Evgenia Motchenkova
Names
first: |
Evgenia |
last: |
Motchenkova |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
/ School of Business and Economics
/ Afdeling Economie (weight: 50%)
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Universiteit van Tilburg
/ Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- How Do Start‐up Acquisitions Affect the Direction of Innovation? (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:72:y:2024:i:1:p:118-156)
by Esmée S. R. Dijk & José L. Moraga‐González & Evgenia Motchenkova - Mergers and innovation portfolios (RePEc:bla:randje:v:53:y:2022:i:4:p:641-677)
by José Luis Moraga‐González & Evgenia Motchenkova & Saish Nevrekar - Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:120:y:2018:i:3:p:859-893)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen - The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:15:y:2015:i:2:p:351-389:n:4)
by Houba Harold & Motchenkova Evgenia & Wen Quan - Mergers and Innovation Portfolios (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14188)
by Moraga-González, José-Luis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Nevrekar, Saish - How Do Start-up Acquisitions Affect the Direction of Innovation? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16362)
by Moraga-González, José-Luis & Dijk, Esmée & Motchenkova, Evgenia - Start-up Acquisitions and the Entrant’s and Incumbent’s Innovation Portfolios (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18309)
by Dijk, Esmée & Moraga-González, José-Luis & Motchenkova, Evgenia - Antitrust enforcement with price-dependent fines and detection probabilities (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00308)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen - Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge (RePEc:edn:sirdps:603)
by Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David - Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:1:p:39-42)
by Houba, Harold & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Wen, Quan - Endogenous personalized pricing in the Hotelling model (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:225:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523000629)
by Houba, Harold & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Wang, Hui - Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:189:y:2008:i:1:p:269-291)
by Motchenkova, Evgenia - Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:42:y:2015:i:c:p:70-80)
by Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David - Combining cartel penalties and private damage actions: The impact on cartel prices (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:73:y:2020:i:c:s0167718720300266)
by Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David - Relationship between FDI, foreign ownership restrictions, and technology transfer in the resources sector: A derivation approach (RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:320-326)
by Ghebrihiwet, Nahom & Motchenkova, Evgenia - Penalising on the Basis of the Severity of the Offence: A Sophisticated Revenue-Based Cartel Penalty (RePEc:kap:revind:v:57:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09738-x)
by Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph - Market Dominance And Search Quality In The Search Engine Market (RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:419-455.)
by Ioannis Lianos & Evgenia Motchenkova - Analysis of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Laws (RePEc:pra:mprapa:17227)
by Kort, P. M. & Motchenkova, E. - Market structure and hospital–insurer bargaining in the Netherlands (RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:12:y:2011:i:6:p:589-603)
by R. Halbersma & M. Mikkers & E. Motchenkova & I. Seinen - Strictness of leniency programs and asymmetric punishment effect (RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:58:y:2011:i:4:p:401-431)
by Evgenia Motchenkova & Rob Laan - Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00695-z)
by Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova - Analysis of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Laws (RePEc:spr:joptap:v:128:y:2006:i:2:d:10.1007_s10957-006-9024-9)
by E. Motchenkova & P. M. Kort - Cost minimizing sequential punishment policies for repeat offenders (RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:5:p:360-365)
by Evgenia Motchenkova - Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080120)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen - The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090081)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen - Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100047)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen - Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110166)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen - Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120139)
by Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova - Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130178)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen - Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140129)
by Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph - The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140146)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen - Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160002)
by Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph - Penalising on the basis of the severity of the offence: A sophisticated revenue-based cartel penalty (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170120)
by Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia (E.) Motchenkova & David Ulph - Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190070)
by Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova - Mergers and Innovation Portfolios (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190085)
by José Luis Moraga-González & Evgenia Motchenkova & Saish Nevrekar - Personalized Pricing, Competition and Welfare (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220020)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Hui Wang - Start-up Acquisitions and the Entrant’s and Incumbent’s Innovation Portfolios (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20230047)
by Esmée Dijk & José Luis Moraga-González & Evgenia Motchenkova - Determination of Optimal Penalties for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:4617e8d9-c554-4d8c-978b-bc79ddd5c619)
by Motchenkova, E. - Strictness of Leniency Programs and Cartels of Asymmetric Firms (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:90dd8ebe-c992-44b4-bc5d-27891cec3389)
by Motchenkova, E. & Laan, R. - Analysis of the Properties of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Law (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:c0c7cecb-9ea8-4f70-86f7-185a8f76c518)
by Motchenkova, E. & Kort, P.M. - Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d6321c1e-b79a-4aae-8ef5-d1d6f24d9403)
by Motchenkova, E. - Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining in the Netherlands (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:055ce443-750b-410f-acc0-00f6d4f6e6fe)
by Halbersma, R.S. & Mikkers, M.C. & Motchenkova, E. & Seinen, I. - Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:20443b22-326b-4ff4-b785-014681a0fda3)
by Motchenkova, E. - Market dominance and quality of search results in the search engine market (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:6c5d3559-aec4-4529-87c4-18571dd37bbc)
by Lianos, I. & Motchenkova, E. - To Protect in Order to Serve : Adverse Effects of Leniency Programs in View of Industry Asymmetry (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:cdc81d9b-34c3-4e1c-85b8-185a01ab0d0b)
by Leliefeld, D. & Motchenkova, E. - Determination of Optimal Penalities for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:ebc993e1-9181-41e0-8d5c-d8993da06433)
by Motchenkova, E. - Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:fb7d2b93-728f-4398-94e3-4a8893af0fd3)
by Funaki, Y. & Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E. - Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining in the Netherlands (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:055ce443-750b-410f-acc0-00f6d4f6e6fe)
by Halbersma, R.S. & Mikkers, M.C. & Motchenkova, E. & Seinen, I. - Analysis of current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust laws (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0cbc7914-8fbb-40f5-8feb-cd9ce3cbb28d)
by Motchenkova, E. & Kort, P.M. - Optimal enforcement of competition law (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:1e37f346-d6d7-453d-beb6-8f4a0c492c4e)
by Motchenkova, E. - Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:20443b22-326b-4ff4-b785-014681a0fda3)
by Motchenkova, E. - Determination of Optimal Penalties for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:4617e8d9-c554-4d8c-978b-bc79ddd5c619)
by Motchenkova, E. - Strictness of Leniency Programs and Cartels of Asymmetric Firms (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:90dd8ebe-c992-44b4-bc5d-27891cec3389)
by Motchenkova, E. & Laan, R. - Analysis of the Properties of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Law (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c0c7cecb-9ea8-4f70-86f7-185a8f76c518)
by Motchenkova, E. & Kort, P.M. - To Protect in Order to Serve : Adverse Effects of Leniency Programs in View of Industry Asymmetry (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:cdc81d9b-34c3-4e1c-85b8-185a01ab0d0b)
by Leliefeld, D. & Motchenkova, E. - Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d6321c1e-b79a-4aae-8ef5-d1d6f24d9403)
by Motchenkova, E. - Determination of Optimal Penalities for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ebc993e1-9181-41e0-8d5c-d8993da06433)
by Motchenkova, E. - Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:fb7d2b93-728f-4398-94e3-4a8893af0fd3)
by Funaki, Y. & Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E. - Adverse Effects Of Corporate Leniency Programs In View Of Industry Asymmetry (RePEc:ush:jaessh:v:5:y:2010:i:2(12)_spring2010:p:104)
by Evgenia MOTCHENKOVA & Daniel LELIEFELD - Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat Offenders (RePEc:vua:wpaper:2006-8)
by Motchenkova, Evgenia - To protect in order to serve, adverse effects of leniency programs in view of industry asymmetry (RePEc:vua:wpaper:2007-2)
by Leliefeld, Daniel & Motchenkova, Evgenia - Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer bargaining in the Netherlands (RePEc:vua:wpaper:2007-4)
by Halbersma, R.S. & Mikkers, M.C. & Motchenkova, E. - Leniency programs in the presence of judicial errors (RePEc:vua:wpaper:2010-8)
by Ghebrihiwet, N. & Motchenkova, E.I. - Research joint ventures and price collusion: Joint analysis of the impact of R&D subsidies and antitrust fines (RePEc:vua:wpaper:2011-25)
by Motchenkova, E.I. & Rus, O. - Measuring the effectiveness of anti‐cartel interventions in the shadow of recidivism (RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:4:p:2393-2407)
by Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph - The Role of Legal Principles in the Economic Analysis of Competition Policy (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814616362_0014)
by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen