Michael Manove
Names
| first: |
Michael |
| last: |
Manove |
Identifer
Contact
| homepage: |
http://sites.bu.edu/manove/ |
|
| phone: |
1-617-353-3299 |
| postal address: |
Department of Economics
Boston University
270 Bay State Road
Boston MA 02215
USA |
Affiliations
-
Boston University
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Wage announcements with a continuum of worker type (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:71-72:p:189-219)
by Kevin Lang & Michael Manove - Education and Labor Market Discrimination (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:4:p:1467-96)
by Kevin Lang & Michael Manove - A Model of Soviet-Type Economic Planning (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:61:y:1971:i:3:p:390-406)
by Manove, Michael - A Model of Soviet-Type Economic Planning: Reply (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:62:y:1972:i:4:p:689-91)
by Manove, Michael - Racial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:1327-1340)
by Kevin Lang & Michael Manove & William T. Dickens - Entrepreneurs, Optimism, and the Competitive Edge (RePEc:aub:autbar:296.95)
by Manove, M. - Racial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers (RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-145)
by Kevin Lang & Michael Manove & William T. Dickens - Network Size and Network Capture (RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-007)
by Gerard Llobet & Michael Manove - Education and Labor-Market Discrimination (RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-008)
by Kevin Lang & Michael Manove - Banking (conservatively) with Optimists (RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp1997_9718)
by Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla - Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks (RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp1998_9807)
by Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano - Network Size and Network Capture (RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2006_0604)
by Gerard Llobet & Michael Manove - Banking (Conservatively) With Optimists (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1918)
by Manove, Michael & Padilla, Atilano Jorge - Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model Of Lazy Banks (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2439)
by Manove, Michael & Padilla, Atilano Jorge & Pagano, Marco - I Waive My Right To Read This Recommendation: A Theoretical Analysis of the Buckley Amendment (RePEc:cvs:starer:79-03)
by Manove, M. & Ordover, Janusz A. - Job Responsibility, Pay and Promotion (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:107:y:1997:i:440:p:85-103)
by Manove, Michael - Non-Price Rationing of Intermediate Goods in Centrally Planned Economies (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:41:y:1973:i:5:p:829-52)
by Manove, Michael - Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:6:p:1313-39)
by Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael - Aggregation for material balances (RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:2:y:1978:i:1:p:1-11)
by Manove, Michael & Weitzman, Martin L. - Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control (RePEc:fth:bostin:0007)
by Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Manove - Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists (RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9718)
by Manove, M. & Padilla, A.J. - Collateral vs. Project Screening: a Model of Lazy Banks (RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9807)
by Manove, M. & Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M. - Education and Labor-Market Discrimination (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12257)
by Kevin Lang & Michael Manove - The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:104:y:1989:i:4:p:823-845.)
by Michael Manove - Soviet Pricing, Profits and Technological Choice (RePEc:oup:restud:v:43:y:1976:i:3:p:413-421.)
by Michael Manove - Sequential Innovation, Network Effects and the Choice of Compatibility (RePEc:red:sed004:721)
by Michael Manove & Gerard Llobet - Provider Insurance (RePEc:rje:bellje:v:14:y:1983:i:autumn:p:489-496)
by Michael Manove - Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists (RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:summer:p:324-350)
by Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla - Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks (RePEc:rje:randje:v:32:y:2001:i:4:p:726-44)
by Manove, Michael & Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco - Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks (RePEc:sef:csefwp:10)
by Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano