Lucas Jóver Maestri

Names

Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) / EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:3:p:34-56)
  by Lucas Maestri
• Banning Information As A Redistributive Device (RePEc:anp:en2004:046)
  by Daniel Gottlieb & Lucas Maestri
• The Interaction Between Unemployment Insurance And Human Capital Policies (RePEc:anp:en2005:089)
  by Carlos E. da Costa & Lucas Maestri
• A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing (RePEc:cca:wpaper:115)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (RePEc:cca:wpaper:151)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons (RePEc:cca:wpaper:312)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect (RePEc:cca:wpaper:401)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (RePEc:cca:wpaper:453)
  by Braz Camargo & Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000117)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000923)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing (RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000076)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10036)
  by Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas & Garrett, Daniel
• A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1680)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1760)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1760r)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• The risk properties of human capital and the design of government policies (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:3:p:695-713)
  by da Costa, Carlos E. & Maestri, Lucas J.
• The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:412-418)
  by Maestri, Lucas
• Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:145-169)
  by Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas
• The role of commitment in bilateral trade (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:578-603)
  by Gerardi, Dino & Hörner, Johannes & Maestri, Lucas
• Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:171:y:2017:i:c:p:136-173)
  by Maestri, Lucas
• Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning (RePEc:ehl:lserod:102229)
  by Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas
• The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies (RePEc:fgv:epgewp:554)
  by Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Maestri, Lucas Jóver
• Banning information as a redistributive device (RePEc:fgv:epgewp:555)
  by Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas Jóver
• The interaction between unemployment insurance and human capital policies (RePEc:fgv:epgewp:595)
  by Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Maestri, Lucas Jóver
• Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets (RePEc:fgv:epgewp:775)
  by Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Maestri, Lucas Jóver
• Efficiency in Decentralised Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:626:p:446-461.)
  by Braz Camargo & Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information (RePEc:oup:restud:v:86:y:2019:i:4:p:1590-1630.)
  by Daniel F Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri
• Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (RePEc:red:sed016:103)
  by Lucas Maestri & Dino Gerardi & Braz Camargo
• Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:68:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1147-3)
  by Carlos E. da Costa & Lucas J. Maestri
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect (RePEc:the:publsh:2449)
  by Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing (RePEc:the:publsh:914)
  by , & ,