:024_2011)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (RePEc:pri:metric:054-2013)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction (RePEc:pri:metric:055-2013)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge (RePEc:pri:metric:061-2014)
by Stephen Morris - Common Belief Foundations of Global Games (RePEc:pri:metric:069_2015)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin & Muhamet Yildiz - Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach (RePEc:pri:metric:075_2016)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion And Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (RePEc:pri:metric:076_2016)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States (RePEc:pri:metric:079_2016)
by Stephen Morris & Ming Yang - Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk (RePEc:pri:metric:081_2016)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Laws and Authority (RePEc:pri:metric:082_2016)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks (RePEc:pri:metric:083_2016)
by Stephen Morris & Muhamet Yildiz - Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design (RePEc:pri:metric:084_2016)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (RePEc:pri:metric:085_2016)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (RePEc:pri:metric:086_2016)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Coordination and Continuous Choice (RePEc:pri:metric:087_2017)
by Stephen Morris & Ming Yang - Information Design: A Unified Perspective (RePEc:pri:metric:089_2017)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Contagious Adverse Selection (RePEc:pri:metric:fi001.pdf)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - The Robustness of Robust Implementation (RePEc:pri:metric:me001.pdf)
by Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Stephen Morris - Contagious Adverse Selection - Revised November, 2010 (RePEc:pri:metric:wp001_r11_2010.pdf)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (RePEc:pri:metric:wp008.pdf)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited (RePEc:pri:metric:wp010.pdf)
by Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (RePEc:pri:metric:wp011_2011.pdf)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs (RePEc:pri:metric:wp017_2011_morris_takahashi_tercieux.pdf)
by Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux - Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction (RePEc:pri:metric:wp020_2011_bergemann_morris.pdf)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:pri:metric:wp023_2011-revised.pdf)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types (RePEc:pri:metric:wp030_2012_bergemann_morris_takahashi.pdf)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory (RePEc:pri:metric:wp031_2012_bhaskar_mailath_morris.pdf)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Games in Preference Form and Preference Rationalizability (RePEc:pri:metric:wp043_2012_morris_takahashi.pdf)
by Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi - The Limits of Price Discrimination (RePEc:pri:metric:wp052_2013_bergemann_brooks_morris_the-limits-of-price-discrimination.pdf)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:red:issued:07-130)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:red:sed005:25)
by Stephen Morris & George J Mailath - Higher Order Expectations (RePEc:red:sedpln:2005-1)
by Stephen Morris - Game Theory Models in Finance (RePEc:spr:isochp:978-1-4614-7095-3_2)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris - Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey (RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:71:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s42973-019-00006-x)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs” (RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:71:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s42973-019-00007-w)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Correction to: Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey (RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:71:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s42973-020-00038-8)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Correction to: Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs” (RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:71:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s42973-020-00039-7)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Strict robustness to incomplete information (RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:74:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s42973-023-00136-3)
by Stephen Morris & Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi - Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:6:y:1995:i:3:p:453-467)
by Hyun Song Shin & Andrew Postlewaite & Stephen Morris - Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:6:y:1995:i:3:p:453-67)
by Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew & Shin, Hyun Song - The rationality and efficacy of decisions under uncertainty and the value of an experiment (*) (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:309-324)
by Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris - Approximate common knowledge revisited (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:385-408)
by Stephen Morris - Interim correlated rationalizability (RePEc:the:publsh:140)
by , & , & , - Topologies on types (RePEc:the:publsh:141)
by , & , & , - Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring (RePEc:the:publsh:167)
by , J. & , - Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games (RePEc:the:publsh:1808)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen - Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model (RePEc:the:publsh:3797)
by Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen - Robust virtual implementation (RePEc:the:publsh:453)
by , & , - Optimal Communication (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:2-3:p:594-602)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:2-3:p:551-559)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Search, Information, and Prices (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/714443)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:6:p:1210-35)
by Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen - Political Correctness (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:2:p:231-265)
by Stephen Morris - Notes on "Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs" (RePEc:upd:utmpwp:006)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - Incomplete Information Robustness (RePEc:upd:utmpwp:019)
by Takashi Ui & Stephen Morris - Fiscal stabilization and exchange rate instability (RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:74)
by Feltenstein, Andrew & Morris, Stephen - First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i::p:107-143)
by Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris - Illiquidity Component Of Credit Risk – The 2015 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:57:y:2016:i:4:p:1135-1148)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - "The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-03)
by Jayasri Dutta & Stephen Morris - "Justifying Rational Expectations'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-04)
by Stephen Morris - "Co-operation and Timing'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-05)
by Stephen Morris - "Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-13)
by Stephen Morris - "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-18)
by Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris - "Policy Persistence '' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-19)
by Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris - "Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:96-06)
by Stephen Morris - "Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:96-07)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - "Contagion'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-01)
by Stephen Morrs - "Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-02)
by Stephen Morris - Policy Persistence (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-2)
by Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris - Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-8)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:98-07)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:99-09)
by George Mailath & Stephen Morris - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:wop:pennca:almost-pub)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (RePEc:wop:pennca:imp-mon)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale (RePEc:wop:pennin:03-06)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Finance Applications of Game Theory (RePEc:wop:pennin:98-23)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris - Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction, and Random Matching (RePEc:wop:safire:97-08-072e)
by Stephen Morris - Robust Mechanism Design:The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs (RePEc:wsi:wsbook:8318)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0001)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Mechanism Design (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0002)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Ex Post Implementation (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0003)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0004)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0005)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0006)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0007)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Robust Virtual Implementation (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0008)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris - Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0009)
by Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris - The Robustness of Robust Implementation (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0010)
by Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Stephen Morris - Rationalizable Implementation (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0011)
by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux - Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work? (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm339)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm340)
by Stephen Morris - Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm341)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Communication and Monetary Policy (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm345)
by Stephen Morris & Jeffery D. Amato & Hyun Song Shin - Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm346)
by Stephen Morris & Franklin Allen & Hyun Song Shin - Robust Mechanism Design (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm380)
by Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann - Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm387)
by Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang - Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm424)
by Stephen Morris & Bernardo Guimaraes - Liquidity Black Holes (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm425)
by Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - Welfare effects of public information (RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:4143)
by Shin, Hyun Song & Morris, Stephen