Lucas Jóver Maestri

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Affiliations

• Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) / EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Learning from Manipulable Signals (repec:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:12:p:3995-4040)
  by Mehmet Ekmekci & Leandro Gorno & Lucas Maestri & Jian Sun & Dong Wei
• Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons (repec:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:5:p:1591-1620)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzón
• Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations (repec:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:3:p:34-56)
  by Lucas Maestri
• Banning Information As A Redistributive Device (repec:anp:en2004:046)
  by Daniel Gottlieb & Lucas Maestri
• The Interaction Between Unemployment Insurance And Human Capital Policies (repec:anp:en2005:089)
  by Carlos E. da Costa & Lucas Maestri
• Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons (repec:aoz:wpaper:111)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzón
• Delegation with Endogenous States (repec:aoz:wpaper:309)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzón
• Learning from Manipulable Signals (repec:arx:papers:2007.08762)
  by Mehmet Ekmekci & Leandro Gorno & Lucas Maestri & Jian Sun & Dong Wei
• Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents (repec:arx:papers:2405.04468)
  by Mehmet Ekmekci & Lucas Maestri & Dong Wei
• A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing (repec:cca:wpaper:115)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (repec:cca:wpaper:151)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons (repec:cca:wpaper:312)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect (repec:cca:wpaper:401)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (repec:cca:wpaper:453)
  by Braz Camargo & Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Delegation with Endogenous States (repec:cca:wpaper:711)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzon
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (repec:cla:levarc:661465000000000117)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000923)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing (repec:cla:levarc:814577000000000076)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information (repec:cpr:ceprdp:10036)
  by Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas & Garrett, Daniel
• Bargaining over a divisible good in the market for lemons (repec:cpr:ceprdp:14920)
  by Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas & Monzon, Ignacio
• Nonlinear Pricing in Oligopoly: How Brand Preferences Shape Market Outcomes (repec:cpr:ceprdp:15253)
  by Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie
• Delegation with Endogenous States (repec:cpr:ceprdp:18885)
  by Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas & Monzon, Ignacio
• A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing (repec:cwl:cwldpp:1680)
  by Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (repec:cwl:cwldpp:1760)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade (repec:cwl:cwldpp:1760r)
  by Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri
• The risk properties of human capital and the design of government policies (repec:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:3:p:695-713)
  by da Costa, Carlos E. & Maestri, Lucas J.
• The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations (repec:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:412-418)
  by Maestri, Lucas
• Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning (repec:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:145-169)
  by Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas
• Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination (repec:eee:indorg:v:79:y:2021:i:c:s016771872100028x)
  by Garrett, Daniel & Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas
• The role of commitment in bilateral trade (repec:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:578-603)
  by Gerardi, Dino & Hörner, Johannes & Maestri, Lucas
• Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation (repec:eee:jetheo:v:171:y:2017:i:c:p:136-173)
  by Maestri, Lucas
• Redistribution with labor market frictions (repec:eee:jetheo:v:201:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000102)
  by da Costa, Carlos E. & Maestri, Lucas J. & Santos, Marcelo R.
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games (repec:eee:jetheo:v:205:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122001314)
  by Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas
• Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning (repec:ehl:lserod:102229)
  by Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas
• The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies (repec:fgv:epgewp:554)
  by Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Maestri, Lucas Jóver
• Banning information as a redistributive device (repec:fgv:epgewp:555)
  by Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas Jóver
• The interaction between unemployment insurance and human capital policies (repec:fgv:epgewp:595)
  by Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Maestri, Lucas Jóver
• Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets (repec:fgv:epgewp:775)
  by Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Maestri, Lucas Jóver
• Redistribution with labor market frictions (repec:fgv:epgewp:826)
  by Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Maestri, Lucas Jóver & Santos, Marcelo Rodrigues dos
• Oligopoly under incomplete information: on the welfare effects of price discrimination (repec:hal:journl:hal-03515749)
  by Daniel F. Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri
• Nonlinear Pricing in Oligopoly: How Brand Preferences Shape Market Outcomes (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03629496)
  by Renato Gomes & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Lucas Maestri
• Oligopoly under incomplete information: on the welfare effects of price discrimination (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03629517)
  by Daniel F. Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri
• Job Quality, Search, and Optimal Unemployment Contracts (repec:idb:brikps:13974)
  by Da Costa, Carlos & Maestri, Lucas & Santos, Cezar
• Efficiency in Decentralised Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (repec:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:626:p:446-461.)
  by Braz Camargo & Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri
• Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information (repec:oup:restud:v:86:y:2019:i:4:p:1590-1630.)
  by Daniel F Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri
• Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions (repec:pra:mprapa:100885)
  by Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas
• Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (repec:red:sed016:103)
  by Lucas Maestri & Dino Gerardi & Braz Camargo
• Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets (repec:spr:joecth:v:68:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1147-3)
  by Carlos E. da Costa & Lucas J. Maestri
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect (repec:the:publsh:2449)
  by Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing (repec:the:publsh:914)
  by , & ,
• Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination (repec:tse:wpaper:126354)
  by Garrett, Daniel F. & Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas
• Nonlinear Pricing in Oligopoly: How Brand Preferences Shape Market Outcomes (repec:tse:wpaper:126836)
  by Gomes, Renato & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Maestri, Lucas