Leslie Marx
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author of:
- Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:3:p:796-801)
by Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer - The Economics of Contingent Re-auctions (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:165-93)
by Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx - Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:3:p:205-40)
by Leslie M. Marx & Claudio Mezzetti & Robert C. Marshall - A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:53:y:2015:i:4:p:857-97)
by Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Tom Wilkening - Mix‐and‐match divestitures and merger harm (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:70:y:2019:i:3:p:346-366)
by Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx - Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf Space (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:575-603)
by Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer - Payments for Order Flow on Nasdaq (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:54:y:1999:i:1:p:35-66)
by Eugene Kandel & Leslie M. Marx - Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets (RePEc:bla:randje:v:38:y:2007:i:3:p:823-843)
by Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer - Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.5:y:2005:i:1:n:4)
by Lopomo Giuseppe & Marshall Robert C. & Marx Leslie M - Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project (RePEc:cla:penntw:6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b3a2d69d)
by Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews - Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S (RePEc:duk:dukeec:10-64)
by David McAdams & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Brian Murray - Bidder Collusion (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:108)
by Leslie M. Marx & Robert C. Marshall - The joint determination of leverage and maturity (RePEc:eee:corfin:v:9:y:2003:i:2:p:149-167)
by Barclay, Michael J. & Marx, Leslie M. & Smith, Clifford Jr. - Defending against potential collusion by your suppliers—26th Colin Clark Memorial Lecture (RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:53:y:2017:i:c:p:123-128)
by Marx, Leslie M. - Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:219-245)
by Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M. - Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:253-278)
by Marx, Leslie M. - Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:2:p:324-329)
by Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M. - The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction (RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:101-114)
by Brusco, Sandro & Lopomo, Giuseppe & Marx, Leslie M. - Opportunism and menus of two-part tariffs (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:22:y:2004:i:10:p:1399-1414)
by Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg - Rent shifting and the order of negotiations (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:25:y:2007:i:5:p:1109-1125)
by Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg - Cartel price announcements: The vitamins industry (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:26:y:2008:i:3:p:762-802)
by Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. & Raiff, Matthew E. - Break-up fees and bargaining power in sequential contracting (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:5:p:451-463)
by Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg - Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:39:y:2015:i:c:p:71-80)
by Kumar, Vikram & Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. & Samkharadze, Lily - Club good intermediaries (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:430-459)
by Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. - Auctions with bid credits and resale (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:55:y:2017:i:c:p:58-90)
by Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. - Individual accountability in teams (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:72:y:2009:i:1:p:260-273)
by Marx, Leslie M. & Squintani, Francesco - Bidder collusion (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:374-402)
by Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. - Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:416-454)
by Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. & Wilkening, Tom - Nasdaq market structure and spread patterns (RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:45:y:1997:i:1:p:61-89)
by Kandel, Eugene & Marx, Leslie M. - Odd-eighth avoidance as a defense against SOES bandits (RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:51:y:1999:i:1:p:85-102)
by Kandel, Eugene & M. Marx, Leslie - The Effects of Transaction Costs on Stock Prices and Trading Volume (RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:7:y:1998:i:2:p:130-150)
by Barclay, Michael J. & Kandel, Eugene & Marx, Leslie M. - Process Variation as a Determinant of Bank Performance Evidence from the Retail Banking Study (RePEc:fth:robuom:98-01)
by Frei, F.X. & Kalakota, R. & Marx, L.M. - Exploring Relations Between Decision Analysis and Game Theory (RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:4:y:2007:i:1:p:32-40)
by Jules H. van Binsbergen & Leslie M. Marx - Process Variation as a Determinant of Bank Performance: Evidence from the Retail Banking Study (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:45:y:1999:i:9:p:1210-1220)
by Frances X. Frei & Ravi Kalakota & Andrew J. Leone & Leslie M. Marx - Economics at the Federal Communications Commission (RePEc:kap:revind:v:29:y:2006:i:4:p:349-368)
by Leslie Marx - Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (RePEc:kap:revind:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:39-56)
by Wayne-Roy Gayle & Robert Marshall & Leslie Marx & Jean-François Richard - An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses (RePEc:kap:revind:v:45:y:2014:i:3:p:245-273)
by Simon Loertscher & Leslie Marx - The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262017326)
by Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. - The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262525941)
by Marhsall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. - Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1040)
by Leslie McFarland-Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels - Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1066)
by Leslie M. Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels - Monotonicity of Solution Sets for Parameterized Optimization Problems (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1067)
by Leslie M. Marx - Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1188)
by Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews - The Economics of Contingent Re-Auctions (RePEc:nys:sunysb:08-02)
by Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx - The `Google Effect' in the FCC's 700 MHz Auction (RePEc:nys:sunysb:08-03)
by Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx - The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:124:y:2009:i:2:p:883-910.)
by Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx - Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States (RePEc:oup:renvpo:v:5:y:2011:i:1:p:25-43)
by Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx & David McAdams & Brian Murray - Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project (RePEc:oup:restud:v:67:y:2000:i:2:p:327-358.)
by Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews - Predatory Accommodation: Below-Cost Pricing without Exclusion in Intermediate Goods Markets (RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:spring:p:22-43)
by Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer - Individual Accountability in Teams (RePEc:roc:rocher:494)
by Leslie M. Marx & Francesco Squintani - Bidder collusion at first-price auctions (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:3:p:177-211)
by Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Peng Sun - Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:371-387)
by Leslie M. Marx - Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/702173)
by Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx - Adverse Specialization (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:4:p:864-899)
by Glenn MacDonald & Leslie M. Marx - "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:99-01)
by Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews - Process Variation as a Determinant of Service Quality and Bank Performance: Evidence from the Retail Banking Study (RePEc:wop:pennin:97-36)
by Frances X. Frei & Ravi Kalakota & Leslie M. Marx