Richard P. McLean
Names
| first: |
Richard |
| middle: |
P. |
| last: |
McLean |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Rutgers University-New Brunswick
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities (RePEc:arx:papers:2305.01477)
by Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication (RePEc:arx:papers:2311.12242)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Alternative Methods for Cost Allocation in Stochastic Service Systems (RePEc:bej:issued:v:1:y:1998:i:1:sharkey)
by Richard P. McLean & William W. Sharkey - Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001242)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (RePEc:cla:penntw:7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4e11ae69)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:penntw:b52ac626d6631b39913783700317fc3a)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Aggregation of Expert Opinions (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1503)
by Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Some Relationships Between Discrete and Continuous Models of an Urban Economy (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:540)
by Richard P. McLean & Thomas J. Muench - An Application of the Khachian-Shor Algorithm to a Class of Linear Complementary Problems (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:549)
by Ilan Adler & Richard P. McLean & J. Scott Provan - Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:2:p:345-61)
by Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P - Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:56:y:1988:i:6:p:1247-57)
by Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P - Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:6:p:2421-2453)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:86:y:2005:i:1:p:95-100)
by Campbell, Colin & Carare, Octavian & McLean, Richard P. - Values of non-transferable utility games (RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-55)
by McLean, Richard P. - Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:131-143)
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Weighted coalition structure values (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:3:p:234-249)
by Levy, Anat & Mclean, Richard P. - A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:34-48)
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:222-241)
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:410-433)
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Core convergence with asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:50:y:2005:i:1:p:58-78)
by McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew - Aggregation of expert opinions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:339-371)
by Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew - Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:153:y:2014:i:c:p:191-212)
by McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew - Industry structure with sequential technology choice (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:47:y:1989:i:1:p:1-21)
by McLean, Richard P. & Riordan, Michael H. - Subjective evaluations of n-person games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:2:p:346-361)
by Blair, Douglas H. & McLean, Richard P. - On constrained generalized games with action sets in non-locally-convex and non-Hausdorff topological vector spaces (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:111:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000260)
by Khan, M. Ali & McLean, Richard P. & Uyanik, Metin - Alternative Mothods for Cost Allocation in Stochastic Service Systems (RePEc:fth:bellco:81)
by McLean, R. & Sharkey, W.W. - An Approach to the Pricing of Broadband Telecommunications Services (RePEc:fth:bellco:86)
by McLean, R.P. & Sharkey, W.W. - The Compromise Value for NTU-Games (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9218)
by Borm, P. & Keiding, H. & McLean, R.P. - Informational Size and Efficient Auctions (RePEc:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:3:p:809-827)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty (RePEc:pen:papers:03-003)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size and Efficient Auctions (RePEc:pen:papers:03-011)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:pen:papers:03-027)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies (RePEc:pen:papers:04-040)
by Richard McLean & James Peck & Andrew Postlewaite - Aggregation of Expert Opinions (RePEc:pen:papers:05-016)
by Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (RePEc:pen:papers:05-024)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (RePEc:pen:papers:06-007)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:11-029)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-005)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational size and two-stage mechanisms (RePEc:pen:papers:15-011)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - A Dynamic Non-direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdependent Value Problems, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:15-023)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - A Very Robust Auction Mechanism (RePEc:pen:papers:18-001)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication (RePEc:pen:papers:23-018)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games (RePEc:rut:rutres:201125)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement (RePEc:rut:rutres:201128)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement (RePEc:rut:rutres:201206)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - On Equilibrium Refinement in Supermodular Games (RePEc:rut:rutres:201207)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games (RePEc:rut:rutres:201402)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games (RePEc:rut:rutres:201513)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:1:p:1-26)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - Nash and Bayes–Nash equilibria in strategic-form games with intransitivities (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:68:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1151-7)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard P. McLean - An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:78:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-023-01538-5)
by Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - An Axiomatization of the Weighted NTU Value (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1991:i:4:p:339-51)
by Levy, Anat & McLean, Richard P - Random Order Coalition Structure Values (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1991:i:2:p:109-27)
by McLean, Richard P - The Compromise Value for NTU-Games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:2:p:175-89)
by Borm, Peter & Keiding, H & McLean, R.P. & Oortwijn, S & Tijs, S - Weighted Aumann-Shapley pricing (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:4:p:511-523)
by William W. Sharkey & Richard P. McLean - Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:3:p:427-448)
by M. Voorneveld & A. Nouweland & R. McLean - On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:4:p:869-890)
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:65-78)
by John P. Conley & Simon Wilkie & Richard P. McLean - On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies (RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-27192-5_6)
by Richard McLean & James Peck & Andrew Postlewaite - Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games (RePEc:the:publsh:1178)
by , & , P. - The compromise value for NTU-games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:8385282a-94b7-4399-9b2e-97e1a6d77054)
by Borm, P.E.M. & Keiding, H. & McLean, R.P. & Oortwijn, S. & Tijs, S.H. - The compromise value for NTU-games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:27c574e5-d810-484c-a668-367d7b6c0746)
by Borm, P.E.M. & Keiding, H. & McLean, R.P. & Oortwijn, S. & Tijs, S.H. - The compromise value for NTU-games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:8385282a-94b7-4399-9b2e-97e1a6d77054)
by Borm, P.E.M. & Keiding, H. & McLean, R.P. & Oortwijn, S. & Tijs, S.H. - The compromise value for NTU-games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:cb1df340-6f44-4cb5-ae3b-44925ac81af5)
by Borm, P.E.M. & Keiding, H. & McLean, R.P. & Oortwijn, S. & Tijs, S.H. - Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (RePEc:wop:pennca:99-14)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite